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This dissertation examines how Greek authors from the fifth to the second century 
BCE employed the concept of pleonexia to explain why cities lost power on the 
international stage and why they lost internal cohesion.  First, it argues that Greek authors 
understood pleonexia to mean “the desire for more at the expense of another” as opposed 
simply “greed” as most modern authors translate it.  Second, it contends that Greeks 
authors deployed the concept of pleonexia to describe situations that modern authors 
would describe as societal collapse—defined as the reduction of societal complexity, 
which can be measured through either the loss of material or immaterial means, e.g., 
land, wealth, political power, influence over others, political stability, or political 
autonomy.  Greek authors used the language of pleonexia to characterize the motivation 
of an entity, either an individual within a community or a city or state, to act in a way that 
empowered the entity by taking or somehow depriving another similar entity of wealth, 





through discrediting, prosecuting, or eliminating rivals.  In international affairs, it 
materialized as attempts of a power to gain more territory or influence over others.  
Acting on such an impulse led to conflict within cities and in the international arena.  The 
inevitable result of such conflict was the pleonexic power losing more than it had had 
before.  The Greeks, thus, had a theory that acting on pleonexia led to a reduction in 
societal complexity.  Tracing this paradigm in over two hundred years of Greek writing 
further demonstrates continuity in Greek thought across the Classical and Hellenistic 
cultural boundaries imposed by modern writers.  The dissertation thus argues that Greek 
authors used pleonexia to construct a psychological model of decline that persisted for 
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Conceptualizing Pleonexia, Decline, and Determining Continuity 
 
  
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine a concept of decline, centered on 
pleonexia, found in Greek thought from the fifth century BCE to the second century 
BCE.  As early as Hesiod’s Works and Days in the eighth century BCE, there is evidence 
that Greek authors understood that civilizations come and go (WD 109-201).  In the 
introduction to his Histories, Herodotus noted that the fortunes of states rise and fall 
(1.5).  In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides explained the end of the 
Athenian Empire and the cause of civil strife (2.65.11; 3.82).  Writing in the fourth 
century, Plato took change of governments for granted (Rep. 545d).  So did Aristotle 
(Pol. 5.1301a).  Writing in the second century, Polybius attributed the change and decline 
of governments to a natural law (6.57.1).  From Thucydides onward, central to these 
discussions was the phenomenon of individuals or states acting on pleonexia. 
 Though pleonexia is ordinarily translated as greed or advantage, I will argue that 
the best translation of the word group associated with pleonexia (pleonexia, pleonektō, 
and pleon ekhein) is “the desire to gain at the expense of another.”  Greek authors 
perceived it as an urge within individuals not just to gain more of something, such as 
wealth or power, but to do so in a manner that either takes the desired good from another 
or in some way deprives another individual access to it.  Greek authors used the idea of 
individuals acting on pleonexia to explain why cities lost power on the international stage 
and why cities fell into civil strife.  On the international stage, they show how powerful 
cities acting on pleonexia engendered resistance and resentment, and that their efforts to 





In domestic affairs, individuals acting on pleonexia turned the city, and in particular the 
political arena, into a zero-sum game, in which for one faction to prosper another had to 
suffer.  This prevail-or-perish mentality pushed people to perform increasingly radical 
acts to obtain political power, until they resorted to violence.  When violence entered into 
politics, the city had descended from a functioning polity into civil strife, stasis.  It 
stopped being a cohesive political entity and entered into anarchy.  This devolution into 
civil discord could ultimately result in the city’s movement from a more egalitarian form 
of government, in which there was at least a limited form of enfranchisement and order 
was maintained through law, to more authoritarian forms, in which political authority was 
monopolized by a single individual and order was maintained by violence. 
  Fifth century writers started this trend of thought.  In his Histories, Herodotus 
cited pleonexia as one of the causes of Persia’s disastrous campaign against Greece in 
480/79 BCE (7.18.2).  In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides used 
pleonexia to explain how cities fell into civil strife (stasis), and why Athens launched 
such disastrous expeditions as the Sicilian campaign, (3.82.8; 2.65.11; 6.24.3).  Fourth 
century authors continued this practice.  In his Hellenica, Xenophon deployed pleonexia 
to explain the downfall of the Thirty, the oligarchic government that took power in 
Athens after the city lost the Peloponnesian War (2.4.10-38).  He also attributed the end 
of Sparta’s fourth century hegemony over Greece to pleonexia.
1
  In the Republic, Plato 
described how the pleonektēs, the individual acting on pleonexia, caused stasis and 
brought about the downfall of various governments (563e-67e).  Elsewhere, he claimed 
that pleonexia was an illness in society, and he stated that individuals motivated by 
pleonexia caused the end of Atlantis (Crit. 121).  Similarly, Aristotle in his Politics cited 
                                                 
1





pleonexia as a reason for change of governments (1301a).  In their writing, Isocrates and 
Demosthenes railed against cities acting on pleonexia, and they repeatedly cited it as a 
reason for the continual strife that plagued Greece in the fourth century.  Writing in the 
second century BCE, Polybius also used acting on pleonexia to explain the downfall of 
powers on the international stage (15.20.4), and the internal collapse of cities (6.8.4-9.5; 
15.21).  He even cited pleonexia as a reason why the Roman Republic would end (6.57.6-
9). 
 Yet modern classical scholars do not take discussions of decline in Greek authors 
seriously.  Charles Fornara and Frank Walbank do not think that Greek authors had 
systematic understandings of decline that were comparable to the concepts that emerged 
in Roman thought in the first century BCE.
2
  Scholars disparage Greek discussions of 
decline, such as Polybius’ constitutional cycle (anakyklosis), as lacking analytical power 
and presenting decline as part of a biological model of growth and decay that lacked 
specific drivers of decline.
3
  In her Jerome lectures, The Rise and Fall of States 
According to Greek Authors, Jacqueline De Romilly argues that individual Greek 
authors, such as Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius, had a concept of decline that 
shared a similar pattern but that there was only a little continuity among these  authors.  
She insists that the similarities between these authors were due to their shared world 
                                                 
2
 Charles Fornara, The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), 84; Frank Walbank, “The Idea of Decline in Polybius,” in Polybius, Rome, and the 
Hellenistic World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 210. 
 
3
 On scholarly criticism of Polybius’ biological model: David Hahm, “Kings and Constitutions: 
Hellenistic Theories,” in The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Christopher 
Rowe, Malcolm Schofield, Simon Harrison, and Melissa Lane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 466-67.  Hahm also points out that the biological model makes sense because Greek authors 
believed that human nature, being a constant without factors such as education, would follow the same 







view, as opposed to conscious efforts by later authors to incorporate the thoughts of their 
predecessors into their own work.
4
 
Nevertheless, discussions by Greek authors about the loss of political power and 
cohesion due to pleonexia fit the definition of what modern scholars consider to be 
analyses of “societal collapse.”  Modern scholars define collapse as the rapid reversion of 
complex socio-political entities into less complex socio-political structures. They 
determine this reduction in complexity by examining the degree of loss of political 
centralization and cohesion, the degree of social stratification, the extent of controlled 
territory, and the degree of economic integration.
5
  They refer to the disappearance of 
these indicators of complexity as collapse rather than decline because they dislike the 
connotations of decline as somehow moral deterioration, and they seek objective indices 
of change.  The end and collapse of societies also provide more objective material 
evidence than decline.
6
  These scholars view societies as complex systems or machines 
that break down when they are no longer able to deal with crises that confront them.  
Some posit that this breakdown occurs because the society has mismanaged or depleted 
the resources that allowed it to prosper.
7
  Others postulate that societal collapse is the 
result of a political authority concentrating economic resources and political power on 
                                                 
4
 Jacqueline de Romilly, The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1977), 42. 
 
5
 Joseph Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
198), 4; Norman Yoffee, “Orientating Collapse,” in The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, 
Yoffee and Cowgill eds. (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press), 15; Jim A. Railey and Richard Martin 
Reycraft, eds., “Introduction,” in Global Perspectives on the Collapse of Complex Systems, Maxwell 
Museum of Anthropology Anthropological Papers no. 8 (Albuquerque, NM: Maxwell Museum of 
Anthropology, 2008), 1. 
 
6
 Tainter, Collapse of Complex Societies, 85; Yoffee, “Orientating Collapse,” 14. 
 
7
 Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies, 194-6; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great 






itself, which causes internal unrest.
8
  This school of thought is similar to Greek 
discussions of decline, but it is in the minority in regard to modern explanations. 
While these discussions of collapse may offer the best modern theoretical 
framework for discussing situations in which a city or state loses power, I retain the word 
decline in this study.  I prefer the term decline over collapse because collapse suggests an 
end to the socio-political system, whereas decline suggests simply its weakening.  In 
most instances, the power that Greek authors analyzed survived.  Thucydides wrote about 
how Athens lost its empire in the Peloponnesian War, yet the city survived its defeat and 
rose to power again in the 370s through the formation of the Second Athenian Naval 
Confederation.
9
  Xenophon recorded how Athens survived an oligarchic coup and how 
Sparta lost its control over the rest of Greece but survived as an independent and 
powerful city.  These cities thus lost indicators of complexity, primarily through external 
loss of territory or through internal loss of social or political stratification, but they 
remained functioning communities.  
This examination of Greek ideas relating pleonexia to the loss of power adds to 
discussion of “societal collapse.”  First, it offers a new subject area for scholars who 
study collapse; most studies do not consider the rise and fall of Greek cities when 
discussing collapse.
10
  Second, the Greek authors’ discussion of decline focuses on 
psychological factors as opposed to material or structural factors.  Modern authors prefer 
                                                 
8
 Robert Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 128; 
Railey and Reycraft, “Introduction,” 5. 
 
9




 Studies of the collapse of Greek city states do not exist in the works of Tainter (1988), Yoffee 






explanations based on material depletion or structural shift to explain decline, whereas 
Greeks looked at attitudes that changed within individuals that caused a society to change 
for worse.  At the least, this difference points to the sharp contrast of approaches between 
ancient and modern analysis, which in itself is illuminating. 
Showing the continued reliance on pleonexia to explain decline in Greek thought 
from the fifth to the second century BCE also demonstrates a continuity in Greek culture.  
Polybius’ reliance on this paradigm of decline based on pleonexia, one that originated in 
Thucydides indicates a level of continuity in values between Classical and Hellenistic 
writers that scholarship has debated since the nineteenth century.  Beginning with Johann 
Droysen in the 1870s, scholars wanted to show that Hellenistic culture was a distinct 
form of Greek culture, not a pale copy of classical civilization.  More recent scholarship, 
however, has begun to examine the parallels between the two ages.
11
  By studying 
pleonexia and the fear of individuals acting out of pleonexia, I show another important 
continuity in Greek thought.  Greek authors from the Classical age forward feared the 
individual who sought to gain at the expense of others and the city that did the same. 
Outline of the Chapters 
 The rest of this chapter provides a more in-depth review of how scholars have 
understood pleonexia, decline, and intellectual continuity in Greek authors.  Chapter two 
examines the use of the term pleonexia by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon and 
                                                 
11
 Johann-Gustav Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus (Gotha: Perthes, 1877-78).  Since then the 
applicability of the term has been debated as scholar attempted to discern what defined the Hellenistic Age.  
Those who have agreed: Michael Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941); W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization (Cleveland, OH; World Press, 1961); 
those who see some form of continuity: Peter Green, Alexander to Actium (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993); Graham Shipley, The Greek World After Alexander (New York: Routledge, 2000).  
For a review on the scholarship of the ancient world, see: Graham Shipley, The Greek World After 
Alexander (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-4; Daniel Ogden, “Introduction,” in The Hellenistic World, ed. 





how they incorporate it into their histories of the fifth and fourth century Greece.  Chapter 
three focuses on the fourth century philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle, and how 
the two thinkers incorporated pleonexia into their ruminations about the nature of human 
society and human interaction.  Chapter four switches from fourth-century philosophy to 
rhetoric as it explores how Isocrates, Demosthenes, and other fourth-century Athenian 
orators deployed pleonexia in their speeches.  Chapter five centers on Polybius; it shows 
how he adapted pleonexia as an explanation of events in his Histories of the 
Mediterranean world in the third and second centuries BCE and how he incorporated 
earlier theories of decline in his own prognostication of the end of the Roman Republic. 
Pleonexia 
 Scholars have no definitive translation for pleonexia.
12
  They provide a host of 
meanings for the word, though the rough consensus is “the unjust desire for more.” 
English concepts included under this broad interpretation include: greed, covetousness, 
avarice, desire for plunder, imperialism, and advantage.
13
  Scholars who study Plato and 
Aristotle recognize that pleonexia meant “the desire for more at the expense of another,” 
                                                 
12




John Sandys, Demosthenes (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd, 1953), 110, 179; Howard Curzer, 
“Aristotle’s Account of the Virtue of Justice,” Apeiron 28, no.3 (1995): 215-16; Kiempe Algra, 
“Observations on Plato’s Thrasymachus,” in Polyhistor, eds. Kiempe Algra, Pieter van der Horst, and 
David Runia (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 47-48; John Dillery, Xenophon and the History of His Times (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 149; Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996), 173, 177; Isocrates I, trans. David C. Mirhady and Yun Lee Too, vol. 4, Oratory of Classical 
Greece (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 267-68; Kurt Raaflaub, “Herodotus and the Intellectual 
Trends of his Time,” in Brill’s Companion to Herodotus, eds. Egbert Bakker, Irene De Jong, and Hans van 
Wees (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 175-76; Mario Vegetti, “Antropologie della Pleonexia,” in Enōsis kai Philia, 
eds. Maria Barbanti, Giovanna Giardina, and Paolo Manganaro (Catania: CUECM, 2002), 66; István 






but this meaning has not become broadly accepted in the academic world.
14
  I argue that 
the best translation of the concept of pleonexia is “the desire to acquire more of 
something (whether that object is tangible, wealth, or intangible, honor or power) in a 
manner that either takes that good from another, or prohibits another from accessing or 
acquiring that good.”  Pleonexia, thus, is a parasitic form of greed.  Greed is the selfish 
desire for more of an object, regardless of the manner by which it is acquired. Pleonexia 
specifies the means of acquisition.  The individual acting on pleonexia, whom Greek 
authors labeled the pleonektēs, obtains the object of desire by taking it from another 
person, or in some way depriving other individuals from having access to it.  The concept 
behind pleonexia can be found in Athenian thought as early as the writings of Solon from 
the late sixth or early fifth centuries BCE; in a poem identified by modern scholars as 
fragment 4, he equates acting on parasitic greed, specifically the enslaving of citizens as a 
way of collecting on debts, to waging a war against one’s own city.
15
  The word 
pleonexia, however, first appears in the Histories of Herodotus.
16
  Since this study 
focuses on the word more than the concept, it begins with the works of Herodotus. 
I will provide a more in-depth review of the scholarship relevant to specific 
authors in each chapter, but here I will address the two monographs that focus on 
pleonexia: Heinz-Otto Weber’s 1967 dissertation “Die Bedeutung und Bewertung der 
                                                 
14
 Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Hartford, CN: Princeton University Press, 1973), 116n16; 
Terence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 624; Richard Kraut, Aristotle 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 138. 
 
15
 Balot, Greed and Injustice, 80-82. 
 
16
 Heinz-Otto Weber, “Die Bedeutung und Bewertung der Pleonexie von Homer bis Isokrates,” 






Pleonexie von Homer bis Isokrates,” and Ryan Balot’s 2001 monograph, Greed and 
Injustice in Classical Athens. 
 In “Die Bedeutung und Bewertung der Pleonexie von Homer bis Isokrates,” 
Heinz-Otto Weber traces the development of the word group associated with pleonexia 
(pleonexia, pleonektēs, pleonekteō) from the writings of Homer to Isokrates.
17
  He 
translates the word group as “mehrhaben (to have more),” “mehrwollenhaben (the desire 
to have more),” or “mehrbesizt (owning more).”
18
  Through a word study of the 
pleonexia word group, he attempts to determine the nuances in use of these specific 
words as well as their connotations in the works of Greek authors.  He argues that the 
word group started with a negative connotation in the fifth century and earlier, but that in 
the fourth century it developed neutral and positive connotations while still retaining its 
principle meaning.  The neutral and positive connotations, however, did not survive past 
the fourth century.
19  
 In Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens, Balot investigates Athenian discourses 
of greed in Athenian authors from Solon, writing in the early fifth century, to Aristotle, 
writing in the mid-fourth century BCE, in order to trace how the authors conceptualized 
greed, and how this discourse potentially shaped Athenian social and political culture.
20
  
He admits that his work is not a word study and cites Weber to show that a study of this 
kind has already been done.
21 
 He argues that in order to understand the nuances of 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., 162-65. 
 
18
 Ibid., 7. 
 
19
 Ibid., 165. 
 
20 









Athenian discussions of greed and their impact on Athenian history, he needed to explore 
the multiple facets of how Athenians understood “greed” by evaluating all “greedy” 
words, such as philokhrēmatia, aiskhrokerdeia, or koros (desire for money, sordid love of 
gain, and greed respectively).
22  
He defines greed in classical Athenian thought as “an 
excessive desire for more that went against distributive ideas of justice,” and notes that 




 My study differs from those by Weber and Balot in two ways.  First, I extend the 
study of pleonexia to Polybius.  Both Weber and Balot end their works with the fourth 
century BCE.  My chronological extension allows me to gauge whether the meaning of 
pleonexia changed between the fourth century and the second century BCE.  I will show 
that it did not.  The continued use of pleonexia to mean “the desire to gain at the expense 
of another” and its inclusion in explanations of the eruption of stasis and changes in 
government demonstrates an intellectual continuity between Polybius and his fourth 
century predecessors.  
Second, I expand on the meaning of pleonexia.  Weber acknowledges that 
pleonexia was a specific form of greed, but simply translates the idea as “the desire to 
have more.”
24
  Balot comes close to my proposed definition when he discusses how the 
Greeks conceived of greed as acts that violated the principles of fair distribution of 
communal property, but he argues that this concept was the general idea of greed in 
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Greek thought, not the specific meaning of pleonexia.
25
  On the difficulties of translating 
pleonexia, Balot quotes Gregory Vlastos “I despair of an adequate English translation (of 
pleonexia)” from Vlastos’ 1969 article, “Justice and Happiness in the Republic.”  Balot 
omits Vlastos’ conclusion, however, that “only when self-interest is sought at the expense 
of others and in contravention of isotēs (equity, fairness) would the Greeks speak of 
pleonexia.”
26
   
Balot’s desire to demonstrate that ancient Greeks had one concept of greed that 
involved violating concepts of distributive justice leads him to argue against the idea that 
pleonexia specifically meant “gain at the expense of another.”  In his chapter, “Aristotle’s 
Political Thought,” Balot argues that in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle fails to 
differentiate between forms of greed such as pleonexia and aneleutheria (illiberality), 
because he had inherited an overall notion of greed from a well-established Athenian 
intellectual tradition.  To prove his argument, Balot argues against previous scholarly 
attempts to justify Aristotle’s distinctions between pleonexia and aneleutheria.  
According to these writers, pleonexia is the desire to have a disproportionate share of 
anything, whereas aneleutheria is the desire to have more of a specific good.  Balot 
rejects these arguments by saying that if the desire to gain is inherent to both pleonexia 
and aneleutheria (which Aristotle claims), then they cannot be so easily demarcated 
according to Aristotelian logic.
27
  He specifically dismisses Terence Irwin’s statement in 
Aristotle’s First Principles that Aristotle conceptualized greed, specifically pleonexia, as 
                                                 
25
 Balot, Greed and Injustice, 4-7. 
 
26
 Ibid., 4n8; Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 116n16.  Vlastos concludes that translations such as 
‘greed’ or covetousness work, even if they are not the precise meaning. 
 
27






a violation of fairness and equality, and involved gain, kerdos, that was “the sort of gain 
that is another’s loss.”
28
  He renounces Irwin’s attempt to define pleonexia with the 
following:  
Aristotle does not himself characterize pleonexia this way.  Moreover, the 
context is insufficient to establish a different sphere for the vice.  It would be 
hard work to show that the vicious individual characterized by illiberality will, 
unlike the greedy, show proper respect for fair standards of distribution.  
Certainly Aristotle’s thieves and pickpockets, who exemplify illiberality 
(aneleutheria), do not care much for distributive justice.  For the purpose of 
distinguishing pleonexia and aneleutheria in Aristotelian terms, a different 




For my purposes, it is enough that Aristotle believed that pleonexia and 
aneleutheria were different, regardless of whether his logic is sound.  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states: 
when a man displays the other vices – for instance, throws away his shield 
from Cowardice, or uses abusive language from Bad Temper, or refuses to 
assist a friend with money from Meanness (aneleutheria)-though he acts 
unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of anything; whereas when a man 
takes more than his share (otan de pleonektē), it is frequently not due to any of 
these vices, and certainly not to all of them, yet nevertheless the action does 




 I agree with Irwin, that Aristotle perceived pleonexia, and just pleonexia, as “the 
desire to gain at the expense of another.”  Aristotle may not use that phrase explicitly, as 
Balot points out, but it is the logical conclusion from Aristotle’ presentation of injustice, 
which Aristotle associates with pleonexia.  If injustice is taking more than one’s share in 
a system in which everything is divided equally among all participants, then that excess 
over the allotted amount must come from another individual. 
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Balot makes a false equivalence when he argues that since the motivation of both 
pleonexia and aneleutheria is gain, they describe a similar act.
31
  The result of both 
pleonexia and aneleutheria is gain, but the manner by which that gain is achieved 
matters.  Those who act on aneleutheria desire gain by any means.  In his list of those 
who act on aneleutheria, Aristotle includes brothel keepers, money-lenders, gamblers, 
and brigands, and others who seek gain from socially unacceptable sources (1122a).  
Those who act on pleonexia do so because they want to get more than their share.  They 
want to receive an inequitable amount of a something, such as the larger portion of good 
fortune or a smaller portion of bad luck (1129b).  The difference is in intent.  The act of 
robbery may fit the definition of pleonexia, but if the robber takes out of desire for 
money, then he is acting on aneleutheria; if he steals because he wants to enrich himself 
by depriving someone else of money, then he is acting on pleonexia.  Aristotle makes this 
distinction clear in 1130a, quoted above.
32
  The Nicomachean Ethics is not the only work 
in which Aristotle distinguishes pleonexia from aneleutheria.  In the Virtues and Vices, 
Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues and vices, he also places pleonexia the category of 
injustice while aneleutheria is its own category (1216a and 1251b respectively). 
 I arrived at my definition by examining every instance of pleonexia and 
associated words that I could find in the relevant authors, the methodology of Weber and 
N.R.E. Fisher, who did an intense word study of hybris in Hybris: A Study in the Values 
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of Shame and Honor in Ancient Greece.
33 
 First, I used the search engine of 
perseus.tufts.edu to find every instance of the words pleonexia, pleonekteō, and 
pleonektēs in the works of Thucydides, and Herodotus, in the Hellenica of Xenophon, 
and in Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Polybius.  I cross checked these 
results with findings in other scholars to confirm that I had catalogued each instance of 
pleonexia (for results see appendices 1-8).
34
  I also include instances of pleon ekhein 
because it is a phrase that Greek and modern authors associate with pleonexia.  Second, I 
examined how the authors deployed pleonexia.  I analyzed both the immediate sentence 
in which pleonexia was found and the surrounding passage in order to understand what 
act or action the author was labeling as pleonexic.  Often the immediate sentence did not 
clarify the meaning of pleonexia; only reading the entire section elucidated how the 
author understood pleonexia. 
 In order to demonstrate that I am not simply injecting my own definition of 
pleonexia into the works of the various authors, each chapter includes a section in which I 
review the various ways in which the authors employ pleonexic language.  Through this 
review, I show that the authors themselves understood pleonexia to mean “the desire for 
more at the expense of others.”  While not every example of pleonexia made it into this 
review, all are catalogued in the appendices.  The majority of the instances of pleonexia 
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uphold my point, but there exist a minority of uses that complicate my definition.  
Xenophon and Plato in particular use pleonexia to refer to “gain an advantage” or just 
“advantage.”  My definition of “gain at the expense of another” holds because to gain an 
advantage over someone means that they are at a disadvantage: one has gained and 
another has lost.  Also, Isocrates tried to present pleonexia in the sense of “advantage” in 
a positive light, where pleonexia was the acquisition of advancement, promotion, or good 
fortune without negative consequences or without hurting others.  He recognized, 
however, that his proposed use went against the way society understood pleonexia (Isoc. 
Antidosis. 281-284).  These variances should be expected because language is versatile—
authors use words within an accepted, albeit broad parameter. 
 In addition to showing how these authors construct pleonexia, I study how they 
present pleonexia’s effect on society.  This dissertation is not simply a word study; rather, 
it is the examination of a concept, the values and perceptions around it, and how Greek 
writers used it.  Greek authors’ application of pleonexia to social and political analysis 
informs readers about Greek mindset.  They linked operating on pleonexia to the 
outbreak of stasis within a city or the end of powers in interstate affairs.
35
  In his study, 
Balot focuses on how authors conceptualized greed, how that concept changed over time, 
and how it potentially affected political beliefs.  I contend that the central idea of 
pleonexia remained basically the same from Herodotus to Polybius and concentrate on 
how authors tied pleonexia to outbreaks of civil unrest, stasis, changes in government, 
and the fall of powers on the international stage.  By relying on pleonexia in this manner, 
Greek authors developed and perpetuated a theory of what we would consider decline 
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that lasted over 250 years.  The longevity of this theory suggests that elements of the 
Greek worldview did not change as radically between the fourth and second centuries 
BCE, the Classical and Hellenistic periods, as some scholars have argued. 
Decline 
 Like pleonexia, decline is hard to define.  Broadly, it is the process in which a 
socio-political entity weakens over time, until it either recovers or ceases to exist.  The 
idea of decline is pervasive in western thought,
36
 but scholars have a difficult time 
identifying what exactly decline looks like or why it happens.  In The Idea of Decline in 
Western History, Arthur Herman divides writing on decline into two categories: historical 
pessimism, in which decline is the result of historical processes, and cultural pessimism, 
in which discussions of decline reflect the authors’ own misgivings with contemporary 
society.
37
  In The Myth of American Decline, Josef Joffe shows how in the past fifty years 
American authors cast their pessimism about society as decline in order to call for policy 
reforms.
38
  In the following review of scholarly thought on decline, I eschew discussions 
of decline that include some form of cultural pessimism, and I will focus on scholarly 
attempts to explain the end of complex socio-political organizations, identified by 
scholars as either decline or collapse.  
 I do not limit my study to discussions of decline found in the scholarship of the 
ancient Mediterranean world, though it is my field.  I find this historiography lacking in 
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conceptual development.  The discussions are dominated by how Roman authors dealt 
with decline, or debates on the end of the Roman Republic or Empire.  Outside of 
Jacqueline de Romilly’s The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors, 
scholars dismiss Greek analysis of the collapse of societies.
39
  Scholarly thought on the 
end of the Roman Republic or Empire has well-developed historiographical traditions 
that have wrestled with the concept of decline, but it has been unable to construct an 
agreed upon definition of decline.  For such a definition, I rely on studies of societal 
collapse in the fields of archaeology and social anthropology, and political science. 
 Scholarship on the end of the Roman Republic and the end of the Roman Empire 
has debated whether either event can be considered an example of “decline.”  At the start 
of the 1970s, both events were considered to be decline.  P.A. Brunt’s 1971 Social 
Conflict in the Roman Republic takes for granted that the change from Republican Rome 
to the authoritarian Principate was a decline, since the Principate removed liberties that 
the Roman people had enjoyed in the Republic.
40
  Scholarship had seen the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire as decline ever since Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire.  During the 1970s, however, both ideas were challenged.  In his 1974 
work, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, Erich Gruen disputed the idea that the 
Roman Republic was in general “decline” when Caesar crossed the Rubicon; instead he 
argued that the events and personalities of 50/49 BCE overwhelmed a Republican system 
that was working.
41
  In The Making of Late Antiquity, Peter Brown re-cast the narrative of 
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the Mediterranean in the third through ninth centuries CE as a distinct world of its own, 
not as the end of the Classical Mediterranean World and the beginning of the European 
Dark Ages.
42
     
As a result of these challenges, scholars began to talk about transformation rather 
than decline.  In a historiographical survey of discussions of the end of the Roman 
Republic, Robert Morstein-Marx and Nathan Rosenstein note the contradiction between 
the idea of the “decline of the Republic,” with its unstated connotations that the Roman 
state weakened, and the reality that the Roman state under Augustus, was arguably 
stronger than its Republican predecessor.
43
  Paying respect to this reality, they choose to 
label the replacement of a republican system with an autocratic one a “transformation” 
caused by the gradual loss of social and political cohesion between the political elite and 
the people of Rome.
44
  
In the field of Late Antiquity, Peter Brown’s writing turned scholarship away 
from discussions of the “decline” of the classical Mediterranean world toward 
investigations of what made Late Antiquity unique.
45
  An example of these debates is the 
debate between J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz and Kenneth Holum.  In his work, The Decline 
and Fall of the Ancient City, Liebeschuetz argues that the cities in the Eastern part of the 
Roman Empire, while remaining materially rich, declined politically because their 
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internal system of governance became more authoritarian.  In the time between the 
establishment of the Principate and the reign of Justinian, the common people in the 
eastern Roman Empire lost political autonomy, and political power became even more 
centralized in the hands of elites.  He cites as evidence of this change the transition from 
city business being debated in public meetings to it being discussed in audience halls in 
the private houses of the political elite.
46
  In his chapter “The Classical City in the Sixth 
Century” in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Justinian, Kenneth Holum 
challenges Liebeschuetz, arguing that the local holders of power merely changed form—
the duumviri and other magistrates of the earlier centuries were replaced by new elite 
families, identified in documents as principales or proteuontes.  The change in venue for 
public business did not change the reality that the elites had always had a monopoly on 
political power and public business; it was not an indication of a new authoritarian 
trend.
47
  Therefore, the decline that Liebeschuetz postulates was simply change.   
Scholarship on the end of the Republic and the end of the Western Roman Empire 
now exist at this crossroads.  For some scholars of the Republic, its end was not a 
predetermined outcome due to the failings of the system; rather, ambitious men killed it 
by exploiting its flaws for their own glory.
48
  In regard to the end of the Western Roman 
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Empire, scholars such as Brian Ward-Perkins have to argue for the existence of decline.
49
  
In The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization, he posits that people’s reduced access to 
luxury goods, such as high quality pottery, or specialized services, such as education, in 
fifth century CE Italy and Gaul proves that culture had declined after Rome lost political 
control.
50
  In the Empire, even the lower echelons of Roman society could buy fine 
pottery and expect to receive an education.  With the end of the empire, trade networks 
vanished and more effort went toward survival than cultural production, such as literacy.  
Therefore, decline.
51 
   
Neither of these fields of study has developed a comprehensive definition of 
decline.  Scholars, in fact, cite the inability to define decline as a reason for dismissing it.  
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein perceive discussions of “fall” and “decline” of the Roman 
Republic as misleading, since the Roman state continued, and prefer referring to the end 
of the Roman Republic as a transformation.
52
  In his review essay of the scholarship on 
end of the Roman Empire, Clifford Ando notes that without an objective definition of 
decline, discussions of decline as opposed to transformation or transition are subjective 
depending on the author.
53
  It is easy to dismiss a concept when people are unable to 
determine what exactly they are arguing.   
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In contrast to historians and classicists, archaeologists, social anthropologists, and 
political scientists have worked towards constructing a viable theoretical framework for 
determining whether a complex socio-political entity, such as the Roman Empire, has 
declined.  These scholars, however, describe the weakening and end of socio-political 
entities in terms of “societal collapse,” not decline.  They define collapse as the rapid 
disintegration of complex socio-political entities, in which the entity reverts to a less 
complex socio-political structure.
54
  There is no universal reason why these scholars 
prefer the term “collapse” over that of “decline.”  In the introduction to his 1988 co-
edited volume, The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, Norman Yoffee opts for 
the term “collapse” over “decline” merely because he dislikes the connotations of 
increasing moral or aesthetic inferiority attached to “decline;” he also does not think that 
the term “decline” implies that a socio-political entity has ended.  In contrast, collapse 
denotes the unquestionable end of a socio-political entity, an end that can be determined 
through the examination of material evidence.
55
  Jared Diamond treats collapse as an 
extreme form of decline; like Yoffee, he sees decline as being reversible but collapse as 
final.
56
  Other authors, however, do not explain why they use collapse instead of 
decline.
57
  In the following review of scholarship, I will use the scholars’ own terms, but 
in the rest of the text I will retain the word decline while relying on a definition derived 
from archaeological and social anthropological discussions of “societal collapse.” 
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I retain the word decline because I like its connotation, that the ending of socio-
political entities is part of a process.  Collapse does not occur overnight; it may seem 
sudden, taking place over the course of a few years or even months, but it is still a 
process.  I also like the idea that decline exists on a continuum whereas collapse implies 
finality.  All the Greek authors reviewed discuss the loss of power of particular cities, but 
the cities did not cease to exist.  For example, Xenophon attributes the end of Spartan 
hegemony to pleonexia, but Sparta continued to be a factor in the affairs of Greece for the 
next two hundred years.  Decline, thus, better captures the phenomena that the Greek 
authors describe.  In order to understand what exactly decline is, however, I use the 
framework that archaeologists and social anthropologists designed to gauge collapse. 
Early in the twentieth century, studies presented the end of socio-political entities 
as an organic all-encompassing phenomenon, in which culture was linked to political 
organization, economy, and society, and “civilizations” followed a biological model of 
creation, growth, climax, decline, and death.
58
  The fundamental works of this kind were 
Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West and Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History.  For 
Spengler, a civilization ended when it lost all its creative energy.
59
  Toynbee saw decline 
as part of the progression of civilization, which happened when the ruling class failed to 
meet the challenges facing their society.
60
  Toynbee and Spengler both portrayed the end 
of a civilization as a form of societal ossification: a society’s vibrancy, elasticity, and 
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energy gave way to the inevitable petrification of values, beliefs, and ideas.  Eventually, 
it grew too fragile and collapsed. 
Other scholars perceived societies as growing until they lacked the capacity or 
resources to continue, at which point they collapsed.
61
  Collapse was simply the natural 
result of the growth of a civilization or society, and it was difficult to determine whether 
it was happening until it already had.  An example of this way of thinking is Kent 
Flannery’s 1972 article, “The Cultural Evolution of States.”  For Flannery, a society grew 
by responding to external stimuli—such as wars, population increase, or the desire to 
control environment—by adding new jobs.
62
  These jobs required oversight and 
regulation, which mandated the creation of management, and soon a pyramid structure of 
society evolved.  The more levels in the pyramid, and the more interconnected the levels 
were, the more complex a society became.  The society collapsed when it was so 
integrated that a failure in one section destabilized the entire pyramid.
63
  Collapse was 
simply an end result of the growth of society, and it needed little explanation.  An 
innovation of Flannery’s was to argue that societies can be differentiated based on their 
socio-political complexity.  Complexity could be determined by examining such factors 
as job specialization, centralization of government, incorporation of numerous kin groups 
into a single polity, and the rule of law.
64
  As a society developed, it adopted more 
characteristics associated with complexity. 
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In his 1978 article, “Systems Collapse as Social Transformation,” Colin Renfrew 
was one of the first to put forward a matrix through which collapse could be 
ascertained.
65
  He relied on concepts of complexity similar to the ones that Flannery 
suggested.  He argued that in the process of collapse a structured, centralized society 
disappeared from the archaeological record.  Sometimes it was replaced immediately 
with smaller, less centralized societies which maintained the traditions of the previous 
society, and sometimes it vanished completely.
66
  He outlined a series of indicators in 
order to recognize this reduction in complexity: collapse of central administrative 
organization of the early state, disappearance of the traditional elite class, collapse of a 
centralized economy, settlement shift and reduced population size, transition to a lower 
level of sociopolitical integration, and development of romantic Dark Age myth.
67
  
Renfrew aided the field of collapse studies by helping introduce a framework for gauging 
whether or not collapse occurred.
68
  Collapse could be determined if it could be shown 
that society had lost markers of complexity. 
 In 1988, Joseph Tainter’s The Collapse of Complex Societies and Norman Yoffee 
and George Cowgill’s The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations further defined 
the field of collapse studies, but they also came to different conclusions about the 
viability of universal theories of the cause of collapse.  In The Collapse of Complex 
Societies, Tainter defined collapse as “rapid significant loss of an established level of 
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 Like Renfrew, he created a list of criteria to determine if 
collapse had happened; a society had collapsed if it had less social stratification, less 
occupation specialization, a reduction in political centralization and organization, fewer 
social control mechanisms, a decrease in trade and resource availability, less investment 
in cultural production, and less information sharing between center and periphery.
70
  
Tainter argued that collapse happened when the cost of maintaining a society became too 
expensive and it lacked the surplus resources needed to cope with additional problems.
71
  
He presented societies as problem solving organizations that increased in complexity in 
order to deal with problems.  The additional levels of complexity brought new operating 
costs.  The increasing cost of maintaining the status quo meant that the society had fewer 
resources with which to handle new crises.  Each successive crisis, then, left the society 
more vulnerable to the next.
72
   
Yoffee and Cowgill, in contrast, saw such universal theories of collapse as 
unsatisfactory.
73
  Toynbee and Spengler were too deterministic.  Theories that tried to 
explain social evolution through biological evolution were inappropriate because the two 
processes are fundamentally different.  Systems theorists, such as Renfrew, generalized 
historical processes so much that the theories lost analytical power.  The explanations 
focused too much on fitting civilizations into pre-conceived models that disregarded the 
distinct institutions and circumstances of individual communities.  The only discussion of 
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collapse Cowgill and Yoffee agreed with were sociological models that portrayed 
collapse as the disintegration of a political center.  Such theories, however, focused on 
how societies persevere through collapse rather than on what happens during collapse.
74
  
Thus, Cowgill and Yoffee took issue with previous comprehensive theories of collapse, 
and instead of putting forward their own theory they sought to establish an analytical 
framework through which collapse could be studied.
75
   
 Despite the differences in opinion on the utility of over-arching paradigms, 
Tainter’s monograph and Yoffee and Cowgill’s edited volume made similar assertions 
about the nature of collapse.  They agreed that it was the reversion of complex societies 
into less complex societies.
76
  This change was primarily political.  Societies declined 
when a central authority lost control over territory or people.  Other aspects of the 
community, such as the economy, population, or social hierarchy, could accompany the 
reduction in political complexity, but the central indicator of collapse was the regression 
of complex political entities, such as empires, into simpler ones, such as cities or 
autonomous regions.   
Tainter and Yoffee and Cowgill also agreed that collapse was not a cultural 
phenomenon.  First, culture, as defined by the values and beliefs of particular groups of 
people, could persist after a socio-political entity collapsed and be integrated into the next 
socio-political entity.  As an example, the Catholic Church survived the fall of the Roman 
Empire.  Second, the value of cultural products, such as art and literature, is subjective; 
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what is admired by one person might be worthless to another.  The quality of the work 
relies more on the genius of the creator rather than the degree of socio-political 
complexity of a given system.  Students argue whether the Iliad and the Odyssey are the 
greatest epics produced in Greek literature, yet Greek literature did not decline after their 
creation.  The loss of societal complexity could affect cultural production, since 
complexity allows for greater specialization and investment in cultural production, but it 
does not have to.  Thus, culture is not a reliable benchmark for determining collapse.
77
 
Finally, both works denied the apocalyptical connotations of collapse.  
Civilizations do not generally die as a result of “collapse.”  Within a given civilizations 
there could be many collapses.  In his chapter on Ancient Mesopotamia in The Collapse 
of Ancient States and Civilizations, Norman Yoffee outlines the rise and fall of various 
Mesopotamian polities in the second and first millennia BCE while demonstrating that 
the core tenets of Mesopotamian culture remained dominant.  It was only when Persia 
conquered the region that the distinct culture of Mesopotamia began to disappear.
78
  This 
desire to reduce the dramatic nature of collapse is similar to the one that occurred in the 
historiography of the ancient Mediterranean due to the works of Gruen and Brown.  
Collapse was no longer the death of great civilizations, but a political change that 
happened as a result of specific stimuli.  Tainter’s Collapse of Complex Societies and 
Yoffee and Cowgill’s The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations, then, helped 
further focus the field of collapse studies by presenting collapse as the swift socio-
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political degeneration of complex societies, which did not coincide, generally, with the 
end of a particular culture.   
 In 2005 Jared Diamond published Collapse, in which he presented the cause of 
collapse as the abuse of natural resources.
79
  He defined collapse “as the drastic decrease 
in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity over a considerable 
(geographic) area, for an extended period of time.”
80
  Collapse occurred when a society 
grew in population and complexity until it overwhelmed the agricultural production 
capability of its territory; the lack of a reliable food source led to a reduction in society 
until a new equilibrium was reached.
81
  The work presented collapse as a potentially 
apocalyptic event.  In the introduction, Diamond acknowledged that there could be small 




Academic responses to Diamond reasserted the idea that collapse was not the 
drastic death of civilizations; it was a reduction in political complexity.  In 2006, Patricia 
McAnany and Norman Yoffee conducted a panel at the American Anthropological 
Association Meeting that repudiated the assertions Diamond made in Collapse, the results 
of which were later published in 2010 as Questioning Collapse.  In the collection, the 
editors and authors assert that the end of societies was rarely as cataclysmic or 
irreversible as Diamond presented in Collapse; more often societies suffered collapse but 
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endured in some form.
83
  Also, they found the link between environmental change and 
political upheaval too tenuous to affirm Diamond’s conclusions.
84
  While the editors did 
not put forward their own definition of collapse, Norman Yoffee in his contribution re-
asserted the view from his 1988 study on Mesopotamia that collapse was a political 
phenomenon.
85
  In a separate series of articles, Joseph Tainter also challenged Diamond’s 
argument about the connection between environment and societal collapse.
86
  He 
bemoaned the lack of an agreed upon definition of collapse, and he re-asserted the 
definition he put forward in The Collapse of Complex Societies: collapse was the “rapid 
significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity.”
87
  In 2008, Jim 
Railey and Richard Reycraft published an edited collection on collapse studies, in which 
the editors and authors followed Tainter and Yoffee and Cowgill in presenting decline as 
the collapse of complex socio-political systems.
88
  So, while archaeologists and social 
anthropologists discuss the nature of decline and, like ancient historians, debate whether 
decline or societal transformation happens, they are advancing the notion that collapse is 
the reduction of socio-political complexity. 
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 Outside of the field of anthropology and archaeology, political scientists also 
measure the weakening of states through the gauge of reductions in socio-political 
complexity.  Robert Rotberg argued that modern states weaken and then collapse due to 
the greed and corruption of the central government.
89
  While he did not discuss this 
process specifically in terms of socio-political complexity, his framework for evaluating 
why states weaken and collapse involves similar notions.  He characterizes strong states 
as those able to provide external and internal security to their citizens, protect civil 
liberties, maintain infrastructure, provide civic goods and services such as hospitals and 
schools, allow the opportunities of economic growth to all citizens, and have well-
maintained infrastructure.  For Rotberg, weak states attempt to accomplish all these tasks 
but are hindered by corrupt governments or factionalism.
90
  Collapsed states lack any 
strong central authority or rule of law.  States weaken and decline when they stop being 
able to provide basic services: security, political liberty, and economic opportunity.
91
  
Indicators of collapse are: reduced economic growth and development, the 
monopolization of political power, in which independence or dissent from the central 
government is curbed, the loss of civil liberties, and an increase in domestic violence and 
crime.
92
  In his 2010 article, “Complexity and Collapse,” Niall Ferguson depicts the end 
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I conceptualize decline as the process during which a socio-political entity loses 
complexity.  This loss can be measured in the loss of control over subordinate cities or 
territory, a decrease in economic activity, or the loss of internal cohesion and/or political 
freedom (which underlies complex institutions).  All forms of decline discussed by 
ancient Greek authors fit this definition.  They perceived decline either as the loss of 
territory and power on the international stage or an individual city’s loss of internal 
cohesion.  This loss of cohesion could result in the transformation of a democratic form 
of government into an autocratic form of government.  As I will argue later in the 
chapter, such a transformation should be viewed as decline, though scholars contest such 
claims. 
The next issue is: how does decline happen? Scholarship on this topic, too, 
divides into various categories.  Traditionally, the first divide is internal versus external 
causes of decline—whether a society falls due to internal troubles or external pressures.  
Internal weaknesses are stresses caused by actions of/and within that society: corruption, 
environmental degradation, or resource mismanagement; external pressures are outside 
the control of a specific society and include war with an external power (barbarian or 
otherwise), natural disaster, or climate change.   
I think this divide is inadequate.  Railey and Reycraft comment on its limitations 
when they attempt to categorize theories of decline due to environmental factors—should 
such theories be considered an internal cause because it is how the society uses natural 
                                                 
93





resources, or is it external because the environment is outside of a society’s control?
94
  
Instead, I divide the theories between those that claim that decline happens due to factors 
outside of a society’s control and those that argue that collapse occurs due to identifiable 
and manageable problems that confront a society.  Such a partition has the all the merits 
of differentiating between internal and external causes while including theories that 
present decline as the result of a society being overwhelmed by circumstances.  The 
pressure does not have to be external to the society, such as barbarians; it could arise 
from within the society, such as an epidemic. What matters is whether the theory states 
that society is capable of managing it.  The division, then, is based on societal agency.  
Theories that believe decline is inevitable and that a society has no agency in the process 
are in one category, while those that postulate that a society can survive through careful 
management are the other. 
The theories of Joseph Tainter and Niall Ferguson represent theories in which a 
society lacks agency.  Joseph Tainter proposed that decline occurs when a society no 
longer profits by investing in complexity.  He argued that societies deal with problems, 
either external or internal, by increasing in complexity—creating more specialized jobs or 
by increasing in bureaucracy and centralization.  This trend continues until the society 
invests too much of its resources in maintaining the system and lacks the reserve 
resources necessary to deal with new problems.  The inability to marshal additional 
resources means that a society is no longer able to deal effectively with crises and 
eventually is overcome by one.
95
  In “Complexity and Collapse,” Niall Ferguson 
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postulates that a government crashes when it cannot deal with a specific crisis.
96
  He 
views empires and hegemonic powers as complex systems, which by their very nature 
will have unforeseeable reactions to even small events; collapse happens when the 
society encounters an event that it cannot process.
 97
 
In scholarship of the ancient world, I place Erich Gruen’s Last Generation of the 
Roman Republic and Peter Heather’s The Fall of the Roman Empire in this category.  
Both emphasize that collapse happens due to circumstances beyond the control of the 
society.  In the case of Gruen, powerful individuals overwhelmed a functioning 
Republican system.  For Peter Heather, the growing power of the Germanic tribes, and 
the pressure of the Huns behind them, eventually overcame the Western Roman Empire’s 




The other group of theories argues that decline happens due when societies fail to 
address adequately problems known to them.  These theories split between those that 
ascribe collapse to material causes, the depletion of resources or material 
mismanagement, and those that attribute collapse to socio-political factors, faults that 
emerge from within a society that causes members of that society to turn on each other.  
The general arc of the former category is that a society grows and prospers as long as it 
has access to resources that allow it to grow more powerful; it declines when it 
mismanages these resources.  Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and 
Jared Diamond’s Collapse belong in this group of decline theories.  In The Rise and Fall 
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of Nations, Paul Kennedy argues that a state loses power when it chooses to invest its 
resources in non-revenue generating projects, such as military commitments, as opposed 
to revenue generating projects, such as infrastructure development.
99
  The distinction 
between these theories and the previous ones is that Diamond and Kennedy both believe 
that a society can choose how to allocate its resources.  As long as society makes the 
good choices, decline is preventable.  For Tainter, Ferguson, and others, decline happens 
as a result of circumstances beyond the society’s control. 
The category of theories based on socio-political flaws represents decline as a 
result of corruption.  In these models, society falls due to the hijacking of the political 
system by factions within it.
  
In his 2002 article, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” 
Robert Rotberg articulates how corruption leads to decline when leaders focus economic 
resources and political power only onto themselves and their supporters.
100
  He notes: 
as these two paths converge, the state provides fewer and fewer services.  Overall 
ordinary citizens become poorer as their rulers become visibly wealthier.  People feel 
preyed upon by the regime and its agents. … Citizens … feel that they exist solely to 
satisfy the power lust and financial greed of those in power. … In the last phase of 
failure, the state’s legitimacy crumbles.  Lacking meaningful or realistic democratic 
means of redress, protestors take to the streets or mobilize along ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic lines … the potential for violent conflict grows exponentially as the state’s 




Rotberg theorizes that societies decline, then, when the political elite act to enrich 
themselves in such a way that they deprive others of communal goods and services.  
Though Rotberg does not include the word pleonexia or directly display any classical 
knowledge (though the pairing of power lust and financial greed echoes Thucydides 
3.82.8 nicely), his analysis encapsulates the idea of decline caused by pleonexia well.   
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Decline as a result of corruption is a contested explanation of collapse theory.  
Railey and Reycraft state that is decline due to corruption is “not commonly cited in 
explanations of collapse.”
102
  They perceive it as applicable to modern societies but 
problematic when applied to ancient ones because of the inability of archaeological 
evidence to demonstrate mal-distribution of resources on account of factionalism and the 
perception of a Marxist bias by citing the exploitation of the masses as a cause of decline.  
Despite these difficulties, however, Railey and Reycraft accept the viability of such 
theories.
103
  In his discussion of the causes of collapse, in contrast, Tainter dismisses the 
idea of societal conflict as a cause of collapse.  He believes that any elite within a society 
would know better than to over-exploit the lower classes and risk a revolt.  He perceives 
greed and corruption as by-products of increased social complexity, not causes of it; he 
stresses that if greed and corruption are inherent in all complex systems, but not all 




Tainter’s complaints are questionable.  He dismisses psychological reasons for 
collapse because he believes in the rationality of individuals.  He argues that political 
elites are rational actors who would never exploit their subordinates to the point of 
revolution.
105
  I think that it is an ideological fault to consider human as rational actors 
and therefore to dismiss theories that rely on human behavior.  I disagree with Tainter’s 
statement that since greed can be found in all complex societies, and since not all 
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complex societies collapse, then greed cannot cause decline.  It is a sweeping 
generalization.  Just because greed has not caused the decline of all societies does not 
mean that it has not caused the decline of some societies.  I agree with Tainter that a 
certain degree of corruption and mismanagement can be expected in complex societies, 
but I argue that malicious exploitation and the emergence of systems in which it is 
common practice can cause decline, as Rotberg and classical Greek authors argue. 
 In regard to Railey and Reycraft’s assertion that it is difficult to find evidence of 
decline due to corruption, such evidence exists in Greek writing.  Greek authors theorized 
that individuals acting on pleonexia brought about decline.  Pleonexia caused the ruin of 
powers in the international arena, and it caused communities to fall into civil discord and 
to change governments.  In the individual chapters I discuss in depth how each author 
links decline to pleonexia, but here is a succinct overview. 
In regard to decline on the international stage, from the late fifth century forward, 
Greek authors described how cities acting on pleonexia to extend their power lost it 
instead.  Herodotus puts pleonexia among Xerxes’ reasons for sending the ill-fated 
expedition against Greece (7.18.2).  Thucydides detailed how ambitious politicians 
persuaded the Athenian people to follow policies of pleonexia during the Peloponnesian 
War, resulting in the disastrous Sicilian expedition (2.65.10-11).  Xenophon attributed 
Sparta’s heavy handed treatment of its allies in the fourth century BCE to pleonexia, and 
recounted how these policies engendered resentment, resistance, and the end of Sparta 
hegemony at the battle of Leuctra in 371 (5.4.1; 6.3.7-9, 11).  Isocrates followed 
Xenophon in tying Spartan pleonexia to the downfall of the Spartan Hegemony (Pan. 





power that acted on pleonexia would only hurt itself.
106
  In Polybius’ Histories, any king 
or state that acted on pleonexia lost power and influence (15.20.4).   More, the collective 
pleonexia of third century BCE Greek powers brought about Roman domination of the 
entire Mediterranean.  Thus, from Herodotus to Polybius, Greek authors described how 
acting on pleonexia caused decline in international affairs. 
Thucydides himself introduced the concept of internal decline due to pleonexia in 
his Corcyraean stasis passage in Book Three of The History of the Peloponnesian War. 
According to his model, a city fell into stasis when leaders began to function on 
pleonexia and philotimia (the desire for more at the expense of others and the desire for 
status in a community) (3.82.8).  Such actions intensified competition among political 
factions, which then resorted to any means necessary to empower themselves while 
simultaneously disenfranchising their rivals (82.2-7).  Such machinations continued until 
violence broke out (82.8).  The violence continued until one faction or individual drove 
other contenders out of the city (3.85).  Thucydides’ idea centered on the psychological 
shift that occurs within the city’s political elite at the beginning of this process: that 
pleonexia and philotimia became an acceptable way to act (3.82.8).   In his Hellenica, 
Xenophon appropriated Thucydides’ stasis model and applied it directly in his narrative 
of the decline and end of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens (2.3.13-38), the oligarchy that 
came to power in 404 BC in the wake of Athens losing the Peloponnesian war. 
 Plato took the core of Thucydides’ model, individuals acting on pleonexia causing 
stasis, and incorporated it into his own theory in the Republic concerning why 
governments changed.  He lays out how individuals, acting on selfish desires to the 
detriment of the common good, transform governments: his ideal government becomes a 
                                                 
106





timocracy an oligarchy, oligarchy a democracy, and finally democracy a tyranny (Rep. 
546b-567e). He declares that the pleonektēs, the individual acting on pleonexia, is the 
reason for oligarchies becoming democracies, and democracies becoming tyrannies, the 
worst form of government (563c).  In the fifth book of his Politics, Aristotle, Plato’s 
student, also declares that pleonexia causes stasis within cities (1302a).  He rejects 
Plato’s idea of cycle of constitutions, but he still accepts that these transitions happen as a 
result of groups desiring more honor, power, or wealth, and in order to achieve that gain, 
they take it from others within the community (1301b-1302a). 
 Polybius incorporated these ideas into his Histories.  In his theory of 
constitutions, the anakyklosis, he outlined how governments change from one form to the 
next, in part due to individuals acting on pleonexia.  He then foretold the collapse of the 
Roman Republic due to pleonexia and ambitious politicians.  He believed that the 
government of the Roman Republic was an amalgam of all of his good government types 
and theoretically balanced the desires of all the Roman people.  It would decline when the 
people of Rome, annoyed at the perceived pleonexia of the political elite, began to follow 
power-hungry politicians who pandered to them (6.57.7-8).  Rome, then, would descend 
to mob rule, controlled by whoever fed the whims of the mob (57.9).  Thus, for over two 
hundred years, from Thucydides in the fifth century to Polybius in the second, Greek 
authors relied on explanations of pleonexia to explain civil unrest within cities and the 
devolution of representative governments into tyrannies. 
Scholarship on classical antiquity questions whether or not this transition from 
one form of government to another, especially the transition from a democratic form of 





engage with this issue when discussing the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning 
of the Principate.  Ancient authors, such as Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, certainly saw the 
last century of the Roman Republic as a decline; modern scholars are less certain.  Brunt 
saw the change as decline due to the loss of freedom and equality under the law, which 
people enjoyed in the Republic but which was slowly lost in the Principate.
107
  More 
recent scholarship sees the changeover as a transition.  Stephen Harrison in “Decline and 
Nostalgia” discounts the discussion of decline in ancient authors such as Sallust and Livy 
as a literary trope that reflected the mood of the authors more than any political reality.
108  
Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein see the change from Republic to Principate as a process in 
which the people of Rome became accustomed to the rule of a single individual; they 
take pains not to label it as a fall or collapse.
109
  Railey and Reycraft also call the end of 
the Roman Republic a transformation because they do not think that Roman society 
reduced in complexity in the transition from Republic to Principate.
110
 
There are good reasons why the change of government, for example the transition 
from the Roman Republic to the Principate, can be labelled a transformation.  First, 
material prosperity and the availability of high-quality products increased in the first few 
centuries of the Principate.  Second, political organization arguably increased in 
complexity because the princeps added a new layer of organization onto the pre-existing 
Republican system.  Along with this new layer of organization came greater job 
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specialization; under the emperors a new imperial bureaucracy arose.  Third, under 
Augustus and later emperors, Roman power not only incorporated the entire 
Mediterranean basin, but also most of Britain, and extended into Germany.  All these 
indicate a greater level of complexity than had existed previously in the Republic. 
In addition, it can be argued that labeling the replacement of a democratic system 
with an autocratic system as “decline” is a culturally biased perspective.  Sallust saw the 
rise of dictators such as Sulla as the decline of the Roman Republic because he had 
grown up with the belief that a functioning republic, which allowed for free competition 
among elites, was the ideal (Cat. 10-12).  Leonardo Bruni, who first used the noun 
declinatio to refer to the change from the Roman Republic to the Principate in the 
fifteenth century CE, grew up in the Republic of Florence.
111
  The post-Enlightenment 
world of the twenty-first century sees the end of representative government systems as 
decline because from the Enlightenment onward the west has embraced liberal 
democracy as the ultimately correct form of governance.
  
Francis Fukyama’s The End of 
History and the Last Man predicts the worldwide acceptance of the ideals of liberal 
democracy over ideologies such as communism or totalitarianism as the inevitable end of 
human history.
112 
In contrast, there were ancient authors who supported more restrictive systems of 
government, and who saw democracy as a degenerate form of government.  In the 
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Republic, Plato’s ideal form of government is an oligarchy in which philosopher kings 
rule.  More likely, he and other fifth and fourth century Athenian writers, such as 
Thucydides and Isocrates, favored a form of oligarchy or managed democracy in which 
the traditional elites of Greek society held most of the power.
113
  To these writers, more 
direct forms of democracy were the second to worst form of government, only just above 
tyranny.  Consequently, the valuing of representative systems can be seen a socially 
constructed belief; labeling its transformation into an authoritarian system as decline is, 
similarly, a value statement rather than an objective use of the term decline. 
Acknowledging these complexities, I argue that the political change that Greek 
authors identify, the change from an elective system of governance which chooses the 
principal holders of political power through some form of selection process giving a 
portion of the free citizens has a vote, to an authoritarian system, in which the principal 
holder of political power is obtained through violence or due to a relationship (familial or 
otherwise) to the previous ruler, is decline.  Such a change in political systems is a 
reduction in sociopolitical complexity, and therefore decline. 
Democracies or republics are complex political systems.  They require a majority 
of a population to obey a relatively arbitrary (and at times antiquated) system of laws, 
which apply to everyone within a society regardless of status or wealth.  Leaders of the 
society are no exception.  Decisions that affect the entire community, or determine the 
holders of political power, are arrived at through some form of group deliberation, e.g. 
voting.  In functioning representative systems, the losers of these processes accept the 
results as valid and the winners do not persecute their opponents.  Political candidates, 
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therefore, must appeal to enough of the population in order to secure at least a plurality if 
not a majority of the potential votes in order to achieve power. 
Authoritarian systems, in contrast, are far simpler.  The leader, emperor, basileus, 
king, princeps, tyrannos, chairman, dictator, holds all political power and generally 
enforces it through a monopoly on violence.  Laws exist, but they do so at the whim of 
the ruler.  Effective rulers understand that to keep the people happy, they must maintain 
the illusion of the rule of law, but they understand that it is an illusion.  Peisistratus, the 
fifth century tyrant of Athens, and Augustus, the first Roman Emperor, are good 
examples.  Both maintained the rule of law and the democratic framework of the pre-
existing political regimes, but both led authoritarian systems, which came to power 
through coups and remained, in part, because of a monopoly on violence.  So, I argue that 
the transition from a representative system, such as a democracy or republic, to an 
authoritarian system, fits current models of decline because it is a reduction of 
sociopolitical complexity, even though this transition may lack the material evidence of 
decline. 
Greek authors therefore put forward a theory of decline that identified the cause 
of the decline as individuals, particular members of the political elite, acting on 
pleonexia.  These theories resemble modern theories of decline because they focus on 
loss of power/societal complexity, but they differ in key areas.  First, Greek authors 
discussed decline on the international stage as a separate process; a city could decline on 
the international stage without suffering from internal decline.  Conversely, though this is 
not directly stated, a city could suffer from stasis in a way that would not affect its 





decline, seeing internal decline as the cause of external weakness or external weakness 
leading to the destruction of the state.
114
   
Second, Greek authors identified the cause of decline as human action.  Modern 
theories focus on material or structural explanations for decline.  Rotberg does point to 
corruption and a pleonexic urge on the part of the central government to consolidate all 
affairs of state, but even he focuses on how the material wealth of a regime is centralized 
along with political power—he does not look at the attitudes of the leaders that lead to 
such policies.
115
  For modern theorists, a state declines when it runs out of resources or 
mismanages its resources.  The Greek favored psychological explanation—a state decline 
when its own citizens turned against it for their profit.  Greek authors thus emphasized 
human agency in discussing decline. 
In general, then, I argue that both Classical and Hellenistic Greek authors used 
pleonexia to explain why decline occurred.  Scholars dismiss discussion of decline in 
Greek thought, I think, because Greek writing does not include a fear of decline.  They 
were familiar with the notion that powers rose and fell, that empires were overthrown, 
and that there had been previous civilizations which had long since passed.
116
  They 
lacked, however, the angst about decline: the dread that the current political system in 
which one lives has passed its prime.  This idea can be found in Roman authors of the 
first century BCE as well as many authors of the nineteenth and twentieth century.
117
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Such dread is the hegemon’s fear or paradise’s nightmare: that one day the hegemon will 
be replaced or that the vibrant and rich civilization will fall to ruin.  Such sentiments exist 
in Polybius, when Perseus quotes Demetrius of Phalerum’s musing on the 
unpredictability of fortune in regard to the rise and fall of states (29.21) or in Scipio’s 
tears for the eventual fall of Rome when he watched Carthage burn (38.21-22).  Thus, 
Greek authors included the angst, but it was less pronounced.  
Greek authors did not have an equivalent fear because no Greek author in this 
study wrote about a time when his particular Greek city was unquestionably dominant.  
They wrote when their respective home states had already been eclipsed.  Herodotus may 
have had pro-Athenian sympathies, but he was from Halicarnassus.  Thucydides 
witnessed and wrote about the end of the Athenian Empire.  Plato, Xenophon, and 
Isocrates were all Athenians who wrote when Sparta was dominant, supported by Persia; 
they also witnessed the establishment and fall of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens.  Aristotle 
and Demosthenes wrote during or after the rise of Macedon.  Polybius wrote in the 
shadow of Rome.  They did not fear the fall because it was already a fait accompli.  
Instead, they wrote of change (metabole).   They understood that fall happens, but that 
people persist after the fact; in fact, the effects of fall could be mitigated if the correct 
steps were taken (Polyb. 3.4.5).  Thus, decline could be survived. 
Continuity 
 I argue that the concept of decline due to pleonexia was passed down in Greek 
authors from Thucydides to Polybius.  Such a transmission demonstrates a greater degree 
of intellectual continuity in Greek thought than has been previously supposed.  Scholars 





be a good member of a community, persisted into the Hellenistic age or was replaced by 
more individual centered philosophies.  Starting with Johann Droysen, scholars have 
argued that the Hellenistic Age, the period between the death of Alexander and Augustus’ 
conquest of Egypt in 30 BCE, was culturally distinct from the preceding Classical Age.
118
  
More recently, scholars have begun to accept that while unique, the Hellenistic Age built 
on the ideas introduced in the Classical period.  In Alexander to Actium, Peter Green 
argues that third and second century BCE Greek philosophy concentrated on individual 
ethics in contrast to fifth and fourth century stress on communal values, though even he 
concedes that the emphasis on the individual had classical origins.
119
  Graham Shipley’s 
overview of the Hellenistic Greek world asserts its continuity with the Classical era; he 
contends that Hellenistic philosophical schools were understandable evolutions of fourth 
century developments.
120
  He admits, however, that the stress in Hellenistic thought on 
individualism reflected changes in the status of elites as they, along with the city-state, 
lost political autonomy to the new Hellenistic kings.
121
  Robert Sharples agrees with 
Shipley that the Hellenistic emphasis on how an individual should live reflects concerns 
that already existed in fourth century authors such as Plato.
122
  I disagree.  I think that 
from the end of the Peloponnesian War forward, writers were interested in shaping the 
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individual in order to protect the community.  They achieved this goal, in part, through 
warning against pleonexia. 
In order to prove the existence of this paradigm and thus continuity in Greek 
values, I will demonstrate that succeeding authors read their predecessors.  There is no 
formula on how to discern such influence.  Some scholars, such as Ernst Barker and 
George Menanke, can see impact in only A few lines of text; others, such as Walbank and 
de Romilly, are more skeptical.
123
  Polybius cites Plato by name, but scholars demur from 
acknowledging that Polybius directly drew on him.
124
  A general consensus exists that 
fourth century writers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Isocrates, read and reacted to 
Thucydides’ ideas about pleonexia.
125
  Another consensus exists that Polybius was at 
least aware of Thucydides.
126
  In The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors, 
Jacqueline de Romilly places Polybius’ linking of individuals acting on pleonexia to the 
fall of states in a greater intellectual tradition that originated with Thucydides, but even 
she is not convinced that Polybius drew on earlier authors, such as Thucydides or 
Plato.
127
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Works that argue for influence, such as Thomas Scanlon’s The Influence of 
Thucydides on Sallust or more recent chapters on the influence of Thucydides on 
Polybius, by Tim Rood and Georgina Langley in Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and 
Polybius, demonstrate such influence by comparing passages with similar language, 
content, and theme.
128
  Thus, in order to determine continuity, I use the following criteria: 
1) word choice, 2) word usage, 3) focus of passage, 4) presentation of events.  Word 
choice: are the authors using the same word? In this instance, pleonexia.  Word usage: are 
they using it in the same way?  The second part of every chapter is a review of how 
authors use pleonexia in order to demonstrate that they all understood the term to mean, 
“the desire to gain at the expense of another.”  Focus of the passage: for the purpose of 
this dissertation, the focus is on the author’s connection of pleonexia to why cities fall 
into stasis, the change of constitutions, or why states lose power on the international 
stage.  Presentation of events: do the authors present a similar course of events when 
describing the effects of pleonexia?  I look at both the content, but also how the authors 
present the material: do they describe the process of decline due to pleonexia in 
comparable ways?  The more passages from different authors match these criteria, the 
more I believe that the later authors drew on earlier authors. 
 
Such a transmission, I also argue, is not a mere literary topos.  A topos indicates 
direct and uncritical borrowing from previous authors in order to demonstrate one’s 
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cleverness or education, as opposed to general and genuine intellectual engagement.
129
  
Although I show that earlier authors influenced later ones, later authors still introduced 
their own perspectives and ideas into the discussion of decline caused by pleonexia.  
Polybius in particular generally references other authors in order to disagree with them, 
e.g., that Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato were wrong to compare Crete’s 
constitution to Sparta’s or Demosthenes falsely accusing other Greeks leaders of 
treachery when they sided with Philip II of Macedon (6.45.1; 18.14).
130
  Less often he 
cites them as reference; he states that Plato and other philosophers were the source for his 
anakyklosis and that Theopompus began his Histories where Thucydides left off (6.5.1; 
8.11.3).  So, while Polybius relied on the ideas present in Thucydides and Plato, he made 
the analysis his own. 
 
The continued reliance on pleonexia in discussing the abuse of power leading to 
decline reveals a deep-seated fear in the Greek perception of society and politics.  
Pleonexia was an existential threat to individuals and communities.  Individuals with the 
power and desire could control entire cities, appropriate property, or even kill without 
restraint.
 
 Athens suffered such a fate during the reign of the Thirty Tyrants, when the 
oligarchs in Athens executed any whom they feared or whom they wanted to rob.  
Polybius feared pleonexic men when he saw how they played on the pleonexia of the 
masses in order to enact poor policies.  He saw the Achaean League brought under the 
control of Rome because individuals, Diaeus and Critolaus, sought to expand their power 
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through harnessing the mob.  Thus, the danger of pleonexia was not illusionary.  It was 









Pleonexia and Decline in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon 
 
 
 This chapter will discuss the idea of decline due to pleonexia in the Histories of 
Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon’s Hellenica.  I begin with Herodotus because 
pleonexia first appeared in Greek literature in his Histories.
1
  Written in the late fifth 
century BCE, it covered the war between the Persian Empire and a coalition of Greek 
city-states in 481-0 BCE, as well as the course of events that led up to it.  Thucydides was 
a near contemporary of Herodotus, and his History of the Peloponnesian War, which was 
written at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth century, records the 
war between Athens and Sparta in the last decades of the fifth century BCE.  Xenophon’s 
Hellenica, the history of Greece from 411 BCE to 362 BCE, continues Thucydides’ 
History of the Peloponnesian War, beginning where Thucydides’ text ends.
2
 
I will first examine how scholars of these authors have understood their use of 
pleonexia, decline in the respective texts, and the connections between the authors.  
Second, I will survey how each author employs pleonexia in his text.  Third, I will 
examine how pleonexia functioned as a driver of decline in each.  Finally, I will discuss 
how the authors incorporated earlier discussions of pleonexia into their own works. 
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 Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon applied the concept of pleonexia in all its 
forms: the noun pleonexia, the verb pleonekteō, and the phrase pleon plus a verb of desire 
to situations in which one entity desired more at the expense of another.  Herodotus and 
Thucydides distinguished between pleonexia and pleonekteō and the phrase pleon 
ekhein.
3
  They employed pleonexia and pleonekteō to refer to the manipulation of 
situations or legal agreements for the benefit of one party over another.  They used the 
word/substantive pleon plus a verb of desire to describe acts of taking something from 
another, but without the implication of abusing legal agreements.
  
Xenophon did not 
make a similar distinction, but he did rely on pleonexia to describe actions in which one 
side took advantage of another.  In his works, pleonexia also took on a more general 
meaning of “advantage.”  All the authors showed that functioning on any form of 
pleonexia hurt the entity that acted on it. 
Scholarship on Pleonexia, Decline, and Continuity in the works of Herodotus, 
Thucydides, and Xenophon 
 
When discussing the works of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, scholars 
translate pleonexia simply as greed, note that it causes the downfall of powers, and 
acknowledge various connections between the three authors.  In Thucydides and Athenian 
Imperialism, De Romilly translates pleonexia as “the desire for more,” and she identifies 
two forms of pleonexia in Thucydides’ text.  The first form of pleonexia is spurred on by 
hybris, a belief in one’s innate superiority, and it is an insatiable desire for more based on 
this arrogance.  The second form is what she calls the law of force: the right of the 
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stronger to rule the weaker.  She postulates that Thucydides differentiated between the 
two forms: the first caused decline through arrogance leading to overreach, while the 
second merely was the way of the world.
4
  In The Rise and Fall of States According to 
Greek Authors, she retains the idea that pleonexia is insatiable desire, but she portrays it 
as a heightened form of philotimia.
5
   
In various works on imperialism in the fifth century, Kurt Raaflaub translates 
pleonexia as “a desire for more.”
6
  In his chapter  “Philosophy, Science, Politics: 
Herodotus and the Intellectual Trends of his Time” in Brill’s Companion to Herodotus, 
he specifies that it is an unjust and insatiable desire for more that ignores the risks, costs, 
or consequences.
7
  In his 1987 work Thucydides, Simon Hornblower argues that 
pleonexia is the desire for more and equates it to greed.
8
  In his Commentaries on 
Thucydides, he translates the word as: “greed” or “exorbitant ambition.”
9
  In Xenophon 
and the History of his Times, John Dillery presents pleonexia as an attempt “to gain 
possession or control of what was not rightfully theirs.”
10
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Similarly, scholars recognize that Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon 
associate acting on pleonexia as a cause of decline.  In “Die Bedeutung und Bewertung 
der Pleonexie von Homer bis Isokrates,” Hanz-Otto Weber notes that Herodotus 
portrayed acting on pleonexia as causing ruin and destruction and that Thucydides 
presented pleonexia as having negative consequences.
11
  In The Rise and Fall of States 
According to Greek Authors, De Romilly argues that for Thucydides, the desire of post-
Periclean leaders to achieve Pericles’ position led them to flatter the Athenian demos, 
which resulted in poor policies.
12
  This devotion to personal gain led to rigidity in 
Athenian policy—Athens must always strive to acquire more power, which itself was 
pleonexia—and resulted in the Sicilian expedition and the ruin of Athenian power.
13
   
Hornblower, Raaflaub, and Balot agree that Thucydides linked Athenian pleonexia to the 
end of Athens’ fifth century empire.
14
  Dillery argues that Xenophon used pleonexia to 
explain the downfall of the Thirty at Athens and the Spartan Hegemony.
15
  Nicholas 
Sterling contends that Xenophon identified pleonexia as the reason why Thebes failed to 
obtain hegemony over Greece.  He argues that for Xenophon pleonexia destroys the 
bonds between allies, and that this lack of faith with Thebes caused other Greek states not 
to ally with it after the battle of Leuctra.
16
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Finally, scholars acknowledge the connections between these three authors.  They 
agree that Thucydides was aware of Herodotus and his writing.  A recent essay by Philip 
Stadter, published in an edited collection which explores the links between these two 
authors, focuses on Thucydides specifically as a reader of Herodotus.
17
 De Romilly 
contends that Thucydides relied on a political version of Herodotus’ hubris-nemesis 
model to explain the decline of Athens in the Peloponnesian War.
18
  Raaflaub agrees that 
Herodotus and Thucydides certainly engaged with the same issues in their respective 
works, especially in warnings regarding pleonexia, but he makes no conclusion about 
whether one influenced the other.
19
 
Scholars also recognize that Xenophon relied on Thucydides in some fashion in 
the Hellenica, but they debate the degree to which he did.  Traditionally, scholars assert 
that Xenophon’s Hellenica was an inferior continuation of Thucydides, especially the 
sections up to 2.3.10.
20
  There are also discussions of the Herodotean elements of 
Xenophon going as far back as Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
21
  Scholars have also sought 
to examine the Hellenica as a text in its own right.  They agree that while Xenophon 
started the Hellenica where Thucydides’ work ended, and therefore was aware of him, 
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such reliance does not mean that Xenophon was a second-rate Thucydides.  Instead, he 
was a writer in his own right, who, like other ancient historians, incorporated elements of 
previous authors as he saw fit.
22
 
Pleonexia in Herodotus 
In the text of Herodotus, instances of the noun pleonexia and the verb pleonekteō 
refer to the manipulation of a situation by one party in order to gain an advantage at the 
cost of another.  The word pleon plus a verb of desire, such as epithumeō or ekhein, 
occurs in Herodotus to refer to acts or the desire to conquer territory.  Herodotus shows 
that acting on any form of pleonexia has negative effects, but he does not link acting on 
either the noun pleonexia or the verb pleonekteō explicitly to decline. 
 Pleonexia first appears in Greek literature in Book Seven of Herodotus’ Histories 
when Herodotus presents three stories explaining why Argos did not join the panhellenic 
alliance against Persia.  In the Argive version of the story, the Argives agree to join the 
alliance, despite being warned by the Oracle at Delphi not to, on the condition that they 
share command with the Spartans because it was Argos’ ancestral right (7.148).  The 
Spartans made a counter offer, stating that each king could have a vote, but that they 
could not disenfranchise their kings by giving the Argive king power equal to the two 
Spartan kings (7.149.2).  The Argives refuse, replying that they would rather be ruled by 
the Persians than deal with Spartan pleonexia (7.149.3).
23
  Pleonexia here refers to the 
Spartans’ attempt to manipulate the agreement between themselves and the Argives so 
that it would appear that the cities were sharing command of the alliance, when in fact the 
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Spartans would retain control.
24
  The agreement appeared equal because each king 
received one vote; however, since there were two Spartan kings to one Argive king, the 
Spartans would retain ultimate power in the alliance. 
 Pleonexia next appears in Herodotus in the speech of Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, 
in Book Seven.  In attempts to gain allies against Persia, the Greeks sent envoys to 
Syracuse, a Greek colony on the island of Sicily, to request aid.  When the Greek envoys 
ask Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, to join the alliance, Gelon accuses them of approaching 
him with a grasping speech (logon … pleonekten) (7.158.1).  He reminds the envoys that 
when previously he asked the Greeks for help against the Carthaginians, they rebuffed 
him (7.158.2).  Only now, when they need help, are they willing to talk with him 
(7.158.2).  Pleonexia in this instance pertains to the Greek willingness to ask Gelon for 
aid when it suited their needs and their equal unwillingness to help Gelon against the 
Carthaginians when it would be a burden to them.
25
  Thus, the Greeks wanted something 
for nothing: they wanted the help of Gelon but had done nothing to earn it. 
 The final appearance of pleonexia in Herodotus’ Histories describes the 
motivations of Themistocles when he demands money from Greek islands.  In Book 
Eight, while pursuing the Persians across the Aegean, Themistocles demanded money 
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 (There was no end to Themistocles’ avarice; using the same agents … he sent 
threatening messages to the other islands, demanding money and saying that if they 
would not give what he asked he would bring the Greek armada upon them and besiege 
and take their islands) (8.112.1).
26
  When he collected this money, Themistocles did not 
share it with the other Greek admirals (8.112.3).  Again, the pleonexia describes an act in 
which one party, Themistocles, exploited a situation, his command of the Greek fleet, for 
his private benefit, running a protection scheme.
27
    Even though later writers recorded 
the exile of Themistocles after the Persian War, Herodotus records no retribution against 
Themistocles for his act of unfairness and injustice in regard to the island allies.
28
  So, in 
Herodotus’ Histories, the historian deployed pleonexia to describe situations in which 
one party attempted to manage circumstances to its advantage in a way that cost another.
 Herodotus employed the phrase pleon plus a verb of desire to designate situations 
of territorial expansion, imperialism.
29
   In his history of Egypt in Book Two, Herodotus 
declares that when Egypt was divided into twelve kingdoms, the kings of each kingdom 
agreed to have good relations and that they would not seek to gain against each other 
() (2.147.3).  In Book Seven, 
Xerxes’ uncle and adviser Artabanus disapproved of the expedition against Greece 
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because he believed it was wrong to teach the heart to desire more than it had at the 
present (
) (7.16a).30  Even after Artabanus changes his mind, he reiterates the warning 
that it was the desire for more () that led Cyrus, Cambyses, and 
Darius to disaster (7.18.2).  Thus, Herodotus applied the noun pleonexia and the verb 
pleonekteō to describe situations in which one party tried to take advantage of another 
party unjustly and the phrase pleon plus a verb of desire to refer to imperialism. 
Pleonexia in Thucydides 
Thucydides conceptualized pleonexia as a natural urge within individuals to 
desire to gain more at another’s expense and as something that caused harm to those who 
acted on it.  As with Herodotus, in Thucydides the noun pleonexia or the verb pleonekteō 
denote that one party is taking advantage of an existing power imbalance for gain, while 
the word pleon and a verb of desire signify the taking of more at the expense of another.  
Most of the instances of pleonexia occur in Thucydides’ speeches, and therefore it is 
debatable whether they are Thucydides’ own thoughts, or the thought of the speakers 
themselves.
31
   I agree with Hornblower that the speeches may not reveal Thucydides’ 
own opinions, but the main point is that the inclusion of pleonexia still reveals how fifth- 
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century Greeks employed the term.
32
  Therefore the speeches allow us to examine its use 
in a late fifth century context order to gauge its meaning. 
Thucydides presents the noun pleonexia and the verb pleonekteō as the 
manipulation of differentials in power, in which one party abuses its power over another 
for gain.  The most direct enunciation of this occurs in Athenagoras’ speech to the 
Syracusans in Book Six.  In the speech, Athenagoras associates pleonexia with the 
tendency of oligarchic governments to take more than their fair share of 
rewards.  According to Athenagoras, in oligarchies the few share the dangers facing the 
city with the people, but keep most, if not all, the profits for themselves 
(
) (6.39.2).  In contrast, all 
people in democracies, regardless of class, enjoy a form of equality (6.39.1).  Pleonexia 
at 6.39.2 refers to the disproportionate distribution of danger and reward found in 
oligarchies: all share the risk; only a few benefit.  This is gain at the expense of others 
because the few are intentionally reaping the benefit from the work of everyone. 
Similarly, pleonexia typifies manipulation of power differences in the speech of 
the Athenian embassy to the Spartan assembly in Book One.
33
  In the speech, Athenian 
ambassadors admit that Athens’ allies perceive Athens as pleonexic on account of court 
settlements or exercises of power.  He states that since Athenians and its allies are equal 
under the law, whenever an Athenian court rules against a citizen of an allied city, or 
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whenever Athens takes action against an allied city, the decision is seen as an act of 
Athenian pleonexia (1.77.3).  Since Athens treats its allies as equals, as opposed to its 
subjects, any act which favors Athens would come at the expense of the allies.  Thus, 
pleonexia again is gain at the expense of others through either court rulings or abuse of 
existing relationships.  
Thucydides also depicts pleonexia as a natural urge in humans.  In his speech 
against the proposed annihilation of Mytilene in Book Three, Diodotus notes that wealthy 
people attempt to circumvent the law on account of their desire for more (tēn pleonexian) 
(3.45.4).  In Hermocrates’ speech to the Sicilians in Book Four, Hermocrates forgives the 
Athenian’s desire for more (pleonektein) because it is always man’s nature to rule those 
who submit () (4.61.5). 
The gain associated with pleonexia is not restricted to material wealth; it could 
refer to power.  In none of the previous examples does Thucydides specify what the 
pleonexic agent obtains.  What matters is that the gain comes from the others’ loss.  As 
Alexander Fuks points out in his article on Thucydides’ stasis narrative, covered later in 
this chapter, at 3.82.6, Thucydides deploys pleonexia to refer to gain of political power 
within a city.
34
   
When referring to acts of territorial acquisition or other forms of violent 
acquisition of power, Thucydides employs the word pleon plus a verb of desire.  In Book 
Four, Thucydides states that the Athenians refused the Spartan peace offer of 424 because 
they desired more () (4.21.2).  Though what the Athenians 
offered is not specified, it is implied that the goal is power over others or territorial 
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acquisition.  In Book Six the desire is explicitly the conquest of territory, as Thucydides 
writes that the Athenian people agreed to the Sicilian expedition out of their desire for 
more () (6.24.4).  Thus, Thucydides associates the motivations 
for conquest with the phrase pleon and a verb of desire and uses the noun pleonexia and 
the verb pleonekteō to indicate gain through manipulation. 
Thucydides’ use of pleonektein in Hermocrates’ speech in Book Four appears to 
complicate the neat arrangement I have so far suggested. At 4.61.4, Hermocrates declares 
that Athenian pleonektein, in this context the conquest of Sicily, is understandable.  The 
precise connotation of pleonektein is unclear.  It could refer to the direct annexation of 
territory: the conquest of Sicily. It could also refer to Athens’ manipulation of its alliances 
with specific Sicilian cities, taking advantage of a situation for gain.  If pleonektein refers 
to the conquest of Sicily, then we should not differentiate between forms of pleonexia and 
pleon ekhein.  If pleonektein indicates the manipulation of situations for gain, then we 
need to separate the meanings of pleonexia and pleon ekhein.  I will now show that 
pleonektein at 4.61.4 refers to Athenian desire to conquer Sicily through manipulation of 
its existing Sicilian alliances, which demonstrates that we must distinguish between 
pleonexia and the phrase pleon plus a verb of desire in the work of Thucydides. 
Hermocrates’ entire speech is about the need for the Greek cities of Sicily to make 
peace in order to preempt the Athenians from meddling in Sicilian affairs.
35
  The 
background of the speech was that the Sicilian city of Leontini and its allies had appealed 
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to Athens for help in their conflict with Syracuse and other Sicilian cities allied with 
Sparta (3.86).  Athens had sent ships in 427 BCE to help Leontini, to prevent grain 
shipments to the Peloponnese, and to explore the possibility of conquering Sicily (3.86).  
Fighting continued in Sicily until 424 when two of the warring cities, Camarina and Gela, 
made an armistice (4.58).  Thucydides states that the cities of Sicily used this armistice to 
call a conference and propose a general peace for the island (4.58). 
At the conference, Hermocrates gave a speech calling for a general peace and 
Sicilian unity.  He noted that the war was not about the interests of individual Sicilian 
cities, but of Sicily as a whole, and that the true threat to the island was Athens (4.60.1).  
Athens was the strongest state in Greece and would not hesitate to use its existing 
alliances on the island as a pretext for conquest (4.60).  Weakened by continual wars, no 
Sicilian city would be safe, not even those allied to Athens (4.61.2).  At this point in the 
speech Hermocrates characterizes Athens desire for power over Sicily with pleonektein 
(4.61.5).  In the immediate context of the speech, it seems that the pleonektein refers to 
Athens’ use of its existing alliances in Sicily to gain power, which supports the idea that 
pleonexia and pleonekteō referred to the manipulation of a situation to benefit one party 
at the expense of another.  The result of Athenian intervention on behalf of its allies 
would be the Athenian conquest of Sicily, territorial acquisition, but what matters is how 
Athens acquired that power: the manipulation of allies. 
 The differences between pleonexia and pleon plus a verb of desire can be further 
seen in the speech of the Corinthian envoys to the Athenian Assembly in Book One.
36
  In 
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the speech, Thucydides uses both pleonexia and pleon ekhein to describe Corcyraean 
actions in the events leading up to the speech.  Corcyra was one of the last non-aligned 
Greek cities in the late fifth century.  The island of Corcyra itself is off the western coast 
of Greece and was on a major shipping line between Greece and Italy and Sicily.  The 
Corcyraeans had come into conflict with Corinth over the city of Epidamnus, which was 
further north on the Adriatic coast.  The Corcyraeans had recently defeated the 
Corinthians in a naval battle, but they realized that they could not hold out against 
Corinth and appealed to Athens for aid.  The Corinthians sent envoys to Athens to 
persuade the Athenian assembly not to accept the alliance.   
 In the opening of their speech, the Corinthians point out that the Corcyraeans 
exploit their geographic isolation and neutrality to engage in piracy and abuse their court 
system in order to prey on the trade ships of other Greek cities (1.37.2-4).  Corcyra’s 
geographic isolation meant that it received more ships from other Greek cities than it sent 
out (1.37.2).  The Corcyraeans avoided alliances with neighboring cities so they could 
use their own judges in trade disputes as opposed to impartial arbiters (1.37.2).  The lack 
of restrictions allowed them to gain either through violence or deceit 
() (1.37.4).  They gained 
through violence because they could attack whomever they chose; they gained through 
deceit by using their courts to decide issues between Corcyraeans and other Greeks in 
favor of the Corcyraeans (1.37.3).  Since Corcyra had no formal treaty obligations, and 
therefore had no agreements to manipulate, they were free to take what they wanted from 
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 At the end of the Corinthians’ speech, the ambassadors note that the Corcyraeans 
are grasping (pleonektai) in respect to how the Corcyraeans are trying to manipulate legal 
situations for their benefit.  In the conflict over Epidamnus, the Corcyraeans only asked 
for arbitration after they had besieged Epidamnus, allowing the Corcyraeans to negotiate 
from a position of strength (1.39.2).  The Corcyraeans appealed to Athens only after they 
started losing the war with Corinth; they never supported Athens before, yet ask the 
Athenians to be equally culpable for their actions by allying with them (1.39.3).  In this 
way, the Corcyraeans continually manipulate situations to their own advantage, 
pleonektai.   
 Consequently, the speech of the Corinthian envoys exhibits that, in Thucydides’ 
Histories, all forms of pleonexia refer to gain at the expense of others and that there is a 
distinction between the phrase pleon and a verb of desire and noun or verb forms of 
pleonexia.  In describing how the Corcyraeans used the remoteness of their island to 
avoid alliances in order to take what they want either through violence or the courts, 
Thucydides uses pleon ekhosin.  In characterizing how the Corcyraeans exploited recent 
events for their own benefit, calling for arbitration after they sieged Epidamnus and 
asking Athens for an alliance after the war with Corinth escalated, he uses pleonektai, a 
form of pleonekteō.     
Throughout Thucydides’ Histories, speakers warn against acting on pleonexia and 
encourage people to avoid it.  The Corinthians end their appeal to the Athenians by 






) (1.42.4).  In the Athenian ambassador’s 
speech to the Spartan congress in Book One, the ambassador admits that men are more 
indignant when they feel that they are being taken advantage of (pleonekteistha) by an 
equal (isou) as opposed to being beaten by a superior (1.77.4).  Hermocrates ends his 
speech calling for Sicilian unity by commenting that those who go to war for gain end 
with less () (4.62.3).  
In his speech to the Acanthians in Book Four, Brasidas declares that it is more disgraceful 
to gain one’s ends through deceit rather than strength because people acknowledge 
superior strength but despise gains made through deceit (4.86.6).  So, Thucydides 
asserted that pleonexia was the desire for more against others, and that it hurt its victims 
but also those acting upon it.  He also differentiated between the forms of pleonexia: the 
noun pleonexia and the verb pleonekteō referred to gain achieved by the manipulation of 
laws or situations, whereas the word pleon plus a verb of desire meant taking from 
another, generally in terms of imperialism. 
Pleonexia in Xenophon 
 Xenophon uses pleonexia in the Hellenica to refer to the manipulation of 
situations and to having an advantage over others.
37
  He deploys pleonexia to describe 
how the Thirty Tyrants of Athens abused their authority to secure the regime’s control 
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  According to Xenophon, after coming to power the Thirty killed those 
who had informed against aristocrats when Athens was a democracy (2.3.11-12).  They 
soon expanded the executions to anyone whom they perceived could be a threat to their 
government (2.3.14).  One of the Thirty, Theramenes, objected to this practice of killing 
men simply because they had been popular when Athens was a democracy (2.3.15). 
Another member of the Thirty, Critias, argued that those who want to gain more, 
, must remove potential opposition (2.3.16).  Pleonektein 
refers to the Thirty’s desire to maintain their political dominance of Athens by killing any 
whom they regarded as dangerous. 
Xenophon next uses pleonexia in Critias’ speech against Theramenes, in which 
Critias disparages Theramenes as a man who consistently acts in ways beneficial to 
himself and harmful to others (2.3.33).
39
  After failing to convince Theramenes that the 
actions of the Thirty were justified, Critias put Theramenes on trial.  In his prosecution 
speech, Critias accuses Theramenes of being instrumental in overthrowing the democracy 
in order to put himself and other members of the Thirty in power; he then turned around 
and roused the democrats against the Thirty so as to retain power (2.3.28).  He 
continually switched sides, wavering between supporting the oligarchs or the democrats 
during the Peloponnesian War, depending on which side seemed to be dominant (2.3.30).  
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Theramenes helped accuse the generals in command of the fleet at Arginusae, even 
though he had been responsible for not recovering the disabled ships (2.3.32).
40
 Critias 
summarizes his accusations by stating that Theramenes was an individual who 
continually acted on pleonexia (
) (33).  Theramenes’ pleonexia was his ability to navigate situations so that 
he profited while others suffered.
Xenophon notes that the Thirty’s intimidation tactics pleased those who were 
pleonexic (2.4.10).  After Critias succeeded in condemning Theramenes to death, the 
Thirty became more bloodthirsty (2.4.1).  This abuse of power created numerous exiles, 
one group of which seized a fortress in Attica and began active resistance against the 
Thirty (2.4.2-7).  In order to have a refuge in case they needed to retreat from Athens, the 
Thirty emptied out the precinct of Eleusis under false pretense (2.4.8).  The Thirty then 
arrested all the men of Eleusis and condemned them to death (2.4.9).  When arranging the 
vote, the Thirty filled half of the Odeum (where voting happened) with armed Spartan 
soldiers and required people to vote publicly (2.4.10).  Xenophon notes that this act of 
voter intimidation pleased those who thought only about their advantage 
() (2.410).  By half filling the Odeum with armed Spartan 
soldiers loyal to the Thirty, the Thirty engineered a situation in which the vote for death 
could only have one outcome.  Thus, Xenophon continually used a form of pleonekteō to 
refer to situations when the Thirty, or members of the Thirty, manipulated events for their 
advantage.  In all of these situations, those who were disadvantaged generally died, 
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demonstrating a rather violent form of gain at the expense of others. 
 Xenophon also applied pleonexia to characterize Sparta’s abuse of its 
allies.  These accusations first occur in the Theban ambassador’s speech to Athens at the 
beginning of the Corinthian War, the war that erupted ten years after the Peloponnesian 
War between Sparta and its former allies Corinth and Thebes as well as Athens and 
Argos.
41
  When trying to convince the Athenians to go to war against Sparta, the Theban 
ambassador explains how Sparta manipulated its relationship with allies, former Athenian 
subjects, and even Persia in such a manner as to benefit Sparta.
42
  The Theban 
ambassador accuses the Spartans of sharing the dangers of war with its allies, but denying 
them a share of the resulting power, prestige, or wealth and treating them like slaves 
(3.5.12).  In the case of former Athenian subjects, the Spartans offered them 
independence, but in reality forced oligarchic governments on them (3.5.12).  Finally, the 
Spartans now snub the Persians, who helped the Spartans defeat Athens (3.5.13).  The 
Thebans end the speech by labeling all these actions as examples of Spartan pleonexia 
(3.5.12-15).  
 In Book Six, Xenophon uses pleonexia to characterize Sparta abusing its 
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relationships with in the Athenian speeches to the Spartan assembly.
43
  In the episode, 
three Athenians speak at the Spartan assembly to push for a Spartan/Athenian alliance.  
The last two speakers characterize Spartan foreign policy as pleonexic.  The second 
speaker, Autocles, points out the central contradiction of Spartan foreign policy: the 
Spartans claim that they desire independence for Greek cities, but they want the same 
cities to obey Sparta (6.3.7).  He points out that Sparta makes decisions about foreign 
policy without consulting the allies but requires the allies to support Sparta even to their 
own detriment (6.3.8).  Sparta imposes pro-Spartan oligarchies in allied cities, which then 
ignore existing laws, and rule for the advantage of Sparta; such actions contradict the idea 
of the allies’ independence (6.3.8).  The Spartans in fact are hypocrites because they 
seized the Cadmea, the Theban citadel, and installed their own puppet government over 
Thebes in order to preempt Theban domination of Boeotia (6.3.9).  Autocles warns the 
Spartans that if they want friends, they should not try to get both full rights from other 
cities as well as try to get as much power for themselves (pleonektountas) (6.3.9).  The 
final speaker, Callistratus, repeats Autocles’ advice when he states that since the Thebans 
are now waging a war against Sparta, as a result of Spartan pleonexia, he hopes the 
Spartans have learned not to seek power at the expense of its allies (pleonektein) (6.3.11).  
Xenophon, then, continually relies on pleonexia to refer to situations in which Sparta 
abused its hegemony in order to gain more power over its allies. 
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 Xenophon also utilizes pleonexia in a more neutral sense to mean advantage.
44
  In 
Book Seven, he notes that the Thebans negotiated with the Persians in order to gain an 
advantage (pleonektesai) in Greece (7.1.33).  When negotiating with the Persians, he 
records that Pelopidas had a great advantage (polu epleonektei) over other Greeks 
because Thebes had sided with Persia during the Persian War of 481-80 BCE and thus 
had a history of collaborating with the Persians (7.1.34).  Thebes allied with Persia, but 
other Greek cities refused to join the alliance (7.1.40).  Nicholas Sterling argues that 
these two instances of pleonexia indicate that Xenophon ascribed Thebes’ failure to 
establish hegemony over Greece in the wake of Leuctra to its pleonexia.
45
  Xenophon 
does not elaborate on the ruinous nature of Theban pleonexia in the way he does Spartan 
pleonexia, but his narration of Thebes acting on pleonexia leading to failure follows the 
general idea of the negative consequences of pleonexia. 
Finally, when discussing the battle of Mantinea, Xenophon twice uses a 
participial form of pleonekteō to refer to Epaminondas’ disposition of his troops in order 
to gain advantage over his opponents (7.5.8, 11).  Thus, Xenophon makes use of 
pleonexia to refer to abusing existing unequal power relationships and also modified the 
term to refer to having or gaining an advantage over another. 
Pleonexia and Decline in Herodotus 
  In his Histories, Herodotus has a negative view of those who act according to 
pleonexia, but he only explicitly warns against acting on pleon ekhein.  He depicts 
pleonexia as a cause of friction between groups, but pleonexia does not cause ruin to 
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those who act on it.  Neither the Argives nor the Syracusans join the Panhellenic alliance 
due to supposed acts of pleonexia, but the Greeks still defeat the Persians.  Themistocles 
acted on pleonexia after the defeat of Persia at Salamis, but nothing bad happens to him 
in the text of Herodotus on account of it.  Herodotus does, however, warn against 
operating on pleon ekhein (imperialism), and notes that the desire for more caused the 
ruin of various Persian kings (7.16a, 18.2).
46
 
Pleonexia and Decline in Thucydides 
 Thucydides utilizes pleonexia to explain the decline of powers.  In internal 
matters, Thucydides presents pleonexia as fueling stasis in Greek cities.  In external 
affairs, he portrays pleonexia, in the form of manipulating agreements, as a cause of 
tension between Athens and its allies, but he does not present it as the reason why Athens 
lost the war.  Instead, he states that ambitious politicians endorsed imperialistic policies, 
which are described with pleon ekhein, and caused Athens to pursue an over-aggressive 
foreign policy, which led to disaster (2.65.10-11).  Eventually such ambitious politicians, 
e.g., Pisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes, in their drive for power in Athens, overturned 
Athens’ democratic government (8.68).
47
 
 Thucydides applied the noun pleonexia in describing the internal decline of a city 
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in the Corcyraean stasis narrative in Book Three, sections 82-4.
48
  He focuses on the city 
of Corcyra when outlining the process, but he notes that similar disturbances erupted 
throughout the Greek world over the course of the war (3.82.2).
49
  He also notes that 
there was a typical process every city went through in the course of stasis (3.82.3).  
During stasis, a city suffered from political factions plotting and counter-plotting against 
each other for power (3.82.3-7).  This struggle for dominance led to a general 
radicalization of politics and society, where actions and rhetoric became extreme (3.82.3), 
and party loyalty mattered more than the general good of the city (3.82.6).  What drove 
this stasis was the desire for power, fueled by pleonexia and philotimia (3.82.8).
50
  The 
consequence of stasis was the general destruction of society (3.84.3).  At the beginning of 
the section, Corcyra is a functioning city in which all elements of society live in relatively 
good order.  By the end of the narrative, the city is divided into two warring factions 
intent on annihilating the other (3.85.2).   
 Though Thucydides declares that philotimia and pleonexia drove the stasis, he 
employs pleonexia more than philotimia to describe the motivations behind stasis.  At 
                                                 
48
 Many commentators on this section note the centrality of pleonexia:  Felix Wasserman, 
“Thucydides and the Disintegration of Polis,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association 85 (1954); Colin Macleod, “Thucydides on Faction,” Collected Essays of Colin Macleod 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); Connor, Thucydides, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 97-
105; Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1, 477-91; Clifford Orwin, The Humanity of 
Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 175-82.  Hornblower in his commentary notes 
that pleonexia is a keyword for the entire work; Hornblower, Commentary, vol. 1, 485.  In Thucydides and 
Internal War, Jonathon Price has a lengthy examination of the stasis narrative, but never mentions 




 Due to the universalizing nature of the message, Thucydides makes it clear that it is not the 
innate pleonexia of the Corcyraeans that caused their stasis, as Balot argues, but rather Corcyra was the 
first to suffer from a general phenomenon that affected most of the Greek world, and which was caused by 
human nature (3.82.1-2); contra Balot, Greed and Injustice, 138-41.  On the intended universality of the 
passage: Hornblower, Commentary, vol. 1, 479. 
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3.82.6, he says that people joined factions for selfish gain (pleonexia) by ignoring law as 
opposed to joining groups in order to help society as a whole.  At 3.82.8, he identifies 
pleonexia and philotimia as the drivers of stasis.
51
  At 84.2, he notes that in stasis, people 
attack others either to gain or, if not out of a desire for gain (pleonexia), then to satisfy 
their own violent instincts.  He only uses philotimia at 3.82.8.  Scholars debate whether 
3.84 is part of the original Thucydidean text or an addition by a later author(s); Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus’ silence on the section adds weight to those who believe it is a later 
addition.
52
  I agree with Balot that, regardless of whether 3.84 is by Thucydides or not, 
the thought within it mirrors Thucydides.
53
  Even without the pleonexia at 3.84, 
Thucydides still uses pleonexia twice as many times in the passage as he does philotimia, 
which reinforces pleonexia’s association with stasis. 
 Thucydides’ treatment of Corcyra outside the stasis narrative cements the idea 
that acting on pleonexia causes decline.  At the start of Thucydides’ narrative, Corcyra 
was one of the most powerful cities in Greece; it had the second largest fleet next to 
Athens.  At the end of his stasis narrative in Book Three, Thucydides leaves Corcyra in a 
perpetual state of civil conflict—the democratic faction held the city, but the oligarchic 
party was in the countryside planning to attack the city (3.85).  In Book Four, Thucydides 
describes how the democratic faction finished off the oligarchs, ending the civil war 
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(4.46-8), but leaving Corcyra a shell of its former power.  Due to pleonexia, then, 
Corcyra went from being one of the wealthiest and most powerful cities in Greece at the 
start of the War to being a footnote.   
 Thucydides employs both pleon ekhein and pleonexia to describe Athenian 
actions on the international stage, but he attributes Athens’ dangerous, and ultimately 
damaging, imperialistic desires to pleon ekhein.
54
  As noted in the previous Thucydides 
section, Thucydides used pleonexia in Book One to describe one aspect of the perceived 
power imbalance between Athens and its allies (1.77).  The allies were annoyed because 
they thought that Athens acted on pleonexia and used the court system to gain favorable 
rulings for Athenian defendants (1.77.4).  They felt cheated because instead of being 
beaten outright, the Athenians manipulated events in order to gain at their expense.   
In Book Three, in their address to the Spartans and their allies, the Mytilenian 
envoys echo the idea that the power imbalance between Athens and its allies created 
tension that ultimately led to the Mytilenian revolt.  In the speech, the envoys state that 
the alliance was fine as long as Athens remained equal in power to other Greek cities 
(3.10.4).  Once Athens became stronger than its allies, the risk of Athens abusing its 
power increased, and the inability of cities to resist became a concern to the Mytilenians 
(3.10.10-12).  Eventually, the Mytilenians revolted in order to preempt Athens 
conquering them (3.12.3).  Admittedly, pleonexia does not appear in the Mytilenians’ 
speech because the Athenians never abused their power with the Mytilenians; the 
Mytilenians only feared that such abuse would happen (3.10.12).  The Mytilenians’ fear 
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of Athenian pleonexia was one of their stated causes for the revolt.  As in the Athenian 
ambassador’ speech in Book One, the Mytilenians’ speech to the Spartans in Book Three 
demonstrates that pleonexia and the fear of pleonexia created tension between Athens and 
its allies, but Thucydides does not associate that tension to the decline of Athens on the 
international stage. 
Athens declined, according to Thucydides, because Athenian politicians, pursuing 
political power within Athens, persuaded the Athenian people to pursue imperialistic 
policies, which he designated with pleon ekhein or similar phrases, that endangered the 
city and the empire (2.65.7).
55
  Thucydides uses pleon ekhein to describe the motivations 
for Athenian policy: in the rejection of the Spartan peace offer in Book Four, and in his 
description of the motivations behind the Sicilian expedition (4.17.4, 21-22; 6.24.3). 
The first time Thucydides introduces this idea that the desire for more causes 
decline is in Book Four in his treatment of the Athenian rejection of peace in 424.  Not 
only does Thucydides trace how Athens lost power on the international stage because it 
pursued policies of imperialism, pleon ekhein, but he juxtaposes the Athenian narrative 
with one in which the Sicilians avoid acting on pleon ekhein and enjoy peace and 
prosperity.   Scholars have for a long time noted the unity of Book Four and the early part 
of Book Five.
56
  They comment on the arc of the narrative: Athenian success at Pylos (see 
below) leads to overconfidence and the rejection of Sparta’s peace offer; then the 
Athenians fare poorly in the war and they return to the peace negotiations in 421.  N.G.L. 
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Hammond points out an additional level of analysis in the text: Thucydides’ contrast 
between the fate of Athens and Sicily; both are warned against acting on policies of 
imperialism.  Athens ignores these warnings and suffers; Sicily heeds them and 
prospers.
57
  In both his discussion of Athens’ rejection of peace and in Hermocrates’ 
speech, Thucydides incorporates the language of pleonexia.   
In 424, Athens won a major victory over the Spartans at Pylos, on the coast of the 
Peloponnesus.  As a result of the battle, the Athenians isolated a force of Spartan hoplites 
on the neighboring island of Sphacteria.  The Spartans desired the return of these soldiers 
and offered favorable terms to Athens to end the war.  The ambassadors advise the 
Athenians to accept the peace offer and not to act on the desire for more (4.17.4).
58
  
According to Thucydides, the Athenians rejected the Spartan offer because Cleon, a 
leading Athenian politician, whetted the people’s desire for more (
) (4.21-22).  Thucydides records only one vote to dismiss the Spartan 
proposal, but fragments of Philochorus suggest that a vote on whether or not to accept the 
Spartan peace offer was held three times (Philochorus F128).  Thucydides glosses over 
events in order to make a point:  the Athenians, spurred on by Cleon, rejected the peace 
offer due to the peoples’ desire for to extend their power in Greece at the expense of 
Sparta and its allies (4.21.2).
 59
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 In Thucydides’ narrative, the war goes poorly for Athens after it rejects the 
Spartan peace offer of 424.  It fails to support the democratic revolt at Megara effectively, 
loses the battle of Delium, and loses many of their allies in northern Greece due to the 
campaign of Brasidas.  By 423, the Athenians agree to an armistice, and they swear to a 
treaty with Sparta in 421 on worse terms than if they had accepted the offer of 424. 
 In contrast, the cities of Sicily avoid pleonexia, being influenced by Hermocrates, 
and they prosper.  In Books Three and Four, Thucydides presents Sicily as being racked 
by war, while Athens waited for a chance to intervene and conquer the island (3.86).  
After the cities of Gela and Camarina agree to an armistice, all the cities of Sicily 
convene to discuss the possibility of a general peace (4.58).  At this juncture in Book 
Four, Thucydides inserts a speech by Hermocrates in which he calls for the Sicilian cities 
to end their quarrels and come to a common peace in order to prevent Athenian 
intervention.
60
  He begins the speech by noting that individuals go to war in order to gain 
more (pleon skhesein) (4.59.2).  The problem with this strategy is that during the course 
of a war, another side may gain the advantage—in this instance, Athens (4.60.1).  The 
outcome of war is uncertain; neither strength nor the desire for revenge guarantees 
success (4.62.3-4).  In fact, those who act out of a desire for more (pleon ekhein) will end 
up with less (4.62.3).  Since the outcome of war is uncertain, cities should be cautious 
entering into it (4.62.4).  Therefore, the best course of action would be for all of Sicily to 
make peace in order to prevent an Athenian intervention (4.63.1).
 
 
Thus Hermocrates associates acting on pleon ekhein with the potential decline of 
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Sicily.  Cities acting on pleon ekhein would perpetuate the war in Sicily, allow for further 
Athenian involvement, and could result in Athenian domination of the island.  As a result 
of Athenian intervention, the Sicilians would have gone from a state of freedom and 
independence to a state of subjugation.  The Sicilians heed Hermocrates’ warning and 
adopt his plan, forestalling the Athenian intervention (4.65).  In antithesis to Athens, 
which suffered due to its pleon ekhein of 424, Thucydides recounts how the island of 
Sicily remained free of general conflict until 416.  Thucydides does record a stasis in 
Leontini in 422 at 5.4.3-6, which an Athenian fleet tries to use as a pretext for a war 
against Syracuse, but nothing happens.
61
  In juxtaposing the fortunes of the Sicilian and 
Athens in Book Four, then, Thucydides demonstrated that acting on desiring more (pleon 
ekhein) leads to decline and the advantages of avoiding it.
62
 
The most famous example of Athenian pleon ekhein is the Sicilian expedition of 
416 BCE, in which Athens sent a large armed force in an attempt to conquer the island.  
Thucydides notes that the expedition was launched due to the Athenian’s desire for more 
(tōn pleonōn epithumian), inspired by Alcibiades, who promoted the expedition in order 
to increase his political standing (6.24.3).
63
  The result of the Sicilian expedition was the 
destruction of most of Athens’ fleet and army.  In the years after the Sicilian expedition, 
which Thucydides narrates in Book Eight, many of Athens’ allies revolted, Sparta allied 
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with Persia in order to obtain the resources to continue the war, and by the end of the 
book, Athens suffered its own stasis, when politicians within Athens fought each other 
for power within the city.  Thus, Athens suffered severe setbacks internationally, as well 
as internal conflicts due to ambition politicians who pushed policies of pleon ekhein.
64
 
 In his narrative, then, Thucydides tied acting on pleonexia to decline.  In his 
Corcyraean stasis narrative, Thucydides delineates a process by which individuals 
impelled by pleonexia and philotimia transformed a functioning city into a war-zone.  In 
regard to Athens, he highlighted how ambitious politicians acting on the desire for 
political power, philotimia, fed the desires of the people, pleon ekhein, and pushed bad 
policies, such as the Sicilian Expedition, on Athens.  In Book Four, he compared policies 
of pleon ekhein with those that avoided pleon ekhein revealing the importance of not 
acting according to pleon ekhein.  Thus, Thucydides shows that operating on motives of 
pleonexia both is dangerous in international and domestic affairs and praises policies that 
shun such behaviors. 
Pleonexia and Decline in Xenophon 
 In the Hellenica, Xenophon illustrates how pleonexia led to the collapse of the 
Thirty Tyrants at Athens and the Spartan Hegemony.  As shown earlier, Xenophon 
characterized the motivation behind the Thirty’s violent removal of potential political 
rivals as pleonexia (2.3.13-14).  These executions led to anger and opposition to the 
Thirty among the Athenian people (2.3.17).  After the execution of Theramenes, the 
Thirty continued their purges, and more people fled from Athens (2.4.1).  These exiles 
created resistance movements, and the one from Thebes, led by Thrasybulus, seized 
Phyle, a deme north west of Athens (2.3.2).  This group repelled all attempts to dislodge 
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them and took over the Piraeus and the port of Athens, and they eventually overthrew the 
Thirty (2.4.10-38).  Thus, it was the pleonexia of the Thirty that caused resistance, stasis, 
and the eventual end of their regime.  
 Not only did Xenophon use pleonexia to explain the downfall of the Thirty in 
Athens, but he also used it to explain the end of the Spartan hegemony.  Current 
scholarship on the end of the Spartan hegemony prefers other explanations over 
Xenophon’s emphasis on Spartan pleonexia.  George Cawkwell argues that Sparta lost 
the battle of Leuctra because of the genius of Epapimondas, not through a particular 
failing of Spartan policy.  Paul Cartledge stresses internal weaknesses within the Spartan 
state leading to a lack of the necessary resources needed to maintain its hegemony.  
Charles Hamilton points to the arrogance and failed policies of Agesilaus (without 
ascribing the actions to pleonexia) as the reason for Theban hostility and the defeat of 
Sparta at Leuctra.  Valerie French and Alvin Bertein in their respective articles in Polis 
and Polemos contend that Spartan society simply could not deal with the new stresses put 
on it as a result of Sparta winning the Peloponnesian War in 404.
65
 
As already discussed, Xenophon deployed pleonexia to characterize how Sparta 
alienated its allies by abusing its authority and power in such a way that hurt its allies.  
According to speakers in the Hellenica, while Sparta claimed to desire the independence 
of Greece, it attempted to manage the affairs of other Greek cities and Persia in such a 
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way as to benefit Sparta (3.5.12-15; 6.3.9, 11).  It installed oligarchies in certain cities to 
keep them compliant with the Spartan desires (3.5.12; 6.3.8).  It demanded full co-
operation of its allies, but denied them a voice in making policy (3.5.12; 6.3.8).  In all 
these ways, Sparta sought to expand or retain its power in Greece by limiting or reducing 
the autonomy of other cities. 
  For Xenophon, the ultimate act of Spartan pleonexia was the Spartan capture of 
the Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes.  This move was meant to allow Sparta to control the 
affairs of Thebes in a manner that suited Sparta.  The seizure of the Cadmea, and the 
installation of a pro-Spartan oligarchy in Thebes, outraged the Thebans and caused them 
to revolt in 378.  Thebes relied upon the discontent of other allies of Sparta to construct a 
coalition, which it used successfully against Sparta at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. 
The Spartan defeat at Leuctra broke the mirage of Spartan military invincibility as well as 
Sparta’s hegemony over Greece. 
Xenophon made the connection clear between Sparta’s seizure of the Theban 
citadel and the end of its hegemony over Greece at 5.4.1: 
Many examples could be given both from Greek and foreign history to 
show that the gods are not indifferent to irreligion or to evil doing.  
Here I shall mention only the case which occurs at this point in my 
narrative.  The Spartans had sworn to leave the cities independent, and 
then they had seized the Acropolis of Thebes.  Now they were punished 
by the action of these men, and these men alone, whom they had 
wronged, although before that time they had never been conquered by 




Xenophon does not employ a form of pleonexia at 5.4.1, but elsewhere, in the speeches 
of Autocles and Callistratus in Book Six, the speakers characterize Spartan policy, 
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specifically the seizure of Thebes’s acropolis, as pleonexic.
67
  
 Thus Xenophon continued the model of decline caused by pleonexia.  He 
continually portrayed the actions of the Thirty as being driven by pleonexia.  These 
actions alienated the people of Athens and caused them to revolt and expel the Thirty.  
Second, he applied the idea of pleonexia alienating dominant powers from lesser powers 
when describing what caused tensions between Sparta and its allies.  The ultimate act of 
Spartan pleonexia was its seizure of the Theban fortress, which caused the Thebans to 
rally the discontented allies of Sparta together and defeat Sparta at Leuctra.  So, in his 
Hellenica, Xenophon cast pleonexia as the force that destroyed both the Thirty in Athens 
and Sparta’s hegemony over Greece. 
Continuity 
 As has been discussed, scholars in general agree that Thucydides was aware of 
Herodotus, and that Xenophon drew on Thucydides.  In particular, Xenophon adapted 
Thucydides’ Corcyraean stasis narrative in his own account of the Thirty Tyrants in 
Athens.  In the Corcyraean stasis narrative, Thucydides introduces a number of factors 
that characterize a city in stasis.  A city suffered from an intensification of action and 
rhetoric, during which language changed to reflect new hyper-partisan values: reckless 
daring for party was considered courage, and prudence and good counsel was considered 
cowardice (3.82.4).  Factions within the city valued the audacious and distrusted 
reasonable men (3.82.5).  They engaged in plots and counter-plots for the good of the 
party while they distrusted anyone who argued for the good of the state as a whole 
(3.82.5).  Shared crimes united a faction more than loyalty, and a faction worked more 
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for its own gain than to preserve the laws of the state (3.82.6).  It was better to remove 
potential threats than to suffer from them (3.82.7).  The faction in power used any means 
necessary, force or subversion of the court system, to remain in power (3.82.8).  
Pleonexia and philotimia drove all these actions. 
 Xenophon’s description of the rule of the Thirty at Athens follows Thucydides’ 
outline.
68
  Upon achieving power, the Thirty plotted against known enemies and potential 
threats to the new regime (Thuc. 3.82.5) when they arrested those who had informed 
against aristocrats during the democracy and those who were most likely to resist the new 
regime (Xen. Hel. 2.3.12-14).  They embraced the brash and violent ideas of Critias, who 
wanted to expand their power, and dismissed the cautious Theramenes, who advised 
prudence (Thuc. 3.82.5; Xen. Hel. 2.3.15-16, 23).  Fearing that Theramenes would 
become a focal point for resistance to their regime,  they ordered him to name a resident 
alien whom the Thirty would arrest and whose property they would confiscate (Xen. Hel. 
2.3.18-21), an attempt to attach him to their cause by having him share in their crimes 
(Thuc. 3.82.6).  Theramenes replied that it was odd to him that those who considered 
themselves “the good” were acting in a manner that equaled “the worst” (2.3.22), 
showing that he perceived a disconnect between words and deeds, a subversion of 
language (Thuc. 3.82.4).  Eventually, the Thirty desired to rid themselves of Theramenes 
by vote of the three thousand before he could become a threat.  During Theramenes’ trial, 
Critias accused him of being willing to plot against the Thirty (Xen. Hel. 2.3.33).  After 
the speech of Theramenes, when it seemed that the council would acquit him, the Thirty 
changed the laws so that he would be found guilty (2.3.5), a subversion of the law and 
courts (Thuc. 3.82.8).  Thus, Xenophon’s account of the Thirty followed the pattern of 
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actions that Thucydides outlined for factions in the Corcyraean stasis narrative.  Like the 
factions at Corcyra, the Thirty too lost power because of their pleonexia. 
Conclusion 
 Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon understood all forms of pleonexia to be 
“the desire to gain at the expense of another.”  They used the noun pleonexia and the verb 
pleonekteō to refer to the manipulation of situations for an individual’s advantage.  
Examples include the manipulation of agreements, as was the case between the Argives 
and the Spartans in Herodotus in Book Seven, the manipulation of unequal power 
relationships, such as Athens’ alleged abuses of courts in Book One of Thucydides, or 
Sparta’s abuse of its allies in Xenophon’s Hellenica.  Herodotus and Thucydides used 
pleon plus a verb of desire to describe situations where one entity wanted to expand its 
control.  For Herodotus, Persia’s desire to conquer Greece was pleon ekhein (7.16a).  In 
Thucydides, pleon ekhein inspired Athens’ to try and conquer Sicily (6.24.3).  Xenophon 
did not use pleon plus a verb of desire in this manner. 
 Thucydides and Xenophon, however, did attach the idea of acting on pleonexia to 
a concept of decline. In regard to the decline within a society, Thucydides delineated a 
progression of steps in which a city went from being a functioning polity to being 
violently torn apart by competing factions in his Corcyraean stasis narrative; he identified 
the drivers of this process as pleonexia and philotimia (3.82.8).   In regard to decline on 
the international stage, Thucydides showed how acting on pleon ekhein caused Athens to 
over-extend itself in the form of the Sicilian expedition, which led to a loss of power.  
Xenophon applied Thucydides’ model of stasis in a community for his own narrative 





pleonexia on the interstate level to explain the end of the Spartan Hegemony (5.4.1, 6.3.9, 
11). 
 The existence of these patterns demonstrates first that late fifth century authors 
conceptualized pleonexia in a similar manner and warned against it.  Second, Xenophon’s 
application of Thucydides’ Corcyraean stasis narrative to his treatment of the Thirty 
reveals that Thucydides’ ideas on the internal deterioration of a community were already 
being adapted by fourth century writers.  In the late fifth century, authors cautioned 
against cities or individuals acting in a toxically selfish manner.  The seeking of excess 
power or wealth was bad enough, but it was made worse when that power or wealth came 
from another.  Such a parasitic attitude, if allowed to continue in a community, created an 
ever increasing cycle of violence and retribution, ending only with some form of 
atrocity—seen in Thucydides’ treatment of the fate of the Corcyraean oligarchs (3.85; 
4.46-8) or Xenophon’s narrative of the reign of the Thirty Tyrants (2.4.10-38).   Thus, in 
the late fifth century, authors understood pleonexia as “the desire to gain at the expense of 
another,” attached it to ideas of losing power on the international stage and internal 







Pleonexia and Decline in Plato and Aristotle 
 
 
 This chapter will review the appearances of pleonexia in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle.   Plato and Aristotle were renowned philosophers of fourth-century Athens, and 
their works are canonical writings in western philosophy.  Plato grew up during the 
Peloponnesian War and was active as a philosopher for the first half of the fourth century.   
Aristotle was one of Plato’s best known students, and he tutored Alexander the Great. 
   This chapter will first look at how scholarship has dealt with the issues of 
pleonexia, decline, and the influence of Thucydides in the works of Plato and Aristotle.  
Second, it will discuss how Plato and Aristotle used pleonexic vocabulary in their various 
works.
1
  Then, it will focus on how the authors employed pleonexia to explain why cities 
fell into stasis.  Finally, the chapter will look at the links between Plato, Aristotle, and 
Thucydides in order to suggest that the philosophers of the fourth century drew upon 
Thucydides when discussing pleonexia and stasis. 
In their studies of government and ethics, Plato and Aristotle present pleonexia as 
injustice, and they use the language of pleonexia to indicate when an individual either 
seeks or has more power in a society than other members of that same community.  In the 
Gorgias and Republic, Plato refers to the man who functions on pleonexia as adikos 
(unjust), and seeks to demonstrate that such an individual was the cause of societal 
discontent.  Also in the Gorgias, as well as in the Symposium and Critias, Plato presents 
pleonexia as an imbalance and a disease of the affairs of cities.  In the Nicomachean 
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Ethics, Aristotle identifies pleonexia as part of the particular injustice, which is when a 
person tries to gain more, of honor, money, or security.  In the Politics, the companion 
piece to the Nicomachean Ethics,
2
 Aristotle uses pleonexia to explain how states fall into 
civil conflict (stasis).  Factions within cities vie with each other for more power or honor 
and try to gain at the expense of the other factions (Pol. 1302a).  In other works, Plato 
and Aristotle rely on pleonexia to designate having an advantage in a specific area, such 
as military, rhetoric, or music. 
 Plato and Aristotle present pleonexia as a driver of why governments change or 
fall into disorder.  In the Republic, Plato ties ideas of decline to pleonexia; cities 
transition into inferior forms of government when society falls out of balance.  A society 
falls out of balance when the political elites within it desire more of something at the 
expense of other individuals within that society; hence pleonexia drives the transition of 
governments.  Plato makes this connection explicit when he notes that the unjust man, 
whom he identifies as the cause for oligarchy changing into democracy and democracy to 
tyranny, is impelled by pleonexia (564b-574a).  In his Politics, Aristotle specifies that 
factions operating on pleonexia cause civil conflict within cities (1302a). 
 By emphasizing pleonexia as a factor in why governments change, Plato and 
Aristotle continue the paradigm from Thucydides that was discussed last chapter.  Both 
authors use the same definition of pleonexia as Thucydides; both show that acting on 
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pleonexia causes unrest and social disharmony in the polis, resulting possibly in stasis.  
The two authors even use word pairings similar to those found in Thucydides.   
Thucydides in the Corcyraean stasis narrative labels pleonexia and philotimia as the 
causes of stasis; in the Critias, Plato notes that pleonexia adikos and dunamis (power) 
caused Atlantis’ fall (121b).  Aristotle pairs kerdos (gain) with timē (honor) when talking 
about the causes of revolution in the Politics.  These are not exact parallels in language, 
but they demonstrate that the three authors had similar ideas, expressed with similar 
vocabulary, in order to explain the same event.  When individuals within a city begin to 
operate on zero-sum principles (pleonexia), the community goes from functioning to 
tearing itself apart.  The specific desire of the individuals may vary (money, gain, power), 
but as soon as they desire it at the expense of others, pleonexia, and civil strife (stasis) 
erupt.   
Scholarship on Pleonexia, Decline, and Continuity in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle 
 
 Scholars recognize the importance of pleonexia in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle, but they have no consensus on its meaning.  Scholars have long accepted that 
pleonexia was the antithesis of Plato’s concept of justice, which was central to the 
Republic.
3
  Most of the time, however, they have accepted some form of greed, or “the 
desire for more than one’s share” or “an insatiable desire for more” as the definition.
4
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th
 ed. (London: Methuen and Co, 1977), 168-77; Julia Annas, 
An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 11-12; G.J. Boter, “Thrasymachus 
and PLEONEXIA,” Mnemosyne 39 (1986): 261; C.D.C Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of 
Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3-42; Keimpe Algra, “Observations on 
Plato’s Thrasymachus,” in Polyhistor, ed. Kiempe Algra, Pieter van der Horst, and David Runia (Leiden: 
Brill, 1996), 47-48, 51; Mario Vegetti, “Antropologie della Pleonexia,” in Enōsis kai Philia, ed. Maria 
Barbanti, Giovanna Giardina, and Paolo Manganaro (Catania: CUECM, 2002), 66. 
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Gregory Vlastos noted that it was gain at the expense of another in his article, “Justice 
and Happiness” but he accepted greed as alternative, if mismatching, definition.
5
  Few 
have followed his insight.  Recently, in her chapter “Socrates’ Refutation of 
Thrasymachus” in Blackwell’s Companion to Plato’s Republic, Rachel Barney states that 
pleonexia is gain at the expense of another.
6
     
 Most scholars acknowledge that pleonexia in Aristotle’s works means gain at the 
expense of another.  David Keyt supports this meaning in “Injustice and Pleonexia in 
Aristotle: A Reply to Charles Young.”
7
  In his study, Aristotle’s First Principles Terence 
Irwin states that Aristotle’s concept of pleonexia involved gain at the expense of another.
8
  
In Aristotle, Richard Kraut argues that Aristotle understood pleonexia as the desire to 
have more at the expense of another.
9
  Balot discusses the centrality of pleonexia, which 
he lumps into his greater category of greed, to both authors.
10
  In his chapter on 
Aristotle’s conception of Justice in the Nichomachaen Ethics in Blackwell’s Guide to 
Aristotle’s Nichomachaen Ethics, Charles Young states that there is no good translation 
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for pleonexia but that it could be conceptualized as a boundless desire for gain, which 
included taking from others.
11
 
 In terms of the concept of decline, scholars of Plato debate whether references to 
decline in the Republic are sincere, and scholars of Aristotle do not consider his 
explanations of why cities descend into stasis as examinations of decline.  Earlier 
scholarship accepted that Plato was both a moral and political philosopher and that in the 
Republic he included a theory of decline based on natural decay.
12
  Julia Annas, Dorothy 
Frede, and Norbert Blössner see Plato’s discussion of decline in the Republic as an 
analogy for the soul and not political theory.
13
  C.D.C. Reeve, Malcolm Schofield, and 
Zena Hitz acknowledge Plato’s sincerity in his discussion of decline.
14
  They return to the 
notion that Plato was a moral and political theorist; his moral theories were intricately 
attached to his discussions of politics—the psychological of the individual influenced the 
nature of the state in which the person lived.
 
  
Scholars investigate Aristotle’s discussion of the causes of stasis in the Politics, 
but refrain from labeling a city’s descent into stasis as decline.  They accept that Aristotle 
presents the cause of stasis as individuals seeking to rectify perceived injustice within a 
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  As stated in chapter one, I think that anytime a government falls into 
violent civil unrest, stasis, can be labeled decline.  This definition may seem a little 
broad, but it fits when discussing the devolution of a society from peaceful cohabitation 
under the rule of law to potentially open and armed conflict. 
 On the issue of intellectual continuity, scholars acknowledge the many potential 
connections between Plato and Thucydides.
16
  Barker and Menanke point out the 
parallels in thought between Plato’s description of the radicalization of language caused 
by democracy in Book Eight of the Republic (560d-561b) and Thucydides’ description of 
how stasis inflated language in 3.82.3.
17
  Paul Shorey in his Introduction to the Loeb 
edition of Plato’s Republic notes that Plato’s writings respond to the political philosophy 
of “might makes right” presented in Thucydides’ speeches in the Peloponnesian War.
18  
Harvey Yunis sees Plato’s critique of Periclean rhetoric in the Gorgias as a direct 
response to Thucydides’ treatment of Pericles in the Histories.
19
  Mario Vegetti asserts 
that the idea of pleonexia emerged from the fifth century and Athenian imperialism, and 
that Thucydides was the first to acknowledge it, but that other authors, such as Plato, 
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reused the idea into the fourth century.
20
  In Plato, Malcolm Schofield accepts that Plato 
responded to ideas found in Thucydides in several of his works.
21
 
The ties between Plato and Aristotle need no elaboration, though scholars debate 
how much Aristotle agreed with his teacher’s ideas.  Ryan Balot treats Aristotle’s ideas 
on greed as the end of a long intellectual tradition, which included Plato.
22
 Ronald Weed 
sees Aristotle adopting Plato’s conception that moral flaws within individuals caused 
stasis in a community.
23
  In Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease, Kostas Kalimtzis 
regards Aristotle’s discussions of stasis as part of a larger intellectual tradition on stasis 
that included Thucydides and Plato.
24
  Steven Skultety contends that Aristotle rejected 
Plato’s ideas that stasis was any form of conflict in a community and instead considered 
stasis only to be violent conflicts between groups aiming to change the constitution.
25
  
Overall, then, scholars recognize the role of pleonexia in Plato and Aristotle, but they 
debate the importance of decline and the nature of stasis in the two authors, and see 
Thucydidean influences in Plato. 
Pleonexia in Plato 
 In his treatises on government and ethics, Plato presents the pleonektēs, the person 
who acts according to pleonexia, as an unjust person, adikous, who seeks to enrich 
himself at the cost of others, but ends up hurting himself.  In the Gorgias and Republic, 
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Plato’s interlocutors treat pleonexia as a natural, innate desire within individuals to gain 
as much as possible.
26
  In responding to these arguments, Plato portrays pleonexia as a 
negative characteristic that it is harmful both to the individual who acts on it and to 
society as a whole.  In the Timaeus, and Laws, which continue the Republic’s theme 
about the importance of virtue and what is a “good” society, Plato describes pleonexia as 
a disease, and he presents it as hateful to the gods (Tim. 82a; Laws 10.906c).  In other 
works, such as the Laches, Plato uses pleonexic language in a more neutral manner to 
denote either seeking or having an advantage. 
 The Gorgias is the first work of Plato’s that introduces the idea that self-control is 
better than the boundless pursuit of desire.  The dialogue between Plato’s teacher 
Socrates, Gorgias, a well-known teacher of rhetoric in the late fifth century, and other 
Athenians, including Polus and Callicles, begins with a discussion of what is rhetoric, but 
turns to the topic of the power of rhetoric, and whether rhetoricians and teachers of 
rhetoric should be good men and teach their pupils to be good as well.
27
  The work then 
moves to the theme of what is needed for happiness: either pursuit of one’s pleasures or 
pursuit of virtue.
28
  Pleonexia appears in this section of the dialogue when Socrates 
debates with Callicles whether it is better to suffer or wrong others. 
 Callicles is the third person in the dialogue to debate Socrates, and injects himself 
into the discussion after Socrates proves that it is better to suffer a punishment than to 
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  He contends that according to nature, suffering a wrong is worse than 
committing one (483a).  In nature, the stronger have the advantage over the weaker 
(
) (483d). This rule is seen in animals 
(zōois) and interstate relations (); Xerxes’ decision to invade 
Greece and Darius’ invasion of Scythia prove this law (483d-e).
30
  Thus, it is better to 
commit a wrong because it proves one is stronger and more powerful, whereas to suffer 
would demonstrate a person’s weakness.
 Committing wrongs is perceived as unjust, Callicles continues, because weaker 
men created laws and prohibitions as a control mechanism against the stronger doing 
what they wanted (483c). In order to protect themselves, the weak tell the strong that 
acting on pleonexia is shameful and unjust (
) and that the act of taking more from others is an act of injustice (483c).  
The weak espouse doctrines of equality to hide their inferiority.  From infancy, the strong 
are indoctrinated with the ideas that having the equal share is good (483e-484a).  If a 
person is strong enough, Callicles believes, then as he grows up he will recognize and 
remove the artificial constraints enforced on him, and, as opposed to being a slave to 
society, he will becomes its master (484a).  Callicles’ argument shows that he believes 
that pleonexia is the act of the strong taking what they want from the weak. 
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 Through Socrates’ reply, Plato demonstrates that he also understands pleonexia to 
mean having more at the expense of others.  After a prolonged discussion of the benefits 
of philosophy, Socrates returns to the question of whether the strong should have more 
than the weak.  He first attempts to get Callicles to define further what it means to be “the 
strongest” (489c-491d).
31
  Socrates starts by asking that if a group had stockpiled food, 
should a doctor, who is wiser than the others, be considered superior (490b)?  Callicles 
says he should.  Socrates then asks whether the doctor should get more of the food than 
the rest ( ) (490c), or should the doctor 
seek to divide the food equally? Should he get the smallest quantity of food if he were 
physically the weakest despite being the wisest (490c)?  Callicles dismisses these 
comments (490d).  Then, Socrates asks if the best weaver should get the largest and finest 
cloths (490d), the best shoemaker the biggest shoes or the best farmer more of the seed 
() (490e).  These questions demonstrate that Plato 
understands pleonexia as gain at another’s expense.  In order for the best person to get 
more, others will get less.  If the doctor received more food, others would have less; if the 
farmer took more seeds, others would have fewer.
32
  Callicles dismisses these ideas, but 
they still showcase that Plato understood pleonexia as having more at the expense of 
others. 
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 The only instances where this definition does not seem to work are the examples 
of the weaver and shoemaker.  Plato includes these examples as jokes: they are Callicles’ 
philosophy that the best should have more taken to the logical, if ridiculous, extreme in 
order to discredit it.  By examining them, especially the shoemaker, nevertheless we can 
learn more about how Plato conceptualized pleonexia.  Socrates notes that the best 
shoemaker should have more (), and that he should have the biggest and 
largest collection of shoes (490e).  This inequality of access indicates that for Plato, as in 
Thucydides, pleonexia was not bound to the desire for material items; rather, it can refer 
to power.  The shoemaker will have an unfair advantage over others because he controls 
the shoe supply and can limit others’ ability to get either quality shoes or many shoes; the 
same argument can be made for the weaver and cloth.  In both, by acting on pleonexia, an 
individual gains material goods and perhaps power (control over the shoe or cloth 
supply), while others lose access to material goods or the power to get shoes or cloth: 
gain at the expense, or exclusion, of others. 
 Plato concludes the Gorgias with Socrates’ discussion of the importance of 
temperance (507-527e).  In the section, Socrates notes that pleonexia goes against 
geometry (508a).  Gods and humans live in balance, and seeking self-advantage ignores 
this balance (508a).  This statement reinforces the idea that pleonexia is gain at others’ 
expense because it presents pleonexia as an act that would imbalance a system.  The idea 
of balance portrays the world as a zero-sum game in which there is a finite amount of 
goods that are equitably distributed.  If one person seeks to have more of anything, then 
the entire system is disrupted.  Thus, not only is pleonexia gain at the expense of others, it 





 In the Republic, Plato returned to and built upon the ideas regarding pleonexia 
presented in the Gorgias.
33
  It focuses on the questions of whether individuals should 
pursue self-aggrandizement or virtue, and what kind of state can bring this about?  In the 
work, Plato revisits the themes of justice versus injustice and why it is better for society 
for the individual to be ruled by moderation as opposed to the individual being controlled 
by his passion.  He opens the work with a discussion of who is happier: the unjust person 
who functions on pleonexia, or the just person who does not, and toward the end of the 
work, he demonstrates that those who operate on pleonexia hurt themselves and society.  
In this way, the Republic continues the themes presented in the Gorgias. 
 The end of the first book of the Republic introduces the question that the rest of 
the work answers: who is happier, the just or the unjust person?
34
  Thrasymachus raises 
this question at 343a, and Glaucon picks it up at the start of Book Two.
35
  As in the 
Gorgias, speakers in the Republic use the language of pleonexia to characterize the unjust 
and just individual.  In the discussion between Thrasymachus and Socrates at the end of 
Book One, Plato first presents pleonexia as actions taken by the unjust man to obtain an 
advantage over others.  When debating who has the advantage when holding public 
office, the just or unjust man, Thrasymachus argues that the unjust man will have the 
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advantage because he would be able to abuse his office for personal profit on a massive 
scale () (343e).  The just man will not abuse his 
office, and therefore his private affairs will suffer (1.343c-e).  The unjust man differs 
from other criminals—specifically temple robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and 
thieves, who commit lesser forms of injustice—because he not only takes the property of 
other people, but he also takes control of them as well (1.344b).  Despite this abuse of 
power, the community will consider the unjust man to be happy and blessed 
() (1.344b).  Thus, in his definition, Thrasymachus elevates the 
unjust man beyond the realm of material desire and establishes him as a tyrant who 
enslaves his fellow citizens.
 In response, Socrates refutes the idea that rulers rule only for their own advantage 
and not the advantage of the people (1.344d-347e).  He dismisses as slander the idea that 
people serve in public office out of a desire for either honor or money (1.347b).  For 
Socrates, good people hold office in order that worse people do not (1.347d).  In 
Socrates’ discussion of how rulers rule for the good of all, Plato uses forms of ōpheleian 
and sumpheron to refer to advantage for the community, as opposed to pleonexia,
36
 
which he had used when discussing who had the advantage between the unjust man and 
the just man.  This change in language is significant.  When discussing positive benefits, 
Plato uses non-pleonexic language.  When using language implying gain at another’s 
expense, however, Plato employs the vocabulary of pleonexia.  This change indicates that 
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pleonexic language had a negative connotation for Plato and that he depended on it when 
discussing situations in which a person took advantage of others. 
 Plato returns to forms of pleonexia when Socrates returns to the discussion of who 
has the advantage: the just man or the unjust person (1.348b).  Socrates asks, “Would the 
just man want to get more from another just person?” (
) (1.349b).37 Thrasymachus denies this.  Then Socrates 
asks, “Would the just man think it proper to get more at the expense of the unjust man?” 
() (1.349b). Thrasymachus 
agrees that the just man would think it proper to outdo the unjust man, but posits that he 
would be unable to do so (1.349b).  Socrates finally asks, “Would the unjust person seek 
to get the better of both the just and unjust?” (
[]
) (1.349c). Thrasymachus agrees.  Plato, through 
Socrates, summarizes the exchange, “The just man does not seek to take advantage of his 
like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both.” (
) (1.349c).  
In the passage, Plato continually associates acting according to pleonexia with trying to 
gain not merely an advantage, but an advantage over another.  Although both the just and 
unjust man can operate on pleonexia, the just man will only do so against one who 
deserves it.  The unjust man acts in this manner towards all people.  
 Once Thrasymachus agrees to this condition, Socrates destroys the idea that the 
unjust man is more intelligent and wiser than the just man by showing that only fools try 
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to outdo all kinds of people.
38
  In doing so, Plato continues to rely on pleonexia.  In the 
beginning of this exchange, Thrasymachus asserts that the just man is foolish, and the 
unjust man is intelligent (1.349d).  Socrates then asks, “Is the musician and the physician 
intelligent or unintelligent?” “Intelligent,” replies Thrasymachus (1.349d).  “And the non-
musician and non-physician, intelligent or unintelligent?” “Unintelligent” (1.349d).  
Socrates then turns, “Would the musician in tuning of a lyre want to overreach another 
musician in tightening and relaxing of the strings, or would claim and think fit (it) to 
exceed or outdo him (the other musician)?” (

) (1.349e). Thrasymachus replies that the musician would not, but 
that the unmusical man would (1.349e).  Socrates then asks, “Would a doctor outdo the 
medical man or the medical procedure?” (
) (1.350a). Thrasymachus states 
that the doctor would not try to outdo others, but that the non-medical man would 
(1.350a).  Socrates then broadens the comparison, asking in regard to all forms of 
knowledge would the wise man try to take advantage of all (1.350a)? Thrasymachus 
replies he would not (1.350a).  The ignorant man, however, would (1.350b).  Thus, 
Socrates establishes that the good and the wise only work on pleonexia when dealing 
with the unjust 
(
) (1.350b).  He determines that the foolish and ignorant act on 
pleonexia toward all (1.350b).  Thus, the just man, who works according to pleonexia 
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only when dealing with the unjust, is good and wise, and the unjust man, who tries to take 
from all, is foolish and ignorant (1.350b-c).
 Socrates then applies this logic to cities.  He asks Thrasymachus which is better: 
the city that tries to enslave others or the one that does not (1.351a-b)?  Thrasymachus 
affirms that the best city is the one that enslaves others (1.351b).  Socrates then asks if a 
city, or any group that tried to work together, could get anything done if the members of 
the group acted unjustly toward each other (1.351c).  Thrasymachus accepts that such a 
group could not accomplish anything (1.351c).   The reason for this is that factions 
originate from injustice (
) (1.351d).  Socrates then asserts that if this statement is true for 
cities, it would be true for individuals; if a person suffered from internal divisions, he 
would not accomplish anything (1.352a).  Thus, in the first book of the Republic, Plato 
presents injustice as working according to pleonexia, and pleonexia as working to gain an 
advantage over others.  Plato ends the book by having Socrates prove that the person who 
acts on pleonexia is foolish and ignorant and incapable of great accomplishments, an idea 
that he applies to cities as well.  
 In Book Two, through the story of Gyges, Plato further connects the idea of 
pleonexia to injustice and gain at another’s expense.  At the beginning of the Book Two, 
Glaucon picks up Thrasymachus’ argument and presents pleonexia as gain at the expense 
of others.  At the start of the book, Glaucon proposes to continue the argument of 
Thrasymachus because he remains unconvinced (2.357).  He brings up the point that 
nature compels all to work on pleonexia and that it is law that restricts men (2.359c).  





they desire and everyone else (2.359a).
39
  His argument parallels one of the topics of the 
Gorgias: is it worse to suffer wrong, or to do wrong?  In defense of the principle that it is 
better to commit wrong (and therefore be unjust), Glaucon brings up the story of Gyges, 
who supposedly owned a ring that allowed him to become invisible (2.359d-e).  With this 
ring, Gyges could act with impunity, and eventually he slept with the king’s wife, slew 
the king, and became king himself (2.360b).  Glaucon’s contention is that all men, if they 
had Gyges’ power, would act in this fashion.  If there were two such rings, and an unjust 
and just man put them on, then both would act the same way because the just man could 
not resist the temptation to act as he desired (2.360b-c).   
 The story of Gyges demonstrates that the unjust man (who acts on pleonexia) 
gains at another’s expense.
40
  Gyges gains by exploiting others: the queen, the king; in 
this way, injustice is not just acquisition or advantage, but an individual manipulating a 
situation in a way to enrich himself to the detriment of others.  The story also sets up the 
problem for the rest of the book: is it better to be just or unjust?  To answer this question, 
Socrates states that he will construct an ideal city, explain how it would work, and 
through it explain the source of justice and injustice to prove that justice is better (2.368a-
369b). 
Plato reincorporates the language of pleonexia into the text in books Eight and 
Nine, in which he demonstrates again that it is gain from others and that it hurts those 
who act on it.  Books Eight and Nine describe the tyrannical man, or the man who 
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follows his desires without control, just as Glaucon, and even Callicles from the Gorgias, 
wanted.
41
  In Plato, Schofield argues this desire is not limited to money, as he interprets 
Balot, but to any and all aspects of life, especially where it trespasses upon social and 
cultural mores.
42
  According to Socrates, the tyrannical man is never satisfied (9.573a-d).  
His desire for more is unquenchable and his passions control him; as a result, he spends 
all his money and then his parents’ fortune as well (
) (9.574a).  Socrates discloses that the young man inflamed by his passions will beat 
his own parents to get the resources to feed his passions (9.574b-c).  After burning 
through these resources, the tyrant will turn to all sorts of crimes to feed his desires 
(9.575a).  If enough of these men exist in a city, then they will enslave the city itself to 
feed their desires (9.575a-e).  In this way, Plato presents the unjust and pleonektēs man as 
gaining at the expense of others.  To have more, he takes from his parents, from others, 
and even deprives his own city of liberty.  Later, Socrates compares people operating on 
base desire to cattle, and he remarks that in their desire for more 
() they fight and kill one another to gratify urges that 
cannot be satiated (9.586b).  Thus, Plato in the Republic reiterated his thoughts in the 
Gorgias that pleonexia is a natural urge in men to gain at the expense of others, and adds 
that such an urge ends up hurting the individual who acts according to it.
 The idea that pleonexia hurts those who act upon it occurs in other works of 
Plato.
43
  In the Symposium, pleonexia is an imbalance in nature which causes disease and 
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pestilence (188b).  In the Timaeus, pleonexia is an imbalance in nature, and when it or 
deficiency (endeia) occurs, there is disorder and disease (stasis and nosos) (Tim. 82a).
44
  
In Book Nine of the Laws, he says that man has a natural instinct that urges him toward 
pleonexia and pursuit of private interests to the detriment of himself and the state 
(9.875b-c).  In Book Ten, he labels the sin (amartēma) of pleonexia as a disease (nosēma) 
of the body, a pestilence (loimos) to seasons, and finally injustice (adikia) to states and 
polities (10.906c).   
 Outside the context of society and virtue, Plato employs pleonexia to refer to 
gaining an advantage over other people, thus putting them at a disadvantage.  This usage 
maintains the idea that pleonexia is gain at other’s expense, but in a more neutral manner.  
Plato uses pleonexic words in the Laches to discuss the idea of gaining an advantage over 
an enemy.  In the first instance of pleonexic language, Nicias notes that wearing armor 
could give a fighter an advantage in battle () 
(182b).  In the second instance, Laches notes that the Spartans seek out everything to gain 
an advantage in war () (183a).  In both 
cases the person operating on pleonexia would gain something in relation to someone 
else (in this case someone who is an enemy on the battlefield).   
 In the Symposium, pleonexia also refers to getting advantage over another in such 
a way that the other person loses.  Responding to Alcibiades’ declaration of love for him, 
Socrates asks if Alcibiades is trying to gain an advantage over him (pleonexia) by trying 
to switching bronze for gold (218e).  The switching bronze for gold is a reference to the 
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Iliad story in which Glaucus and Diomedes switch armor of unequal value.  After 
realizing that there were formal ties between them, Glaucus gives Diomedes his gold 
armor in exchange for Diomedes’ bronze armor (Il. 6.215-36).  In the deal, Diomedes 
gained more because the gold was worth more than the bronze.  By using this analogy, 
Socrates equates pleonexia with the idea of unequal exchange and reinforces the idea that 
it is unjust gain at the expense of another.   
 There are a few instances where Plato uses pleonexia in a neutral fashion.  In 
Book Three of the Laws, one of the speakers notes that in the course of the conversation, 
the group has gained (pleonektoumen) such knowledge (683a).  This is a rare instance 
where a form of pleonexia just means gain.  The speakers are not competing with anyone 
else; the line refers to what they had learned in earlier books (683a). In Book Seven of the 
Laws, Plato notes that neither regulated music nor unregulated music has an advantage 
(pepleonektein) over the other (7.802d).
45
  Here, his meaning is that neither form of 
music is better than the other when it comes to hearing it, though Plato states that 
regulated music is better because it teaches structure and discipline to children (7.802d).   
Pleonexia in Aristotle 
 Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics parallels Plato in presenting 
pleonexia as an act of in injustice in which individuals take more than their share to the 
detriment of others.  Aristotle presents this definition in the fifth book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and he contrasts pleonexia and injustice with the equitable 
                                                 
45 
A description of regulated versus unregulated can be found in 3.700 when Plato discusses the 
problems of excess in society.  Regulated music is music that follows specific rules and has specific 
characteristics, for example hymns, dirges, and paeans (3.700a-b); unregulated music is when these various 







distribution found in justness.  Aristotle does not, however, demonstrate that pleonexia 
hurts those who act upon it.  In the Politics and Virtues and Vices, he reiterates the idea 
that pleonexia is gain at the expense of others.  Like Plato, Aristotle occasionally employs 
the term pleonexia to refer, neutrally, to gaining advantage. 
 The Nicomachean Ethics is one of Aristotle’s three complete works on ethics.
46
  
The aim of the work is the study of human happiness.  To do so, Aristotle reviews both 
virtues and vices.  Book Five defines the virtue of the particular justice and the vice of the 
particular injustice.  Aristotle relies on forms of pleonexia when defining the vice of 
particular injustice.  At the start of the book, Aristotle declares that the unjust man is one 
who breaks laws (paranomos) and who is pleonektēs and unfair (anisos) (1129a).  He 
clarifies his meaning of unfair to indicate an act in which a person takes more than an 
equitable share of something (1129b).  This means that the person either takes a greater 
share of rewards, or conversely takes a smaller share of punishments.  Aristotle notes, 
“taking the lesser share of evil seems to be good, and taking more than one’s due means 
taking more of something good,” (
) (1129b).  Thus, in the 
introduction of the discussion of injustice, Aristotle presents pleonexia as an act of unfair 
gain, in which a person takes more than his share.  Though Aristotle is not explicit that 
this hurts another person, it is implied.  If equitable shares of goods exist, then the 
amount of goods must be limited; if the amount of any good is limited, by taking more 
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than one’s allotted amount, a person is taking goods from another.
47
  Thus, for Aristotle, 
the pleonektēs (the individual acting on pleonexia) gains at another’s expense.
48
 Aristotle goes on to distinguish injustice in the particular sense (of which 
pleonexia is a part) from other vices.  He states that when a man throws away his shield, 
uses abusive language, or refrains from giving money to a friend, he is acting unjustly but 
not “taking more than his share of anything,” () (1130a). To further 
his point, Aristotle compares reasons for adultery.  If the purpose of adultery is to sleep 
with a particular woman, then it is an act of profligacy (1130a).  If the person profits from 
the adultery, then it is an act of particular injustice (1130a).  He then defines injustice in 
the particular sense as an act that 1) deals with man’s relations with others 2) concerns 
honor, money, or security, and 3) involves the pleasure of gain (1130b).  Aristotle 
reinforces the idea that the particular injustice is having more than one’s share by 
defining the particular justice in part as the distribution of honor, wealth, and other assets 
of a community on either an equal or unequal basis (1130b).  Unequal distribution does 
not constitute pleonexia, however, because pleonexia is not disproportionate distribution, 
but rather the desire or act of gaining more than one’s allotted amount. 
 Also, according to Aristotle, particular injustice must be a conscious act.  Later in 
Book Five he notes that judges should only be censured if they knowingly decide a case 
in a manner that is unfair (1137a).  The same is true in the case of the person who gives 
too much, whom Aristotle labels a profligate.  If a person over gives, then the person who 
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receives the inappropriate amount of gifts has done no wrong, since it was not the desire 
of the receiver to gain more than a fair share (1136b).  In his discussion of “lovers of 
self,” Aristotle declares that the common definition of this class of people is, “those who 
take the greater share of something” () (1168b).  For all 
three of these instances, individuals must knowingly act in a way to gain unfair shares in 
order for the act to be described as pleonexia.
49
 
 Aristotle’s use of pleonexia in the Politics and Virtues and Vices reinforces the 
idea that it is the desire for more at the expense of others.  In the opening of Book Five of 
the Politics, Aristotle notes that stasis occurs when groups want to gain at another’s 
expense: either through equalizing an unequal society, or disrupting an equal society 
(1302a).
50
  In Book Seven, Aristotle relies on pleonexia to describe “barbarian” territorial 
expansion: barbarians are honored when they expand their power at the expense of others 
(
) (1324b).  In his Virtues and Vices, he groups pleonexia with impiety (asebeia), 
and pride (hubris) under the category of injustice (adikia), and defines it as getting more 
than what is fair in contracts (1216a).  Thus, in works outside of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle retains the idea that pleonexia is gain at the expense of another. 
 Like Plato, Aristotle uses pleonexia to refer, more neutrally, to gaining advantage.  
In the Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle continually uses pleonexia to refer to having the upper 
hand in situations.  In regard to waging war, he prompts speakers to know whether the 
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enemy has military forces similar or dissimilar to the speakers’ own, as whichever side 
has the most has the advantage (
) (1.4.9).  Good fortune gives advantages to 
people in terms of children and material goods (
) (2.17.5).  Defendants have the advantage over 
prosecutors when using the logical fallacy of whether an argument is necessary 
(
) (2.25.10).  In the Politics, Aristotle also uses forms of pleonexia to 
refer, neutrally, to gaining an advantage.    Builders of city walls should ensure that the 
city wall is good for defense, because an attacker will study the walls to see how he might 
gain an advantage (
) (1331a).  He declares that cities that do not want to gain (pleonexia) 
through trade should not build a port (1327a).  In this instance pleonexia refers to the 
advantage of having a port, but this gain does not occur at others’ expense.  So the 
possibility for neutral instances of pleonexia exists, but it is by no means the most 
common use of the idea.
 Like Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon, discussed in the last chapter, both 
Plato and Aristotle understand pleonexia in a communal context to be an act of injustice, 
in which one person gains at the expense of others.  Plato goes further than Aristotle in 
demonstrating that not only is pleonexia gain at another’s expense, but also that it will 
hurt the person acting upon it.   





 In the Republic, Laws, and Critias, Plato demonstrates that when groups within a 
city begin to try to enrich or empower themselves at the expense of others within a city 
(pleonexia), then stasis and decline ensue.  In the Republic and Laws, constitutions 
decline due to an imbalance of desires among the elite of a city, which is caused in part 
by pleonexia.  Plato makes this link more explicit in the Critias when he explains that the 
gods struck Atlantis down because its population had become corrupted with pleonexia. 
 Plato shows that within a city the government changes for the worse when the 
political elite follow their desires at the expense of the city as a whole in the Republic and 
Laws.
51
  In Book Eight of the Republic, Plato declares his intent for the rest of the book to 
be about “how faction fell upon them (the population of his ideal city)” (545d).  Scholars 
debate Plato’s sincerity in discussing the degeneration of constitutions in this section.  
Aristotle critiqued the section as ahistorical and unrealistic (Pol. 1316a).  Blössner treats 
the section as an extended metaphor that allowed Plato to discuss the destructive 
appetites of the soul.
52
    Others argue that this section can be viewed as a discussion of 
political and moral philosophy.  Plato is not outlining a definitive cycle of constitutions; 
rather he is presenting a logical pattern that allows him to discuss both governments and 
psychological urges neatly.
53
  I agree with the latter.  Plato begins with the decline of his 
ideal city, Kallipolis, which he had established in the preceding books.  Kallipolis will 
fall when the city’s leaders, the guardians, fail to time the births of the next generation 
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precisely, and as a result inferior babies are born into the leadership caste (8.546b-d).  
The new, inferior, leaders will ignore important facets of Kallipolis’ education, such as 
music and gymnastics (8.546d-e).   They will instead focus on the acquisition of land and 
money, whereas older leaders will focus on virtue (8.547b).  The conflicting goals will 
create division among the leadership, and eventually strife (8.547a).
54
  This strife will be 
settled by a compromise among the elite of the city, but this compromise will change the 
city’s government, and it will transition from being an aristocracy (rule of the best) to a 
timocracy (rule of those focused on gaining honor).  Thus, for Plato, the transition of 
government happened when a faction within the elite began to follow its own desires at 
the expense of the city as a whole, which creates an imbalance in society. 
 This idea of imbalance causing a change in government implicitly demonstrates 
that Plato thought pleonexia caused decline.  As demonstrated earlier in the chapter, in 
the Gorgias, Plato presented pleonexia as a disease and an imbalance.  In the Republic, he 
links the idea of imbalance in society to changes in government.  Timocracy changes into 
an oligarchy when the elites prefer the acquisition of wealth to the acquisition of honors 
(8.551a-b).  Oligarchy becomes democracy when oligarchs become too obsessed with the 
acquisition of money, and the people revolt out of a desire for an equal share in 
government (8.555b-556e).  In each instance, it is the imbalance of personal desire 
against the good of the state that foments a change among the political elite of the city, 
which in turn transforms the government.  Pleonexia is implicit in this transition, since 
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Plato linked pleonexia to acting as one desires in Books One and Two, which is what the 
corrupt leaders do in Book Eight, and because in other works he presented the idea of 
imbalance in the language of pleonexia. 
 Scholars, in general, acknowledge that in Plato the degeneration of regimes 
happens as a result of out-of-control desires, though only some mention pleonexia.
 55
  In 
“Degenerate Regime’s in Plato’s Republic,” Zena Hitz argues that it is the loss of reason 
that causes regime change in the Republic; for her, reason controls a person’s desires, so 
that the loss of reason would result in the loss of control and decline.  What she and 
others miss, however, and what I and Balot emphasize, is the parasitic nature of these 
appetites.
56
  Even the scholars who dismiss the notion that this section is about the 
decline of governments agree that it is out-of-control appetites which corrupt the youth.
57
  
I agree with Frede that in this section Plato is showing a decline in the morality of youth, 
but again, such a decline would coincide with the decline of the political system. 
 Plato moves to using pleonexia explicitly as a cause for why cities decline when 
explaining how the tyrannical man subverts both oligarchies and democracies.  After 
explaining how an oligarchy becomes a democracy, Socrates stops to discuss the 
similarity of the shifts of oligarchy into democracy, and of democracy into tyranny.  At 
8.563e, Socrates declares:  
The same malady that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more 
widely diffused and more violent as a result of this license (desire for 
liberty) enslaves democracy.  And in truth, any excess is wont to bring 
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about a corresponding reaction to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, 




 The excess in oligarchies is the pursuit of wealth to the detriment of others, 
leading to revolt and democracy.  In a democracy, the people seek for liberty until their 
quest for it causes them to fall into tyranny (8.562a-d).  Socrates describes that in pursuit 
of liberty people in a democracy will eventually allow for no master over them at all, not 
even law (8.563d).  The source of this excess is the class of “idle and spendthrift men” 
( ) (8.564b).  From this class of men 
there arises a leader who plays upon the populace’s fear of oligarchs to gain power over 
the mob, and then uses that power to exile other prominent citizens and seize their 
property (8.565e-566a).  With his popularity, the tyrant persuades the people to grant him 
a bodyguard; he then eliminates all other political competition, and assumes sole rule of 
the city (8.566b-d).  The nature of this man is to have no boundaries on his desires, to 
take from his father’s estates, to control his fellow citizens, to take from shrines (8.568d); 
he will surround himself with like-minded people and use them to control the city 
(8.567d-e).  Thus, democracy is transformed into tyranny.  Plato’s outline of the 
tyrannical man’s consolidation of political power at the end of Book Eight is a little too 
elaborate to be just an analogy of the soul.  The discussion of how desires warp the soul 
occurs, but his discussion of how an individual proceeds to concentrate political power on 
himself demonstrates that Plato was also concerned with political analysis. 
 Plato opens Book Nine with an investigation into the character of the tyrannical 
man.  He notes that such a man has no control over his passions, whether they are for 
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money, women, or whatever else, and cannot satiate them (9.572e-573b).  His desires 
control and even torment him (9.573).  In an attempt to gratify his passions, he will burn 
through his own wealth and then turn to taking the wealth of his father and mother 
(9.574a).  When describing how the tyrant uses his parents’ wealth, Plato notes that in the 
same way in which the passions take over the tyrannical man (
), so does the tyrannical man take over his parents’ estates 
for money in order to satiate his desires (
) (9.574a).  
Thus, Plato portrays the description of the tyrannical man as one who operates on 
pleonexia (and who is, in fact, driven to it by his passions).  Therefore, there are not only 
thematic links between the idea of decline and pleonexia in the Republic, but through the 
tyrannical man, Plato links individuals acting on pleonexia with changes in government, 
in particular democracy to tyranny.  The Republic, then, presents decline and change in 
government as a result of citizens desiring more at the expense of others within the city, 
pleonexia.
 In the Laws, Plato connects acting on pleonexia to the destruction of the bonds 
that hold society together and the decline of the power of states.
59
  The early kings of 
Argos and Messene brought destruction (diephtheiren) into the Greek world when they 
tried to get more than what is allotted to them by law (
) (3.691a).  Persian society declined after Cyrus because the constitution of Persia 
gave disproportionate power to the rulers and made the ruled slaves.  In the reign of 
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Cyrus, the Persians balanced freedom with control and all enjoyed a degree of equality 
(3.694a).  As a result, soldiers fought more readily for their commanders and men gave 
better counsel without fear (3.694b).  Thus, the state prospered because all felt included.  
 Persia suffered when Cambyses abused his power and position and alienated the 
people (3.695c).  Darius reinvigorated Persian society because he enforced legal equality 
(3.695d).  This legal equality earned Darius the loyalty of Persian soldiers and allowed 
him to conquer as much land as Cyrus (3.695d).  Persia deteriorated under Xerxes and 
successive kings because the kings preferred to indulge in their authority as opposed to 
maintaining forms of equality.  The reason for these reversals was education—Cambyses 
and Xerxes were brought up in royal households, and they were accustomed to being 
indulged (3.695).  Cyrus and Darius, in contrast, were born outside of the royal household 
and valued forms of equality (3.694a; 3.695d). 
 Persian society declined after Darius because their laws gave more power to the 
rulers at the expense of the ruled.  The monopoly of power in the hands of the few in the 
Persian government destroyed (apōlesan) the bonds between the rulers, the ruled, and the 
state itself (3.697c).  Rulers acted on their whims, with no care how their actions would 
affect others or the state as a whole (3.697d).  Their subjects became alienated from the 
state, making them poor soldiers (3.697d-e).  The kings then had to rely on mercenaries, 
who were not as effective solders.  Persia lost internal cohesion and power, then, because 
the Persian kings monopolized the power of the state at the expense of their subjects—
pleonexia. 
 Athens suffered the opposite problem—its citizens enjoyed an excess of freedom 





Persian Wars, out of fear of Persia and out of reverence for the bonds of the state, 
Athenian society was united (3.699b-d).  After the Persian Wars, however, and on 
account of their excess of freedom, the citizens of Athens lost their respect for all 
authority, including religious precepts and laws (3.701a-c).  The result was that the 
citizens had no respect for laws, oaths, or religion, and reverted to a more anarchic 
condition of society (3.701c).   Plato does not continue his account of Athens, but it is 
implied that due to their excess of freedom, which resulted in irreverence in the 
population, the Athenians could not act with the same community spirit that helped them 
survive the Persian Wars.  Plato’s point in this section is that the excess of either 
despotism or liberty in constitutions causes individuals to value no longer the state but 
rather to seek their own gain at the expense of the state and community.  This weakens 
the state.  Thus, in the Laws, Plato follows the ideas he established in the Republic: 
societies decline when individuals begin to try to gain more of something at the expense 
of others within that society. 
 In the Critias this imbalance and resulting pleonexia caused the downfall of 
Atlantis.  Here, Plato notes that as long as the rulers of Atlantis obeyed the laws and 
retained their virtue, they were good (121a).  However, when the rulers of Atlantis began 
to govern based on lawless ambition and power (), 
Zeus decided to destroy them (121b-c).  Though there are no contextual clues to signify 
the meaning of pleonexia in this passage, the similar circumstances of the pleonexia in 
the Critias to Plato’s previous works, Republic and Laws, suggests an analogous 
meaning.  So, even in one of his last works, Plato attaches acting on pleonexia to the 





Decline in Aristotle 
Aristotle more directly than Plato links ideas of pleonexia to causes of stasis and 
decline in his Politics.  In the work, he declares that stasis occurs when factions within a 
city begin to work to gain more for their faction at the expense of other groups within the 
city.  He identifies pleonexia, and in particular pleonexia for goods and honors, as a 
fundamental cause of stasis in cities.  The work also lists various reasons which propel 
factions toward stasis, but most of them include, in some fashion, the faction acting out 
of a desire to gain more for its side.   
At the opening of Book Five, Aristotle declares his intent to examine “the number 
and the nature of the causes that give rise to revolutions in constitutions, and what are the 
causes that destroy each form of constitution,” (1301a).  Aristotle states that stasis erupts 
when citizens within a city are not given their self-perceived fair share in governance, 
and therefore act in order to gain the share that they think they deserve.
60
  For those who 
believe in democracy, the people believe that all people are equal; in oligarchies, people 
seek to establish inequality.  He notes that “those that desire equality enter on party strife 
if they think they have too little … those that desire inequality or superiority do so if they 
suppose that although they are unequal they have not got more but an equal amount or 
less” (

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) (1302a).61 Thus, 
at the outset of Book Five, Aristotle establishes pleonexia and groups acting on pleonexia 
as the cause of stasis. 
In Aristotle on Stasis, Ronald Weed argues that Aristotle implicitly agreed with 
Plato that stasis ultimately derived from flaws within individuals’ character.
62
 This 
assertion misinterprets Aristotle.  Unlike Plato, Aristotle never directly states that stasis 
occurs due to flaws in character.  At the start of the Politics, Book Five, he states that 
stasis happens when groups create factions within a city to gain either power or honor or 
to avoid losing either (1302b).  This is not a moral judgment on Aristotle’s part; he 
simply identifies this motivation as the cause of stasis. He even admits that virtuous men 
can create factional strife, though they are least likely to do so (1301b); therefore in 
Aristotle’s view moral flaws are not a cause of stasis.
63
 
 After establishing pleonexia as a cause of stasis, Aristotle lists the motives for 
why people enter into stasis.
64
  First, according to Aristotle, the goal of those entering 
into stasis is gain and honor (), or to prevent dishonor and loss 
(1302a).  Second, Aristotle gives seven causes for why people engage in stasis: the 
motive of gain and honor (which he differentiates from the gain and honor he just 
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mentioned), insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate growth 
of power.  In his description of these causes, Aristotle reinforces the idea that pleonexia 
drives stasis (1302b-1303).   Gain and honor cause revolution when people perceive that 
individuals are either justly or unjustly receiving a larger share in governance 
() 
(1302b).  People rise against the government when someone in office shows hubris and 
pleonexia (1302b).
65
  Disproportionate distribution of honors (political office) creates 
stasis because people seek to correct the imbalance (1302b).  The same with excessive 
predominance; when an individual gets too powerful in a community, factions arise to 
oust the individual.  Fear motivates stasis as factions attempt to either avoid punishment 
or to pre-empt an attack.  Contempt causes stasis because factions dislike the government 
and believe that they are powerful enough to overthrow it.  Disproportionate growth 
fosters stasis as factions within a polis get too large and desire to redress the difference in 
power (1303a).  In all these examples, stasis happens when a group gains, or desires to 
gain, more at the expense of others within the city; sometimes Aristotle describes these 
actions as pleonexia, as in the case of gain and honor, and other times he does not employ 
the term, but the circumstances fit the definition.  Thus, Aristotle demonstrates that stasis 
happens when individuals either try to expand their stature more at the expense of others 
or when they wish to hold on to power when others try to remove it. 
 To this list, Aristotle adds election intrigue, carelessness, pettiness, and 
dissimilarity.  These reasons do not require pleonexia, though they retain the idea of 
gaining at other’s expense.  Election intrigue is abusing the election process to win the 
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election (1303a).  Carelessness causes revolution because it allows people who abuse 
their power into office (1303a).  Pettiness transforms a constitution as small, gradual 
changes are made to the constitution that eventually distorts it from its original form 
(1303a).  Finally, ethnic differences foster factionalism as each group seeks to empower 
itself at the expense of others (1303a).  Thus, while some of Aristotle’s reasons for 
groups entering into strife do not involve the term pleonexia, they still rely on the idea of 
groups acting on self-interest to empower themselves at the expense of others.
66
  Aristotle 
focuses his entire discussion of stasis on changes between oligarchic and democratic 
forms of governments.  Later in Book Five of the Politics, however, he states that 
monarchies and tyrannies fall for the same reasons as oligarchies and democracies 
(1311a; 1312b).   
Aristotle’s description in Book Five of why cities fall into stasis reflects earlier 
sentiments in the Politics.  In Book Four, Aristotle states that when in power, groups 
change the constitution to get more advantage for themselves (1292b).  In his discussion 
in Book Two of how to avoid stasis, he argues that it is best to teach the rich not to desire 
more () and to ensure that the many do not have the 
power to do so (1267b). 
Much like other authors, Aristotle, or a student of Aristotle’s, believed that civil 
harmony could occur by avoiding pleonexia.  The author of the Athenian Politeia praises 
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Athenian law givers who avoided acting on pleonexia.
67
  He notes that in his poetry, the 
legendary Athenian law giver Solon exhorted the elite of Athens to avoid acting on 
pleonexia in order to secure social and political stability (5.3).  The writer lauds Solon for 
constructing a constitution that sought to enrich the state as a whole and not his own 
private wealth (6.3).  Peisistratus, the tyrant of Athens, did well when he was the tyrant 
because he ruled according to the rules of the state and not for his own advantage 
(pleonexian) (16.8).  Thus, for Aristotle, stasis happened when people wanted to gain 
more at the expense of others, and the state was strengthened when its rulers avoided 
acting on pleonexia.  Overall, then, Plato and Aristotle present the cause of civil strife and 
decline as groups within a city acting in such a way to empower themselves at the 
expense of others within the community, leading to a change in government.  Both 
writers, directly and indirectly, acknowledge the role of pleonexia in this process. 
Continuity 
 Both circumstantial and textual evidence support the idea that Thucydides’ 
concept of decline through pleonexia influenced Plato and Aristotle.  The circumstantial 
evidence includes the fact that Plato overlapped with Thucydides chronologically and 
was a student of Socrates with Xenophon, an author I have already demonstrated as 
having been influenced by Thucydides.  Plato was born in 427 BCE, lived through the 
Peloponnesian War, and grew up while Thucydides was writing the Histories.  He 
survived the Thirty Tyrants of Athens, a regime that Xenophon characterized as 
pleonexic.  He wrote during the early and middle fourth century BCE, a time when 
Xenophon and Theopompus wrote works that continued Greek history from the end of 
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Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War.  Given the circumstances and his 
connection through Xenophon, we would expect Plato to have been in contact with 
Thucydidean thought even without specific textual references. 
  Textual evidence, however, also supports the notion that Plato was aware of 
Thucydidean thought on stasis.  Both writers discuss the radicalization of language.  At 
560d-561b, Plato notes that when passions take over a person, they inflame his mind and 
corrupt certain values; reverence becomes folly, temperance want of manliness, and 
moderation illiberality.  This discussion of how language becomes transformed due to 
passion corresponds to Thucydides’ own description of what happens to language in the 
course of stasis (Thuc. 3.82.4).
68
  In Plato’s Laws, the unnamed Athenian notes that 
serving the public interest binds a state together, but that serving the private interest 
destroys it (Laws 7.875a).  In his eulogy to Pericles, Thucydides notes that Pericles 
served the interest of the state and Athens profited, but Pericles’ successors followed his 
own interests to the detriment of the state (2.65.8-11).  Thus, there are verbal and 
conceptual echoes in thought between Plato and Thucydides. 
 Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle each portray stasis as deriving from individuals 
within a city acting on personal desires for wealth and political power.
69
  In Book One of 
the Republic, Socrates points out to Glaucon that to hold office either out of a desire for 
honor or money () is perceived to be and is a censure 
or reproach (oneidos) (347b).  In the Critias, Plato notes that Atlantis fell when its leaders 
began to seek unjust gain and power () (121b-c).  In 
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his Politics, Aristotle states that part of the cause of revolution is the desire for gain and 
honor () (1302a).  This idea echoes Thucydides’ view in the 
Corcyraean stasis narrative that stasis originates from pleonexia and philotimia.   
 Overall, then, it can be inferred that Plato and Aristotle were aware of 
Thucydides’ ideas on pleonexia and stasis.  First, Plato grew up in the age of Thucydides 
and interacted with Xenophon, whom Thucydides influenced.  Second, there are 
Thucydidean echoes in the writings of Plato, including their discussions of stasis.  
Finally, they conceptualized the causes and results of stasis in similar ways.  Certainly, 
Thucydides’ Histories, Xenophon’s Hellenica, and Plato’s philosophical works indicate 
that Athenian thought in the early fourth century, probably in reaction to the Thirty 
Tyrants, conceived of pleonexia as a destructive impulse, one which destroyed the 
societies in which it manifested. 
Conclusion 
 Thus, Plato and Aristotle continued the paradigm of decline discussed in the 
previous chapter.  First, both authors understood pleonexia to mean gain at another’s 
expense.  Second, both used pleonexia to describe a cause of stasis—when groups within 
a community fought against each other in order to gain more for a particular side.  Third, 
both point to the desire for gain and honor as reasons for stasis, a concept first found in 
Thucydides.  Plato and Aristotle’s reliance on Thucydides’ ideas and the general concept 
of pleonexia causing stasis suggests that such ideas were circulated and perpetuated 
among Athenian intellectuals in the fourth century.  As a result of both the Peloponnesian 
War and the reign of the Thirty Tyrants, intellectuals understood that individuals acting 







Pleonexia and Decline in Isocrates and Demosthenes 
 
 
 This chapter will examine how fourth-century Athenian speech-writers used 
pleonexia.   It focuses on Isocrates and Demosthenes, two of the most famous speech-
writers of fourth century BCE Athens, because most of the instances of pleonexia in the 
corpus of Athenian oratory occur in their works or works attributed to them.
1
  Isocrates 
(436-339 BCE) established a school of rhetoric in Athens and taught rhetoric to the 
Athenian elite for almost the first half of the fourth century BCE.
2
     His works span 
diverse topics such as how to be a good citizen, why the study of rhetoric is beneficial, 
and why the Greeks should launch a Pan-Hellenic military expedition against Persia.  He 
did not perform many of his speeches to the public but disseminated copies of them to 
select circles.
3
  In contrast, Demosthenes (385/4 or 384/3-322 BCE) was not only a 
famous writer but also a renowned orator. He demonstrated his skill in both the courts 
and the Athenian assembly, and he grew to prominence in the 350s and 340s in Athenian 
politics due to his resistance to Philip II of Macedon.
4
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In this chapter, I will first review how scholars treat pleonexia in Isocrates and 
Demosthenes and the connections they draw between the logographers and authors 
already studied.  Second, I will examine the numerous instances of pleonexia in Isocrates 
and Demosthenes in order to demonstrate that despite variations in use, the meaning 
behind pleonexia remains constant.  Finally, I will consider the continuities between 
Isocrates, Demosthenes, and authors already discussed.  Overall, I will show that 
Isocrates and Demosthenes understood pleonexia as the desire or intent to gain at the 
expense of others, and that acting on pleonexia was detrimental to the pleonexic agent, as 
was the case with Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. 
Isocrates and Demosthenes use pleonexia in the same circumstances as the other 
authors, but they deploy the terms in slightly different ways.  In the realm of foreign 
affairs, Isocrates and Demosthenes used pleonexia to refer to acts of imperial expansion.  
Such uses deviate from Herodotus and Thucydides, who utilized pleonexia to discuss 
when a hegemon took advantage of a pre-existing power relationship and relied upon 
pleon ekhein or epithumian to discuss outright territorial annexation of the territory of 
others.  In domestic affairs, Isocrates and Demosthenes characterized the pleonexic 
person as one who seeks gain regardless of the cost to others, and they recognized that 
acting according to pleonexia threatened the integrity of the community.  Isocrates, 
Demosthenes, and speech-writers who imitated them also parallel Thucydides and 
Herodotus by casting pleonexia as manipulation of contracts and court cases.  
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 The two authors diverge in their use of pleonexia in two ways.  First, Isocrates 
attempts to give a positive meaning to pleonexia.  He acknowledges that the common 
conception of pleonexia is that of illicit gain, but he states that he uses the term to mean 
having true advantage obtained through virtue as opposed to base advantage acquired 
through deceit or theft.  Second, neither Isocrates nor Demosthenes relies on the 
paradigm of decline caused by pleonexia that I have so far traced.  Only in his Busiris 
does Isocrates connect pleonexia to stasis.  Demosthenes never makes such a connection, 
but he does say that acting on pleonexia undermines the stability of a community. 
The speeches of the Athenian orators provide a different perspective on pleonexia.  
So far I have reviewed historians and philosophers, people who wrote for fellow 
aristocrats.
5
  An implication of this limited audience is that the writers could have used a 
specialized vocabulary that would not have been accessible to the larger Athenian 
population.  Speech-writers, however, communicate to a general audience.  The Athenian 
assembly and Athenian juries were composed of a cross-section of citizens, and therefore 
the language of speeches had to be understandable to most people.  Examining the use of 
pleonexia in these speeches of Isocrates, Demosthenes, and their contemporaries, then, 
reveals how an average fourth century Athenian would have understood pleonexia the 
concept. 
Scholarship on Pleonexia, Decline, and Continuity in the Speeches of Isocrates and 
Demosthenes 
 
 Scholars of Isocrates and Demosthenes translate pleonexia as greed or advantage, 
and they admit that earlier authors influenced the two rhetors.  In regard to Isocrates, 
scholars understand pleonexia to mean greed or advantage, recognize that he reacted to 
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the idea of pleonexia presented by fifth-century authors, in particular Thucydides, and 
observe how he tried to rehabilitate the term.  Otto Weber emphasizes Isocrates’ positive 
use of pleonexia and argues that it is the end of the evolution of the concept which began 
with Homer.
6
  In Athènes devant la dèfaite de 404: Histoire d’une crise idèologique, 
Edmond Levy translates pleonexia as “de désir d’avoir plus que les autres et plus que sa 
part légitime” (the desire for more than others and more than what is allowed), and he 
notes how Isocrates condemns intra-polis relations based on pleonexia and promotes co-
operation.
7
  In their translations of Isocrates for the Oratory of Classical Greece series, 
David Mirhardy, Terry Papillon, and Yun Lee Too translate it merely as advantage.
8
  In 
his 2007 article “La πλεονεξία chez Isocrates,” Christian Bouchet argues that Isocrates 
had no set concept of pleonexia, and that the meaning of it in his texts relied on context.
9
   
Similarly, works on Demosthenes provide no in-depth discussion of pleonexia.  If 
commentaries make note of Demosthenes’ use of pleonexia, they define it as greed, gain, 
or advantage.  Sandy’s commentary on On the Peace, the Second Philippic, On the 
Chersonesus, and The Third Philippic, first published in 1900, only comments on 
pleonexic words twice.  In his 2002 commentary on the Fourth Philippic, István Hajdú 
cites Weber for his treatment of pleonexia. In all the volumes of the Classical Orator 
Series on Demosthenes, the editors make reference to pleonexia only rarely and in none 
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of them are there citations to pleonexia in the index, even though Demosthenes uses 
pleonexia or affiliated terms fifty times in his corpus.
10
 
 Scholars see many parallels between Thucydides, Isocrates, and Demosthenes.  
De Romilly claims that Isocrates might have read Thucydides, but she is uncertain.
11
    
Edmond Levy believes Isocrates—in his rejection of pleonexia on the international 
stage—is reacting to Thucydides’ use of the word in the Histories.
12
  Josiah Ober 
believes that Thucydides and Plato influenced Isocrates with their criticisms of 
democracy.
13  
Stephen Usher in the introduction to his commentary on Demosthenes’ De 
Corona comments that the ancient commentator Dionysius of Halicarnassus believed that 
Thucydides influenced the style of Demosthenes; Dionysius himself states that 
Demosthenes followed Thucydides in constructing his work tightly in order to illicit an 
emotional reaction (D.H. Th. 53-4).
14
  Both Richard Jebb and Yun Lee Too see a 
potential parallel between Thucydides 3.82.2 and Isocrates’ Antidosis 283, a passage 
where Isocrates notes that people intentionally change the meaning of words.
15
  Thus, 
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while an expanded view of the role of pleonexia is lacking in the scholarship, scholars 
acknowledge the ties between Isocrates, Demosthenes, and earlier Athenian writers. 
Pleonexia in Isocrates 
  Isocrates relies on pleonexia and associated words to signify the desire for gain 
at the expense of another, or to refer to having an advantage.  He also shows that acting 
on pleonexia hurts not only the victims but the entity acting on it.  While acknowledging 
the negative connotation of pleonexia in popular thought, he puts forward his own 
definition of pleonexia that had no negative aspects or consequences.  In the following 
analysis, Isocrates’ works are grouped based on his application of pleonexia, not when 
the works were written.  I agree with Bouchet that we cannot tell whether Isocrates’ 
thoughts on pleonexia developed over time and there is no evidence to suggest it.  
Instead, the meaning of pleonexia depended on its context.
16
  In general it refers to “gain 
at the expense of others” but how this manifests itself differs.  In the Panegyricus, 
Plataicus, On the Peace, To Philip, and Archidamus, he applies pleonexia to interstate 
affairs, and he characterizes it as the desire to acquire territory, to have supremacy, or to 
gain an advantage.  In his speeches about the internal affairs of a city, Against the 
Sophists, Against Callimachus, Evagoras, and Areopagiticus, he portrays pleonexia as the 
desire to manipulate the law or circumstances in order to enrich an individual at the 
expense of others and the general detriment of a community.  In To Demonicus and 
Antidosis, he advocates for a new definition of pleonexia—one which means having or 
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gaining an “advantage” in such a manner that does not harm others.
17
  In the Nicocles and 
Panathenaicus, Isocrates uses pleonexia in all the ways outlined above. 
 In Panegyricus, Plataicus, On the Peace, To Philip, and Archidamus, Isocrates 
presents pleonexia as the desire for either direct or indirect control of another’s territory, 
and shows it to be a destructive impulse.  Isocrates’ Panegyricus, considered by scholars 
as one of his greatest works, utilizes pleonexia to mean having a power or advantage over 
another and the annexation of territory (i.e., imperial expansion).  First, Isocrates uses 
pleonexia to refer to situations when one party had power or advantage over another. The 
Panegyricus was published in 380 but was written in response to the Peace of Antalcides, 
sworn in 387, which secured Spartan hegemony over Greece with the backing of the 
Persian Empire.
18 
  Through the peace, Persia gained undisputed dominance over Greek 
cities in Asia Minor and gained influence in affairs of Europe by supporting Spartan 
control over mainland Greece.
19
  In the opening of the Panegyricus, Isocrates calls upon 
the leading states of Greece, Athens and Sparta, to divide the supremacy of the Greek 
world between them in order to take away the advantages (tas pleonexias) that the 
Persians desire for themselves over the Greeks (4.17).  This pleonexia refers to the 
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control that Isocrates believed the Persians wanted over the Greeks.  It could apply to 
Persia’s direct control of Asia Minor, granted by the treaty, but Isocrates deploys the 
word epithumousin (desire) to indicate that Persia desired advantage (pleonexia) over the 
Greeks, not that it had already achieved it.    
 Later, Isocrates notes that thanks to the peace of Antalcides, the Persian king has 
the advantage over the Greeks (pleonexia) because he controls half the known world 
(4.179).  Here, pleonexia pertains to Persia’s ability to have the Greeks to recognize its 
power over them by making Greek cities erect copies of the treaty on steles or in temples 
(4.179).  Thus, pleonexia denotes the advantage gained by having more power than others 
and the ability to use that power to settle affairs as one desires regardless of the 
inclination of the other party.  Due to the power differential, the weaker party must obey 
the stronger, even if no direct control mechanisms, such as territorial governors, exist. It 
has lost complete freedom of action. 
 Isocrates also employs pleonexia to mean power or advantage over others when 
he discusses the benefit of reason.  In praising Athens, he notes that the city recognized 
that logos distinguished men from animals; men use this advantage (pleonexia) to 
dominate animals (4.48).  Through reason, mankind controls animals and nature in 
general.  Thus, pleonexia does not have to refer to a specific unfair gain, but the ability to 
influence and control other beings without the other ability to stop this control. 
 Second, Isocrates deploys pleonexia in the Panegyricus to refer to the desire for 
territory.  In defending Athens’ conduct before and during the Peloponnesian War, 
Isocrates claims that the establishment of cleruchies was not pleonexia.
 20
   The section 
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compares Athens’ fifth century empire to the Spartan hegemony of the fourth century.  
According to Isocrates, the Athenians treated their allies with equality and benevolence, 
whereas the Spartans sponsored chaos and upheaval.  Isocrates claims that the Athenian 
Empire fostered economic growth of both private households and cities (4.103), did not 
develop factionalism, provided all with the same laws (4.104), and exported to its allies 
the same form of democracy that Athens enjoyed (4.106).
21
  He ends by asserting that 
cleruchies were meant to add population to depopulated allied cities and were not 
territory grabs (pleonexia) on the part of Athens (4.107).  The pleonexia in the sentence, 
then, deals with the charge that Athens took territory from its allies.   
 Later in the pamphlet, Isocrates calls upon Athens and Sparta to lead an 
expedition against Persia.  He claims that the resulting war would not be a campaign of 
conquest (pleonexia) but rather a just war (4.183), since Persia had previously injured 
Greece during the Persian Wars and still had designs to conquer it (4.183).  The 
pleonexia signifies the advantage gained by being more powerful than others and also the 
confiscation of territory from another power. 
                                                                                                                                                 
imposition of tribute, that made the Athenian empire so onerous.  That cleruchies were banned in the 
charter of the Second Athenian Naval Confederation (the fourth century version of Athens’ fifth century 
empire) demonstrates how unpopular the practice was.  In the Panegyricus, amusingly, Isocrates attempts 
to defend the practice. Isocrates, Panegyricus, ed. and trans. S. Usher (Warminster, UK: Aris & Philips, 
1990), 176.  On the Second Athenian Naval Confederation, and specifically cleruchies: Jack Cargill, The 
Second Athenian League (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 146-60; George Cawkwell, 
Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War (London: Routledge, 1997), 101-3.  On the exploitive nature of 
cleruchies: Alfonso Moreno, “ ‘The Attic Neighbor’: The Cleruchy in the Athenian Empire,” in 
Interpreting the Athenian Empire, ed. John Ma, Nikolaos Papazarkadas, and Robert Parker (London: 
Duckworth, 2009), 211-21. 
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 As stated in the introduction, Isocrates is an Athenian apologist, and his presentation of the 






 In the Plataicus, Isocrates calls for Athenian citizenship for the people of Plataea 
after Thebes destroyed the city in 373.
22
  He uses pleonexia to indicate acts of territorial 
acquisition, of gaining an advantage in war, and to show the detrimental effects of such 
policies.  He begins by attacking the hypocrisy of Theban policy: the Thebans deride the 
Spartans for seizing the Cadmea, yet they destroy the walls and at times entire allied 
cities in order to maintain control (14.19).  Thebes disliked giving Oropus to Athens (a 
territory contested between the two cities) yet took the territory of others (14.20).  
Isocrates attributes such attitudes to Theban pleonexia (14.20).  Thebes dislikes actions 
that weakens itself but approves of the same actions when they strengthen Thebes to the 
detriment of a rival power. 
 Isocrates then praises cities for acting on pleonexia when appropriate, and he 
censures them for operating on it when inappropriate.  He notes that “the wise seek to 
have advantage in war but in peace to respect covenants and oaths” 
(

) (14.23).  He claims that the Thebans do not follow this policy; rather, they 
mouth words of freedom but seek to advance their own agenda (14.24-5).  The Thebans 
claim that their actions are to the advantage (sumpheron) of their allies (14.25), but 
Isocrates disagrees.
23
  He characterizers Theban actions as self-serving, and he argues 
that it is foolish to act on pleonexia when it impedes justice (
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 Plataea was a longtime ally of Athens, which had stood with the Athens during the Persian and 
Peloponnesian wars.   
 
23 
Again a contrast between sumpheron and pleonexia.  The Thebans would claim that their actions 
help all, sumpheron, whereas Isocrates labels the Thebans’ actions as helpful only to the Thebans and 






) because people bring great risk to 
themselves by seeking gain at the expense of others (14.25).  Thus, Isocrates utilizes 
pleonexia in the context of international relations to describe acts of imperialism and 
gaining advantage in war, and he warns against acting on it in times of peace.
 Isocrates’ Archidamus, a speech in defense of Spartan control of Messene, 
includes pleonexia to refer to the desire for territory and to having an advantage.  The 
context of the speech is a peace conference in 366 where the allies of Sparta beseeched 
Sparta to accept a Theban peace proposal that would end the war in return for Messene’s 
freedom, even though Sparta had controlled Messene for three hundred years.
24
  
Archidamus, the speaker and son of the ruling king of Sparta, begins the speech by 
condemning the allies of Sparta for asking the Spartans to give up Messene out of 
pleonexia (6.13).  He declares that the allies fear losing their own territory in the war and 
therefore call upon the Spartans to voluntarily give up Messene, even though the Spartans 
have gone to war on the allies’ behalf in the past (6.13).  The meaning of pleonexia here 
is clear:  the allies do not want to risk continuing the war against Thebes and wish to 
retain control of their own territory at the cost of Sparta’s control of Messene. 
 In the rest of the speech, Isocrates employs pleonexia to refer to having an 
advantage in war.  Archidamus believes that the Theban demand for Sparta to give up 
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The war between Thebes and Sparta began with Sparta’s seizure of the Cadmea in 378 and 
resulted in the battle of Leuctra in 371; though Sparta lost at Leuctra, the fighting continued for another ten 
years.  The dating of the speech remains speculative and Terry Papillion puts it anytime between 366 and 
355; Terry Papillon, “Introduction to the Archidamus,” in Isocrates II, trans. Terry Papillion, vol. 7, 
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battle of Leuctra and Mantinea, 371-62 BCE, is known as the “Theban Hegemony.”  Thebes was the 
leading power in Greece, but it never enjoyed the supremacy that Athens or Sparta had had earlier.  
Buckler’s The Theban Hegemony remains the text on the subject; John Buckler, The Theban Hegemony, 
371-362 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).  For a broader view of the history of the 
region in the fourth century see: John Buckler and Hans Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in 





Messene is unprecedented; even when Sparta was forced to conclude peace on unfair 
terms (conclude a peace under circumstances that made it impossible to have the 
advantage [pleonektein]) with Persia or Athens, it was never forced to give up Messene 
(6.30).  The pleonexia in this section denotes the ability of Athens or Persia’s to control 
the fate of Sparta without Sparta being able to respond.   
 Near the end of the speech, Archidamus employs pleonexia to mean having an 
advantage in war.  He proposes that in Sparta the women, children, and infirm would 
leave Sparta and go to various colonies or friendly cities, whereas Spartan men would 
form a roving army (6.74-80).  This would give the Spartans many advantages 
(pleonexias), since the Spartan government was already organized like an army.  The 
Spartans could terrorize other Greeks as they pleased without fearing the need to defend 
home territory or dissension in the ranks (6.76).  On account of these advantages, they 
would have power over their enemies (6.77).  Though the plan sounds impractical, Terry 
Papillon points out that in section 46 Isocrates described a similar action carried out 
successfully by Amyntas of Macedon.
25
 
 In On the Peace, Isocrates’ treatise written on how Athens should treat its allies in 
response to the Social War (357-55),
26
 pleonexia describes acts of seeking to have power 
over others in international affairs, and it appears in both a negative and positive manner.  
In the opening, Isocrates uses pleonexia negatively to mean advantage gained through 
conquest.  He says that initially his counsel will appear to be to allow Thebes to continue 
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 Papillon, Isocrates II, 126n45. 
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Papillon, “Introduction to On the Peace,” Isocrates II, 134.  The Social War was the functional 
end of the Second Athenian Naval Confederation, when several key island cities, Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and 






to control territory it recently took from Athens, which would weaken Athens.  He chides 
those who believe this, noting that “it is folly and madness to think that injustice is 
advantageous” () 
and that those who desire to subjugate other cities have not learned the consequences of 
such policies (8.17).
27
  Here pleonexia describes the advantage Thebes gained through 
control of Athenian territory.  Isocrates decries such policies as folly, and he moves on to 
how to attain true advantage.  He states:  
that all men crave their advantage (sumpherontos) and to be better off than the rest (tou 
pleon ekhein tōn allōn), they do not all know the kind of conduct which leads to this end 
but differ from each other in judgment, some possessing a judgment which is sound and 
capable of hitting the right course of action, others one which completely misses their true 
advantage (sumpherontos) (28). 
   
 Those who act on piety and justice will have an advantage (pleonektein) in the 
true sense of the word as opposed to the base sense (8.33).
28
  Those who function on 
injustice, the base pleonexia, operate as animals about to fall for a trap; they perceive that 
taking the goods of others is the greatest goal, but find out that these actions hurt only 
themselves (8.34).  Like Plato, Isocrates notes that the unjust live under the delusion that 
a life of injustice is better than a life of justice (8.35).   
 He reveals the meaning of true advantage by discussing the history of Athenian 
foreign policy.  The city won fame at Marathon and the Persian War not through 
aggressive expansion, but for protecting Greece from Persia (8.37-42).  For this service, 
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 I disagree with Laistner’s commentary on this section - he notes that Isocrates uses pleonexia in 
a “good sense” because it refers to advantage, yet Isocrates notes that it is folly and madness 
() to believe that injustice is advantageous.  So, while it could mean advantage in this 
situation, Isocrates is certainly not giving it a positive connotation.  Isocrates, De Pace and Philippus, ed. 
and trans. M.L.W. Laistner (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1967), 84. 
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 As will be discussed later, Isocrates here differentiates between a pleonexia in which some gain 
and others are hurt, pleonexia in a base sense, and a form of pleonexia where one has an advantage without 






the rest of Greece thought Athens was worthy of hegemony (8.42).  Since then, however, 
Athens has ruined its good name by seeking to enslave other Greek cities (8.42).  During 
the Persian War, Athenians abandoned Athens to save Greece; in Isocrates’ day, citizens 
do not risk a fight even for gain (pleonexia), though they dream of world domination, but 
instead use mercenaries (8.43-44).  The true advantage Isocrates discusses is the power 
gained through good will.  Earlier, cities followed Athens because it gained a good 
reputation through its service and sacrifice during the Persian Wars.  This authority over 
others was not obtained by conquest, but was freely given. Thus he differentiates between 
what he sees as greater and lesser forms of pleonexia and chides Athens for adopting 
policy based on the latter. 
 Later in the speech, Isocrates labels Athens’ attempts at territorial expansion 
during the Peloponnesian War pleonexia, and he derides them.
29
  He recounts how during 
the festival of Dionysus, Athens paraded both the tribute of the allies and the orphans 
created by the war on stage for all to see.  The orphans were brought out to show why the 
allies were paying tribute,
30
 but really the Athenians were showing the Greeks “the 
multitude of orphans and misfortunes which resulted from pleonexia” 
(
) (8.82).  The pleonexia in the passage could refer to the imposition of tribute 
on the allies, but it does not.  By repeating the article tas, Isocrates links the sumphoras 
(misfortunes) to the gignomenas (happening) so that pleonexia, which is modifying the 
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Which war is unclear in the immediate context, though later Isocrates discusses Athenian policy 
during the 410s, so my assumption is that the war refers to the Peloponnesian War.  Todd notes that the 
section 40-94 deals with the events of the Peloponnesian War. Papillon, Introduction to On the Peace, 
Isocrates II, 135. 
 
30






tas gignomenas, describes the source of the misfortunes, the war (8.82).  So, in the 
passage, Isocrates equates Athens’ struggle for power in the Peloponnesian War with 
pleonexia.  He continues that the policy of desiring the possessions of other states 
() led to pointless aggression in the form of the Sicilian 
campaign and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands while the Spartans ravaged 
Athenian territory in Attica (8.84-85).  Overall then, On the Peace employs pleonexia as 
the seeking power over others, and it underscores how ruinous such policies had been for 
Athens. 
 In To Philip, an open letter written to Philip II of Macedon after the Peace of 
Philocrates in 346,
31
 Isocrates again relies on pleonexia to refer to either one state having 
power over others or territorial acquisition.  The speech urges Philip to lead a panhellenic 
campaign against Persia in order to remove the advantages (pleonexias) that the Persians 
have over the Greeks (5.9).  In this context, pleonexia could refer to Persia’s control of 
Greek cities on the Ionian coast of Asia Minor, which had been granted to Persia in 386, 
or to the power Isocrates believed Persia to have over the Greek states—the Greeks relied 
upon Persia to guarantee the various peace agreements that had been attempted from 387 
to 361.
 
 Either way pleonexia describes the power Persia held over Greeks, a power 
Isocrates resented and wanted to remove.     
 When explaining why Macedon must lead the effort, Isocrates uses pleonexia to 
describe Greece’s history of struggles for dominance.  He notes that Argos, Sparta, and 
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The peace ended a ten year war between Athens and Macedonia.  Philip II was the father of 
Alexander the Great, and in the mid fourth century was the leading figure in Greece.  The signing of the 
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(Leiden: Brill, 1989), 114-42; Douglas McDowell, Demosthenes: On the False Embassy (Oxford: Oxford 
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Thebes cannot be reconciled because they have a long history of seeking to gain 
(pleonektein) against each other (5.39).  Argos and Sparta had historically challenged 
each other for hegemony over the Peloponnesus, and Sparta and Thebes had a more 
recent history of fighting for control of Greece—a contest that resulted in the battles of 
Leuctra in 371 and Mantinea in 361.  Isocrates hopes that Philip’s leadership would 
compel the competing states to work according to policies of mutual advantage (ōpheleia) 
as opposed to ruinous policies of self-aggrandizement (pleonexia) (5.40).
32
  Isocrates 
concludes by using pleonexia to describe the Spartan hegemony.  He explains that just as 
no one praised Athens for its empire but for its actions at Salamis, so too people laud 
Sparta for its defense of Thermopylae, not its later victories over other Greeks (5.148).
33
  
To Greeks, the monument at Thermopylae is proof of Spartan valor, whereas trophies of 
Spartan victories over other Greeks are monuments of Spartan pleonexia (5.148).
34
  The 
monuments remind the Greeks of the period when Sparta had control over them, and they 
loath them.   
 In his speeches regarding foreign affairs, then, Isocrates routinely relies on 
pleonexia to refer to acts of seeking power, either through direct annexation or indirect 
influence, over others, and he warns against such policies; they can alienate others and 
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 Similarly to Plato (chapter Three) Isocrates contrast between a form of advantage that supports 
all, ōphelias, and the advantage that only benefits one party at the expense of others, pleonexia. 
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 Again what is interesting here is that Isocrates, though he is critiquing Athens and Sparta for 
similar misconduct, the abuse of power when in position of authority, does not suggest that Athens 
operated on pleonexia. 
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 Norlin and Van Hook translate pleonexia here as greed, but I keep it as pleonexia, since, 
hopefully, I have demonstrated by now that translating simply as greed glosses over the nuances; Isocrates, 






thus lead to disadvantages for the more power state.  But he also uses the term more 
neutrally to refer to gaining an advantage in war. 
 In Against the Sophists, Against Callimachus, Evagoras, and Areopagiticus, 
Isocrates applies pleonexia to identify individuals who seek profit for themselves to the 
detriment of the polis community.  In Against the Sophists and Against Callimachus, he 
deploys pleonexia to describe men who manipulate situations for their own advantage.  
Against the Sophists, written around 390, contrasts other teachers of rhetoric with 
Isocrates.
35
  He identifies two kinds of teachers whom he labels sophists.
36
  The first kind 
of sophists treated the teaching of rhetoric as a form of rote memorization and measured 
success by the number of students they could attract (3.10).  The second kind taught 
rhetoric as a skill that allowed a person to take advantage of others in court (3.19).  
Isocrates attacks the latter kind of teachers for ignoring the virtues of the study of rhetoric 
and for instructing students to be meddlesome (polupragmosunē) and pleonexic (3.20).  
He contrasts his own ideas of studying rhetoric as a way of self-improvement to those 
teachers who see it as a means to win disputes or court cases (3.21).  If taught well, as 
Isocrates does, rhetoric can better an individual, but too many teachers either do not put 
in the required effort, or treat rhetoric as a way to craft clever arguments that give a 
person the advantage (pleonexia) in court. 
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 David Mirhady, “Introduction to Against the Sophists,” in Isocrates I, trans. David Mirhady and 
Yun Lee Too, vol. 4, Oratory of Classical Greece (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 61. 
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 In general, sophists were teachers of rhetoric.  They were maligned in Athenian writing as 
charlatans who taught their students how to trick juries with clever speeches.  For a brief overview: Yun 






 Against Callimachus was written for an unnamed defendant who was trying to 
protect himself against persecution from an Athenian named Callimachus.
37
  In the 
speech, Isocrates portrays Callimachus as a man who sought, wherever he resided, to live 
in such a manner as to benefit himself while either not contributing to society or actively 
seeking to keep others down () (18.50).  During the last ten years of 
the Peloponnesian War, Callimachus avoided military service (18.47).  He fled Athens, 
only to return during the regime of the Thirty.  Then he sided with the Thirty against the 
democrats until it became obvious that the regime had lost (18.48-9).  Continually, he 
sought to use the laws to benefit himself as if he had been unjustly hurt in some capacity, 
but in reality he avoided more duties than most citizens (18.50).  In this manner, he did 
not seek to be equal to his fellow citizens but to have more than them (18.50).  
 The Evagoras, a eulogy composed sometime between 370-365 for a king of 
Cyprus, contains one use of pleonexia meaning advantage and one in which pleonexia is 
harmful to the community.
38
  In the introduction, Isocrates notes that poetry has an 
advantage () over prose when it comes to eulogies 
because of its reliance on meter, but speech writers should see this as a challenge, not an 
obstacle (9.11).  When recounting the history of the city of Salamis, Isocrates states that 
the city was ruled by the sons of Teucer until a Phoenician fugitive stole the crown and 
killed the king because of the fugitive’s grasping disposition (
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) (9.20).  Out of his desire to solidify his power, the usurper then sold the 
city into servitude under the Persians (9.20).  Thus, individuals operating on pleonexia 
are detrimental to the autonomy of a city since they are willing to sell the city into 
servitude in order to gain something for themselves.
 The Areopagiticus, in which Isocrates called for the reform of the Areopagus 
council, presents the Areopagus as an institution that improved Athens in part by curbing 
pleonexia.
39
  It associates pleonexia with oligarchies and condemns governments that 
work according to it.  In listing the virtues of the Areopagus, he notes that the existence 
of such a body removed the temptation of pleonexia from office holders because there 
was oversight and punishment () (7.55).  The 
body watched out for the interests of the state and guarded against the excesses of the 
poor, the young, and old, and office holders (7.55).
 Isocrates concedes that his defense of the Areopagus makes him sound like an 
oligarch, but he insists that he has always disparaged oligarchies and pleonexia (7.60).  
He praises well-ordered democracies and Sparta in particular, because policies of equity 
and equality among citizens strengthen a city in both internal cohesion and external 
influence (7.61).
40
  In contrast, the current Athenian government, which he claims 
everyone criticizes, is still better than the Thirty Tyrants (7.62-69).  Though the current 
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primarily over homicide cases, but others such as treason as well.  Robert Wallace argues that this speech is 
not a sincere call for aristocratic reform in Athens, rather it reflected Isocrates’ own program of leadership 
and education as a way to reinvigorate Athens power abroad: Robert Wallace, The Areopagus Council to 
307 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), Chapter 6, 207-12.  In Political Dissent, 
Ober discusses the speech in the context of Isocrates’ ideas on how to reform fourth century Athenian 
democracy. Ober, Political Dissent, 277-86. 
 
40
 Technically the Spartan government, among full Spartan citizens, was a democracy—full 






democratic government may not be good, it cannot match the crimes of the Thirty, which 
allowed public buildings to fall apart, stole temple property, sold public dockyards at a 
loss, and put Athenian citizens to death without trial (7.66-67).   
 The democracy, however, healed the wounds created by the Thirty and restored 
Athenian power.  Isocrates’ proof of the magnanimity of the democracy is that the 
democrats paid back a debt created by the Thirty with public money.  When the Thirty 
were fighting the democrats, they borrowed a vast sum to besiege the democrats holding 
the Piraeus (7.68).  When the democrats overcame the oligarchs, they agreed to pay back 
the debt with public money as opposed to taking it from the supporters of the Thirty 
(7.68-69).  In this way, the restoration of democracy brought peace and stability to 
Athens (7.69).   This peace and stability allowed Athens to regain the power it had lost at 
the end of the Peloponnesian War.   Athens became so powerful that Sparta had to turn to 
it for help.  Under the Thirty, Sparta gave orders to Athens; under the democracy, Sparta 
begged Athens for assistance.
41
  Isocrates summarizes his analysis with “the oligarchs 
wanted to rule the citizens and be slaves to the enemy, whereas the populists wanted to 
rule others and give equality to the citizens.”  He ends the section by remarking that he 
brought up the Thirty in order to reinforce the idea that he disapproves of both oligarchy 
and pleonexia (7.70).   
 The entire section links oligarchies—specifically the Thirty at Athens—with 
pleonexia.  The actions of the Thirty—the plundering of temples, selling off dockyards 
for a loss, killing citizens—can all be associated with individuals acting according to 
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pleonexia.  Isocrates then contrasts the unfair actions of the oligarchy with the equality 
and fairness of democracies, even bad democracies.  He also shows that working on the 
basis of pleonexia weakens a regime: the Thirty eventually fell, whereas the restoration of 
the democracy, in Isocrates’ thinking, renewed Athenian power itself.  So, in the 
Areopagiticus, Isocrates reinforces the idea that functioning on pleonexia undermines 
both internal cohesion and the power of a city. 
 Isocrates also applies pleonexia, more neutrally or even positively, to describe a 
person having admirable advantages in life.  In To Demonicus and Antidosis, Isocrates 
presents pleonexia as both a negative and positive attribute.  In To Demonicus, Isocrates 
uses pleonexia to explain how men should not act.  Written between 374 and 370 BCE to 
a young man whose father recently died, it is a treatise on ethics that discusses how a man 
should act in relation to the gods, other men, and himself.
42
  In the section on how to 
interact with others, Isocrates exhorts Demonicus to act like a king: if he finds himself in 
a position to take more than others (pleonektein), then he should only take his fair share 
(1.38).  Acting in this manner would give the young man a good reputation, which is 
preferable to living with unjustly acquired wealth (1.38).  Isocrates hopes that the young 
man does not follow those who seek gain by injustice but rather those who follow justice, 
because the latter have the advantage (pleonektousin) (1.38).  This section, then, presents 
three ideas about how Isocrates understood pleonexia.  First, the idea can be used both in 
a positive and negative sense in the same passage.
43
  Second, the two uses have a similar 
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meaning—acting in such a way as to benefit one’s self.   The difference is how this action 
manifests itself.  In the negative manifestation, this benefit happens by preying on others.  
In the positive manifestation, this benefit happens by acting in ways that are laudable 
within the community.  Third, Isocrates associated justice with this positive manifestation 
of pleonexia.   
 The Antidosis, written sometime in 354-53 as a defense of Isocrates’ career and in 
order to distinguish himself from sophists, incorporates pleonexic language to refer to 
both manipulation of language for personal benefit and the idea of pleonexia providing a 
positive advantage.
44
  Near the beginning of the speech, Isocrates notes that he has been 
charged with “teaching young men to speak and to gain advantage in courts contrary to 
justice” (
) (15.30).  Isocrates repeats this charge in section 89 and again 
at 228 in order to disparage those who make it.  The repetition of the charge shows that, 
as in Against the Sophists, Isocrates and others understood pleonexia as the act of gaining 
an unfair advantage in court.  It also serves to recall to the audience’s mind the charges 
against Isocrates so that he can introduce new arguments against them.
 In the speech, Isocrates derides his detractors for being ignorant or lazy; he 
believes that they desire to speak well, but they believe that either it is an innate ability 
that they lack or are unwilling to put in the time and the effort to learn how to speak well 
(15.247).  Therefore, they deride those who try to learn rhetoric and attack those who 
wish to learn to speak well for seeking their own advantage (
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) (15.247).  Like the charge against which Isocrates 
is responding, this section presents pleonexia as a way of manipulating speech in order to 
give the speaker an unfair advantage in court.
 At 228-29, Isocrates posits that acting on pleonexia disrupts the community.  He 
asks if he were teaching his students to act on pleonexia, then why do they live peaceful 
lives and not annoy their neighbors (15.229)?  The implication is that if he had taught 
them to act according to pleonexia, then they would be unable to live within a community 
(or they would be hated).  Since his students work well within a community, they do not 
act on pleonexia. 
 In most of this treatise, Isocrates treats pleonexia negatively—it is the desire to 
manipulate a jury unfairly for one’s own purposes.  Toward the end of Antidosis, he 
makes a transition to discussing a positive form of pleonexia, though in the course of his 
discussion, he notes that his use of the term goes against the common understanding: 
People can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to 
speak well; if they become possessed of the desire to be able to persuade 
their hearers and finally if they set their hearts on seeing their 
advantage—I do not mean “advantage” (pleonexias) in the sense given 
to that word by the empty-headed, but advantage in the true meaning of 







 He dismisses the idea that liars and robbers have the advantage over others 
(
) (15.281).  Then, he presses the idea that 
righteous and faithful individuals, who handle the affairs of the home and the city the 





) because the gods will favor them (15.282).  People mistakenly 
believe that robbers and liars have an advantage because people do not understand the 
true meanings of words (15.283).  They label buffoons gifted instead of those who 
demonstrate true excellence, and those who engage in criminal activity are thought to 
have the advantage () (15.284).45  In Isocrates’ world-view, the 
righteous and upright have the advantage of good things but not of evil 
()(15.284).  The advantage of 
which Isocrates speaks is the ability to think and reason.  He explains that those who 
study philosophy have the benefit of critical thinking and therefore are less likely to make 
mistakes (15.292).
   
Thus, Isocrates uses pleonexia to refer to advantage, but he presents it 
as a positive attribute. 
 Although Isocrates uses pleonexia to denote a positive attribute, he still presents it 
in a binary condition: good people will gain more of the good things in life and will suffer 
less.  To have advantage, in the sense of pleonexia, means to have more of good things 
while having less of something else.  Those who enjoy true advantage will gain rewards 
for leading an exemplary life, for example respect in the community, and through their 
virtue will suffer less from the ills of life.  Thus, though Isocrates attempts to present a 
new definition of pleonexia (which he claims is the true definition of the term), he still 
understands it in a binary condition—to have more of something means having less of 
another. 
 In Nicocles and Panathenaicus, Isocrates uses pleonexia in discussions of both 
international and domestic affairs to refer to acts where one individual desires to gain by 
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taking from another; he also uses his own positive definition of pleonexia as found in 
other works.   One of his earliest works, Nicocles, is about how and why the subjects of a 
king should support a monarchy.  Written in the voice of Nicocles, a king of Cyprus, the 
work relies on both positive and negative meanings of pleonexia.  Nicocles relies upon a 
positive pleonexia to convey an idea of advantage in regard to philosophy, and a neutral 
form of pleonexia to indicate the benefits a monarchy enjoys during war and the benefits 
of political associations.  Nicocles opens with a discussion of the virtues of the study of 
philosophy.  Isocrates starts by asserting that critics of philosophy claim people study it 
out of a desire for advantage () and not a desire for virtue (3.1).  Those 
same critics applaud men who strive to act rightly (orthōs).  The writer then asks what the 
difference is between seeking advantage through speech or action, since more advantage 
can be obtained by action (3.1).
46
  It is better to seek advantage through virtue 
() than pursue it through deceit and injustice 
(3.2).
47
  The instances of pleonexia in the passage refer to seeking an advantage; as in the 
Antidosis, Isocrates distinguishes between a common understanding of pleonexia, which 
is gain at another’s expense, and his own.  At 3.1, the pleonexia indicates taking 
advantage of others through clever speech, a negative connotation.  The pleonektēseien at 
3.2 identifies actions that would empower an individual.  Through the study of 
philosophy, one learns reason and virtue, giving the individual greater ability to do good 
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things, without taking from another.  In contrast, those who gain through deceit and 
injustice take from others.  Thus, pleonexia denotes seeking an advantage. 
 Later in the text, Isocrates deploys pleonexia more neutrally when discussing 
seeking advantage over others.  Monarchies have all the advantages (pleonexia) in 
wartime, because one-man rule is more efficient than having multiple commanders 
(3.22).  Persia, Dionysius of Sicily, Carthage, and Sparta all benefited from having a 
single commander, as opposed to states that had multiple commanders, such as Athens 
(3.24).  Finally, Isocrates uses the language of pleonexia to refer to political associations 
granting an advantage to people in types of government that are not monarchies.  In the 
section where he entreats the nobles to obey the king and not to plot against him, he notes 
that political associations might be advantageous (pleonektousin) in other forms of 
governments, but they are dangerous to monarchies (3.54). 
 Isocrates also relies upon negative uses of pleonexia.  First, he uses pleon ekhein 
to describe how oligarchs and democrats work to prevent negative pleonexia.  He notes 
that oligarchies and democracies strive to guarantee equality among enfranchised citizens 
to ensure that no one should be able to take more from another (
) (3.15).  In this instance, Isocrates uses pleon ekhein to refer 
explicitly to the act of taking more at another’s expense.  Second, Isocrates employs 
pleonexia to refer to imperialism.  Isocrates notes that other rulers seek to conquer 
territory belonging to a weaker neighboring state in order to have more (pleonektein) 
(3.34).  In this instance pleonexia has a neutral connotation as Isocrates is not judging 





they do.   So in Nicocles, Isocrates employs pleonexia in a positive, negative, and neutral 
manner, but continually in the context of gaining advantage or power over others.
 The Panathenaicus, Isocrates’ last work, was completed in 339 for the 
Panathenaic festival of 342, warns against acting on pleonexia both on the international 
and intra-polis arena.  On international affairs, Isocrates again stresses that functioning 
according to pleonexia only hurts those who follow it.  Isocrates claims that although 
both Sparta and Athens pursued imperial policies in the past, Athens never dominated its 
allies to the extent that Sparta did.  He contends that Athens encouraged allied city-states 
to become democracies, while Sparta forced pro-Spartan oligarchies on its subject cities 
(12.54).
48
  Isocrates agrees with other authors that the imposition of governments on 
allies was a mark of Spartan pleonexia and that such acts caused resentment and 
resistance to Spartan leadership (12.55).  Later, he claims that the problem with Greece in 
its current state is that Athens and Sparta seek to gain an advantage (pleonexias) over the 
rest of the Greeks with the support of the Persian king ( … 
) (12.160).  Again, as in 
the Panegyrics, pleonexia refers to having power over others, but Isocrates casts that 
those who act on this only hurt themselves.  Athens and Sparta do not benefit from acting 
on pleonexia because they weaken themselves and only give power to Persia. 
 In internal matters, when discussing the best form of government, Isocrates notes 
that government reflects the nature of those who participate in it.  He argues that the form 
of government—oligarchy, democracy, or monarchy—does not matter; what matters is 
what kind of individual holds office (12.132).  If the office holder is just, then the city 
will do well in both foreign and domestic affairs (12.132). If they function on pleonexia, 
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then the citizens will suffer (133).  The pleonektēs cares nothing for the affairs of the 
common good (), but strives 
instead for his own benefit (
) (12.133).  Those who live in the state ruled by pleonexia have to endure their 
leader’s wickedness (
) (12.133).  Thus, Isocrates distinguishes between governments 
operating on justice and those driven by pleonexia.  Those that operate on justice support 
all; those that operate on pleonexia benefit a few at the expense of many.
 At the end of the Panathenaicus, an unnamed student of Isocrates enters the work 
and states that Isocrates is trying to be clever by describing Sparta as pleonexic.  He 
declares that like sophists or people in the law court who are trying to manipulate a 
contract (), Isocrates is guilty of using 
double meaning: appearing to condemn Sparta of pleonexia when he is actually 
celebrating it (12.240).  He affirms that it is fine to apply pleonexia to the Spartans (he 
acknowledges the speech describes the Spartans as warlike and grasping [ 
]), but that it is wrong to give pleonexia a negative 
connotation.  He states that people who use pleonexia to describe contract breakers, 
cheaters, and those who falsify accounts are wrong (12.243).  Such men are thought ill by 
all, but the Spartans, kings, and despots, who operate on pleonexia, are seen to be blessed 
by heaven (12.243).  People might despise the power of Sparta, but all wish they had it, 
or were associated with someone who had it (12.243-44).  It seems a constant that all men 





) (12.244).49  
Thus, in his last work, Isocrates continues to use pleonexia as he had throughout his 
career—it signified when an entity operated in such a way as to benefit itself at the 
expense of others, whether on the international or domestic stage.  The only difference in 
the last work is that he allowed an interlocutor to put forward a position found in other 
writers: that people are jealous of those who act on pleonexia on a grand scale.  Isocrates 
has no reply to this accusation.  
 Thus, when discussing both foreign relations and internal matters, Isocrates uses 
pleonexia to refer to attempts to gain at the expense of others or, more generally, to obtain 
an advantage.  In foreign relations, he characterizes both the Greeks’ constant fighting 
against each other and the abuse that Athens, Sparta, and Thebes inflicted on its 
respective allies as pleonexia.  Ultimately, this pleonexia only harmed the perpetrators 
themselves.  In domestic affairs, he presents it as actions in which an individual gains 
either power or advantage over others and shows that it is disruptive to a body politic.  
When discussing the military or rhetoric, he does allow pleonexia a positive meaning; in 
both instances, it is good to have the advantage (pleonexia).  In this way, Isocrates uses 
pleonexia in a manner similar to authors already discussed while incorporating his own 
interpretation. 
Pleonexia in Demosthenes 
 Demosthenes uses pleonexia in general to refer to gain at the expense of others in 
his speeches for the assembly and the courts.  When used in relation to foreign affairs, 
this desire referred to territorial acquisitions or power over other states.  Within the 
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context of forensic speeches, the gain described financial transactions or the manipulation 
of law.   Demosthenes presents such actions as dangerous to a city.  Like other authors, 
however, he also applies the term to obtaining an advantage in a neutral sense and once 
even puts it in a positive context as well.  As with Isocrates’ speeches, I have organized 
the speeches of Demosthenes, and those attributed to Demosthenes, based on the use of 
pleonexia as opposed to chronological order. 
 In his orations against Philip II of Macedon, Demosthenes uses pleonexia to refer 
to the ambition or acts of gaining control of territory or cities.
50
  In the Second Olynthiac, 
one of the speeches that Demosthenes gave against Philip during Macedon’s war against 
Olynthus in 349-48 BCE,
51
 he declares that Philip has built a coalition based on 
pleonexia (2.9).  Philip promised Amphipolis to Athens and then betrayed Athens by 
keeping the city; he gave Potidaea to the Olynthians and promised Magnesia to the 
Thessalians (2.6-7).  Philip, thus, gained support from Greek states through the promise 
of the subjugation of another city, pleonexia. 
 The Second Philippic, delivered in 344, repeats the charges that Philip operates 
according to and feeds on the pleonexia of others.  Demosthenes adds that such actions 
                                                 
50
 As with all discussions in this dissertation, I am interested only in how the author uses 
pleonexia, not whether the representation is accurate.  Philip’s actual intentions are debated in scholarship.  
older scholarship, such as Cawkwell, Ellis, see Philip as wanting to settle affairs in Greece in order that he 
could attack Persia.  More recently Ian Worthington argues that above all Philip desired to make Macedon 
strong; finally, Robin Lane Fox puts forward that Philip wanted to conquer Persia but to accomplish this 
goals he felt it necessary to conquer Greece;  J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1976), 92, 125-27; George Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 
1978), 112-13; Ian Worthington, Philip II of Macedon (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2008), 
194-200; Robin Lane Fox, “Philip: Accession, Ambitions, and Self-Presentation” in Brill’s Companion to 
Ancient Macedon, ed. Robin Lane Fox (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 354. 
 
51 
The order in which the Olynthiacs were given is debated; Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives the 
order as 2,3,1, but modern commentators establish the order as 1, 2, 3; Jeremy Trevett, “Introduction to 
First Olynthiac,” in Demosthenes, Speeches 1-17, trans. Jeremy Trevett, vol. 4, Oratory of Classical Greece 






can only lead to the ruin of states.  In the opening of the speech, he notes that those like 
Philip who seek self-aggrandizement ( . . . ) 
must be stopped by practical measures and not by speeches (6.3). He then attacks Philip 
for siding with Thebes at the end of the Third Sacred War and accuses Philip of preying 
upon Theban, Argive, and Messenian pleonexia as a way to further his own desires.
52
  
Philip favored Thebes after the end of the Third Sacred War because he believed the city 
would aid his pleonexia and desire to control everything (6.7).  He knew he could count 
on the pleonexia of the Thebans because during the Persian War, 481-79 BCE, Thebes 
aligned with Persia against the rest of Greece in order to gain power (6.11).   Therefore, 
he was certain that Thebes would forego the common interest of Greece in order to 
advance its goals (pleonexias) (6.12).  Demosthenes counters critics’ assertion that Philip 
is acting out of justness, not pleonexia, by stating that Thebes had no right to 
Orchomenus or Coronea, but this did not stop Philip from giving the cities to Thebes 
(6.13).  
In the Third Philippic, Demosthenes asserts that Philip’s ambitions are greater 
than the Greek or barbarian world (
) (9.27).  Before this statement, he listed the numerous cities and 
territories that Philip conquered, destroyed, or (Demosthenes claims) subverted,
53
 setting 
up the pleonexia to refer to Philip’s acts of conquest.  On the Crown, Demosthenes’ 
speech from 330 that defended his career against accusations made by his rival 
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Aeschines, reiterates this characterization of Philip’s career as feeding on the pleonexia 
of others.  Demosthenes notes that Aeschines would have had Athens follow the path of 
ambition () and support Philip, just as Arcadia, 
Messene, and Argos did (18.64).
54
  The three Peloponnesian powers aligned with Philip 
for help against Sparta.
55
 When defending Athenian foreign policy, Demosthenes continues to use 
pleonexia to describe acts of imperialism.  In the Second Olynthiac, he claims that Athens 
refused self-aggrandizement (
) in the Corinthian War and chose to give both money and men for the 
common good of Greece against Spartan aggression (2.24).  Thus, Athens chose to act in 
such a way to benefit the common cause as opposed to trying to increase its own power.  
In the Second Philippic, he notes that Philip gave territory to Thebes because Philip knew 
he could buy Thebes’ good will, whereas Athens would never support his goals of power 
(6.8).  As opposed to selfish actions, the Athenians during the Persian War abandoned 
their own city for the cause of Greece (6.11).  In On the Chersonese, he alleges that 
Athenians do not seek advantage or gain (
), but instead seek to prevent others from ruling or 
to liberate those who are oppressed (8.42), an assertion reiterated in the Fourth Philippic 
(10.14).
56
  Athens is anti-pleonexic, in fact, because it wishes to free cities from the 
control of others instead of trying to increase its own power by subjugating cities.  Thus, 
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by contrasting Athenian good will to Philip’s actions, Demosthenes reinforces the idea 
that pleonexia on the international stage is evil gain at the expense of other cities’ 
independence.
57
 Throughout these same speeches, Demosthenes states that any policy based on 
pleonexia will ultimately be self-defeating.  In the Second Olynthiac, he declares that 
alliances such as Philip’s, built on pleonexia and crime (ponēras), will break apart (2.9).  
In the Second Philippic, he observes that Philip’s ultimate goal is power over all, and to 
accomplish this, he feeds on the pleonexia of other cities, in particular Thebes.  Those 
who trust Philip are foolish, however, because he only gives gifts to states in order to 
subjugate them later.  He gave the Olynthians Amphipolis and Potidaea only to conquer 
Olynthus itself (6.20-21); he ejected despots and added territory to Thessaly only to put it 
under the control of his tetrarchs (6.22).  In On the Chersonese, Demosthenes alleges that 
cities that sided with Philip did so out of desire for power over neighboring cities and 
consequently suffered domination by Philip.  The Olynthians allied with Philip and 
acquired the city of Potidaea and other territory; the Thebans attained Boeotia; and the 
Thessalians took Pylaea (8.65).  These cities, however, will or have already suffered.  
Philip enslaved the Thessalians and destroyed Olynthus (8.62).  In On the Crown, no 
state profited from siding with Philip, according to Demosthenes.  Philip “destroyed the 
prestige, the authority, the independence, and even the constitution of every city alike (of 
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those who allied with him)” after his victory at Chaeronea in 338 (18.65).
58
   Thus, acting 
on pleonexia is dangerous and will only lead to subjugation by another power. 
 Outside of his speeches against Philip, Demosthenes also presents pleonexia as 
the desire to gain territory at others’ expense and argues that policy based on such desire 
is dangerous.  Demosthenes uses pleonexia to refer to territorial annexation in For the 
Liberty of the Rhodians.
59
  At the outset of the speech, he declares that people go to war 
more readily to defend their own territory than for conquest () 
(15.10).  Men will not fight as hard for territory they conquered compared to territory 
they feel they must defend (15.10).  Demosthenes introduced this point by reminding the 
assembly how Athens liberated the island of Samos from Persia during a satrap revolt 
without provoking a war with Persia.
60
  Since the king did not feel that Samos was part of 
the Empire, he did not go to war with Athens to regain it (15.9). 
 For the Megalopolitans, written as a response to a Spartan peace offer of 353 that 
endeavored to end the continual fighting in Greece through territorial concessions, 
depicts Sparta’s goal of territorial acquisition as pleonexic.
61
  First, Demosthenes 
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contrasts his proposed course of action for Athens against the idea of pleonexia.  He 
contends that an alliance with the Arcadians (the people of Megalopolis) is consistent 
with the Athenian policy of acting according to justice as opposed to pleonexia (16.15).  
Athens is not trying to gain power through the alliance; rather, it is helping an ailing city, 
like it had helped Sparta, Thebes, and Euboea (16.14).  So, Athens would not enter into 
the alliance with the Arcadians for sake of expanding its influence (pleonexia), but rather 
good will.   
 Second, Demosthenes casts Spartan and Theban territorial goals as pleonexia.  If 
Sparta gained control of Megalopolis (which would happen through the proposed plan), 
then it could reconquer Messene and threaten Thebes (16.21).  Demosthenes therefore 
argues that it is better to resist Spartan pleonexia (the annexation of Megalopolis and 
Messene) now, rather than having to come to Theban aid later (16.21).  His solution is to 
restore the independence of Orchomenus, Thespiae, and Plataea, cities which had been 
destroyed or annexed by Thebes, without disrupting existing cities and without allowing 
Megalopolis or Messene to fall to Sparta (16.25).  The restoration of the cities would 
check Theban power without empowering Sparta.  If the Megapolitans agree with this 
idea, then they would be siding with justice; otherwise, they would be complicit in 
Theban pleonexia (16.28). 
 Against Aristocrates asserts that those who act on pleonexia are dangerous to 
Athenian interests and ruinous to the city’s reputation.  The speech revolves around 
whether or not Athens should pass a law that would prosecute any potential killer of 
Charidemus, a mercenary general working for the Thracian king Kersobleptes.  





Charidemus’ killer.  Demosthenes attacks the suggestion as being unwise policy.  He 
characterizes Charidemus as an adventurer who seeks his own advantage (pleonexia).  He 
professes that granting Charidemus such protection would be bad policy for Athens 
because men who act on the desire for more (pleonektein) risk what they already have 
(23.113).  Such men consider the rewards but not the dangers of their actions (23.114); 
this avarice makes them mercurial.  Kotys, a former king of Thrace and father of 
Kersobleptes, was friendly to Athens when it was to his advantage, but when he had the 
power, he would attack Athenian holdings near Thrace (23.114).  Men like Kotys, Philip 
II, and Alexander of Pherae served Athenian interests when it suited them but then 
betrayed the city’s trust (23.119-21).  In the case of Kotys, though Athens had rewarded 
him with citizenship and all manner of honors, he was so hated at the time of his death in 
Athens that the Athenians rewarded his killers (23.119).  However, as Demosthenes later 
points out, even one of Kotys’ killers acted on pleonexia and hurt Athens.  Pytho, after 
killing Kotys, first fled to Athens, but when it was in his interest, he turned to Philip 
(23.127).   Demosthenes ends the story of Pytho by reminding the jury that they should 
not trust men who act on pleonexia (23.127). 
 Allying with pleonexic men is not only dangerous but would also hurt Athens’ 
reputation.  Demosthenes portrays Charidemus as ready to attack any city which got in 
the way of his ambition () (23.139).  If Athens supports 
him, then it must be ready to attack cities that only desire to protect their independence.  
If Athens attacked such cities, then it would lose its reputation as a protector of Greek 
freedom (23.140).  In the speech, then, Demosthenes presents men who act on pleonexia 





victims, but also of those who would trust them.  Overall, in his speeches relating to 
foreign policy, Demosthenes continually uses pleonexia to refer to territorial ambitions 
and presents such drives as having negative consequences for those who act or support 
them. 
 In forensic speeches by Demosthenes or attributed to Demosthenes, the writer 
presents pleonexia as either the seeking of monetary gain from an opposing party or the 
manipulation of laws for the benefit of one party over others.  Generally these actions are 
portrayed as harmful to society. 
 First, there are the cases in which pleonexia indicates monetary gain at the 
expense of another.  Against Spudias, an early speech of Demosthenes, presents a case in 
which the plaintiff alleges that Spudias, as the inheritor of the estate of the plaintiff’s 
father-in-law, owes the plaintiff the 1,000 drachmas that he had been promised by the late 
father-in-law.
62
  In the speech, the writer notes that “Spudias claims he is being defrauded 
(pleonekteisthai) of 1,000 drachma, but he is lying” (41.25).  Here, Spudias makes the 
claim that the plaintiff is taking advantage of him by taking the money and refusing to 
pay it back.  In that way, the plaintiff would have gained at Spudias’ expense. 
In Against Meidias, delivered in 346 BC, Demosthenes accuses Meidias of 
striking him (Demosthenes) while he was officiating during the greater Dionysia of 338, 
one of the great Athenian public religious festivals.
63
  Demosthenes claims that he gave 
up the profit (pleonexia) of a private suit to protect the public (21.28).  Since Meidias 
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assaulted Demosthenes, Demosthenes could have brought a private injury suit against 
him; if Demosthenes won, then Meidias would have had to pay Demosthenes.  Thus, 
Demosthenes presents pleonexia as profit from a private lawsuit in which he would have 
gained remuneration from Meidias.  It is a neutral use, since Demosthenes would not 
present himself as pleonexic, but he still utilizes the term to refer to gain at the expense of 
another.   
Later in the speech, Demosthenes deploys a more negative form of pleonexia.  He 
declares that the leniency of Athenian jurors is an advantage (pleonexia) for all offenders 
(21.184).  They have an advantage because the good will of juries allows them to get 
away with crimes.  Not just crimes involving money, but also crimes which involve 
bullying others for personal benefit.  Because of the leniency of the juries, then, the 
offenders continue to prosper from their malicious actions, leaving their victims to pay.  
Thus, in Against Meidias, Demosthenes uses pleonexia to refer neutrally to monetary 
gain derived from another and in a broader sense of taking advantage of others.
64
 
 For Phormio, a speech in which a son challenged a former slave over part of the 
inheritance of an estate, was written but not delivered by Demosthenes in either 350 or 
349.
65
  In the speech, Demosthenes accuses the plaintiff of only recognizing the parts of 
the father’s will that benefit himself as valid; the rest is not (

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) (36.34).  The claim of pleonexia rests on an unfair reading of the will; the 
plaintiff only acknowledges what benefits himself while dismissing the rest to the 
detriment of other claimants.
Against Evergus and Mnesibulus, written sometime in the mid fourth century 
BCE by Apollodorus, an Athenian speech writer and a contemporary of Demosthenes, 
deals with the return of naval equipment after Theophemus had equipped a ship for the 
Athenian navy.
66
  Apollodorus notes that Theophemus’ pleonexia is terrible in matters 
that concern him (47.31). Theophemus owed naval equipment to the city, but he tried to 
claim that Apharaeus, the previous owner of the equipment, was responsible for it 
(47.31).  When Apharaeus proved that Theophemus was liable, Theophemus claimed he 
gave the equipment to Denarchus, who was dead and whose estate was in litigation 
(47.32).  In this convoluted scheme, Theophemus wanted to defraud the city by using the 
equipment but not paying for it.  Later, Apollodorus displays Theophemus’ pleonexic 
nature ( ) when he claims that Theophemus seized the property 
of the plaintiff in order to secure a loan payment (47.77-78).  When the loan was paid, 
Theophemus refused to return the property (47.76-77). 
 Against Timotheus, another speech attributed to Apollodorus, involves whether or 
not the plaintiff owed Timotheus for a shipment of timber that was supposedly sent from 
Macedon.
67
  Timotheus claims that he entrusted the shipment to the plaintiff, but the 
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plaintiff claims that Timotheus has no proof of this. Timotheus wants to get the plaintiff 
to pay more for goods already delivered.  The plaintiff notes that Timotheus is trying to 
cheat him in order to gain () 
(49.41).  So the charge against Timotheus is that he misrepresented the facts to profit 
himself at the expense of plaintiff. 
 Against Callicles, probably by Demosthenes, involves a dispute between two 
neighbors about who should pay for damages due to a flood that was made worse by a 
wall that the defendant’s father had put up years before.  The defendant opens the speech 
by saying that there is nothing worse than a base and greedy neighbor (
) (55.1).  He goes on 
to describe how the plaintiff keeps trying to get the defendant’s property.  Callicles first 
had his cousin file a lawsuit against the plaintiff, then he filed suit for 1,000 drachmas, 
and finally he had his brother bring a third suit (55.2).  In these instances, the pleonexia 
refers to the neighbor’s attempt to get the land from the defendant.
 In Against Macartatus, two Athenians argue over who is the true inheritor of the 
estate of Hagnias II.
68
  In the speech, the writer, probably not Demosthenes, characterizes 
Macartatus and Theopompus as caring for nothing but profit (
) (43.68).69  To this end, they held onto the property owed to 
others longer than they were supposed to, and once they controlled the estate, they 
uprooted and sold off all the olive trees on it for a profit (43.69-70).  Pleonexia in this 
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speech refers to the act of uprooting and selling the trees.  Olive trees require years of 
cultivation before they can be harvested; therefore, by selling the plants from the estate, 
Macartatus and Theopompus did not just deny the owners of the profit from one harvest 
of olive oil, but several years of profits.  Thus, for the sake of their immediate gain, the 
money made by selling the olive trees, they substantially hurt the plaintiff or anyone else 
who may have had a claim to the estate.
 Against Leochares is another case regarding a disputed inheritance, and it is not 
attributed to Demosthenes.
70
  The speech presents Leochares as a man who acts on 
pleonexia in defiance of the law in order to profit at the expense of the proper heirs.  He 
inherited an estate in Eleusis and claims another estate through adoption (the status of 
which is in question) due to pleonexia (44.28).  To fund his legal proceedings for the 
disputed estate, he uses its own resources as a source of revenue, even though he does not 
own it (44.28).  In an appeal to the jury, the plaintiff asks that the jury not aid men who 
seek advantage (mē pleonektēsai) but help those who seek their legal rights (44.28).  
 Later in the speech, the writer reinforces the message that the jury should protect 
those who work within the law.  According to the speaker, Leochares attempted to enroll 
himself in the deme of Otrynia on account of pleonexia despite being registered in 
Eleusis (44.35).
71
  The goal was to strengthen his claim to the inheritance of the estate 
and enjoy the benefits of being an Otrynian.  These benefits included being paid during 
the Panathenaic Festival (44.37).  Such acts are pleonexic not just because Leochares is 
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acting out of a desire for gain, but also because he is seeking gain at the expense of 
others.  The admission fee was paid for by the city, so by falsely claiming it, he is getting 
money at the expense of city.  Claiming to be Otrynian in order to help with the 
inheritance case would also give him an advantage over the other claimants.  Therefore, 
the writer continues, the jury should not support those who seek unjust advantage 
(adikous pleonexias) (44.38), but should uphold the laws. 
Against Olympiodorus, not a speech by Demosthenes, also portrays pleonexia as 
an act by which a person gains at the expense of others.
72
  In the speech, the plaintiff 
Callistratus claims that he and Olympiodorus decided to divide an inheritance between 
the two of them at the expense of other claimants (48.10-11).  The two made an 
agreement and swore oaths that they would not try to take advantage of the other (
) (48.9).  Callistratus explains how he 
made certain that the estate was divided evenly between himself and Olympiodorus; he 
even split the proceeds from when they forced a slave to return stolen funds from the 
estate (48.15-16).  Olympiodorus, however, did not return this favor when he found out 
that more money had been stolen (48.18-20).  Later, Olympiodorus won the entire estate 
in a counter-suit, but he reneged on his oath with Callistratus to divide the estate evenly 
(48.31-32).  In summarizing these actions, the plaintiff labels Olympiodorus as “covetous 
and unjust” () (48.46).  Here, pleonexia appears distinctly 
in a context of unjust distribution; the defendant is labeled as pleonexic because he took 
more than had been agreed upon.
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 Against Dionysodorus is about Athenian mercantile practices and is not 
considered to be written by Demosthenes.
73
  In the speech, two men borrowed 3,000 
drachmas to transport grain from Egypt to Athens.  They ended up delivering the grain to 
Rhodes and then continued to transport grain from Egypt to Rhodes for several years.  
The initial lenders sued the defendants to regain the principal plus interest earned on the 
loan, whereas the defendants were only willing to pay them back for shipping the grain 
from Egypt to Rhodes.  The speaker notes that if this case were being held in Rhodes, 
then the defendants might be able to get the better of him (), 
but because an Athenian court was judging the case, he hoped for better (56.47).  Here 
the pleonexia refers to the fact that a Rhodian jury might be more sympathetic to the 
defendants than an Athenian jury would, since the defendants delivered the grain 
regularly to Rhodes.  Thus, the attempt to have the case tried in Rhodes, thus giving the 
defendants an advantage, is put in terms of pleonexia.  Thus, Demosthenes or pseudo-
Demosthenes continually used pleonexia to refer situations in which one party sought 
financial gain at the expense of another. 
Fourth-century speechwriters also deployed pleonexia to describe individuals who 
tried to manipulate the law for personal gain.  These speeches also condemn such actions 
as being unhealthy for the state.  In the second speech Against Aristogiton, a case in 
which the defendant tried to pay his debt to the state by illegally selling land, the writer, 
probably Demosthenes, uses pleonexia to refer to private benefit at public expense and 
notes that individuals who act on pleonexia are detrimental to the city.  At the beginning 
of the speech, the writer notes that the defendant blocked a vote in the wake of Chaeronea 
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that would have enfranchised disenfranchised Athenian citizens. Now the defendant asks 
the court to re-enfranchise him.  The writer describes this action as pleonexia “for the 
previous measure was fair and equal to all in the city, but this (motion) is unfair and 
brings profit only to you (Aristogiton) of all the people of Athens,” (

) (26.13).  This demonstrates the unfairness inherent in the 
idea of pleonexia.  The first measure would have profited many, but the second would 
only profit Aristogiton.
 At the end of the speech, the writer notes that good laws help all in society, 
whereas bad laws only service the pleonexia of a few.  The writer notes that bad laws or 
lawlessness foster madness (manias), intemperance (akrasia), and pleonexia (26.25). 
Conversely, laws derived from wisdom engender good thinking and justice (sōphrosunē, 
dikaiosunē) (25).  He continues that as a physician dispels disease from a patient, so too 
does a good lawgiver dispel savagery from a city through good laws (26.26).  Though the 
author does not equate pleonexia to decline, in a manner similar to Plato he characterizes 
it as a societal illness that is solved through good law.  Thus, in Against Aristogiton, the 
author demonstrates that pleonexia both is gain at the expense of others and a poison to 
society. 
 In Against Stephanus, Apollodorus charges that it is in the interest of the state that 
the weak should be able to seek redress from the laws rather than those who act on greed 
and covetousness (pleonexia, aiskhrokerdeia) (45.67).
74
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 Against Nausimachus and Xenothepos, probably written by Demosthenes in 346, 
presents the only positive use of pleonexia in the entire corpus of Demosthenes. In the 
speech, the writer notes that those who squander their money in selfish pursuits complain 
about having to pay for services to the state, whereas those who serve the state and 
manage their affairs well enjoy an advantage over the previous category (pleonektoien) 
(38.26).  Not only do others recognize their service, but they also recognize that the 
people serve without complaint (38.26).  The advantage to which the writer refers is the 
goodwill that people generate through service to the community.  Though the references 
to pleonexia are positively charged, the section retains the idea that people who operate 
on pleonexia have an advantage over others; pleonexia is still a binary state where one 
party gains something over or against another party.  In this specific case, it is the good 
will of the people of the city.
75
  
 Outside of the speeches, there are three more instances of pleonexia in the corpus 
of Demosthenes.  The first example is in his exordia (unused openings to speeches).  In 
the twenty-fourth fragment, he asks the jury not to allow the opposing speakers to take 
advantage (pleonektousin) of their simplicity.  Thus, pleonexia refers to the act of 
manipulating the jury for the benefit of the speaker.
76
  The second occurrence is in 
Demosthenes’ funeral speech, delivered for the dead of the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 
B.C.  Demosthenes begins the speech by summarizing the deeds of Athens’ ancestors 
(60.6-11).  He recalls that the Athenians boldly resisted the Persians and claims that, after 
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the Persian War, the Athenians restrained any impulse for power over other Greek cities 
() (60.11).  This fits 
with Demosthenes’ general characterization of Athenian foreign policy, distorted as it 
might be, and his insistence in other speeches that pleonexia is the gaining of power over 
other states. 
 The third usage of pleonexia is found in a letter regarding the sons of Lycurgus.  
In the letter, Demosthenes urges the Assembly not to punish the sons of Lycurgus unless 
they wanted to give an advantage (pleonektein) to those in Athens who were friends with 
the Macedonian court (3.23).  Before this sentence, Demosthenes notes the services that 
Lycurgus performed for the people of Athens (3.2-3) and how the jailing of his sons 
dishonors Lycurgus and his service to Athens (3.6-7).  Punishing the sons would give the 
friends of Macedon the advantage because it would win them public opinion (3.23).  If 
the sons of such an honored man as Lycurgus were prosecuted, then people would lose 
faith in the city (3.27-28).  In contrast to the harshness of Athens, Alexander would ask 
for, and obtain, pardons for the men.  He had already done so in the case of Laches and 
Mnesibulus (3.24).  Thus, if Athens punished Lycurgus’ sons, Alexander would be able 
to show magnanimity, and the people would trust him and his agents in Athens over the 
Assembly (3.27). 
 Thus, both in his speeches on foreign policy and in domestic court cases, 
Demosthenes relies on pleonexia to refer to gain at the expense of others.  In foreign 
affairs, pleonexia means an attempt to gain power over another territory.  In the court 
cases, pleonexia alludes to interpreting a law, will, or situation in one way as to benefit 





contrary to law and justice and are detrimental to society.  While such instances are the 
majority, Demosthenes, like Isocrates, occasionally uses pleonexia in a neutral or positive 
sense.  
Continuity 
 Thus Isocrates and Demosthenes rely on pleonexia in a manner similar to that of 
the previous authors studied. It signified the desire to gain at another’s expense and was 
detrimental to a polis in both inter-polis and domestic affairs.  Scholars agree that earlier 
authors from the fifth and fourth centuries influenced Isocrates and Demosthenes, 
including in their use of pleonexia.  Isocrates himself admits that other authors influenced 
how he used the term pleonexia.  In the Panathenaeus he writes: 
 Were I a younger man, I might perhaps have found means to characterize 
all of their (the Spartans) crimes in a few words which would have stirred 
in my hearers an indignation commensurate with the gravity of the things 
which these men have done; but as it is, no such words occur to me other 
than those which are on the lips of all men, namely, that they (the 
Spartans) so far outdid all those who lived before their time in 
lawlessness and greed (anomia kai pleonexia) that they not only ruined 
themselves and their friends and their own countries but also brought the 
Lacedaemonians into evil repute with their allies and plunged them into 
misfortunes so many and so grave as no one could have dreamed would 




 Isocrates admits that he drew on the analysis of others, especially in choosing the 
word pleonexia, to describe the Spartan hegemony.  This passage contains sentiments 
similar to Autocles’ speech to the Spartan assembly in Book Six of Xenophon’s 
Hellenica, specifically that Spartan pleonexia, in the form of abusing its allies through the 
imposition of oligarchies, eventually caused the end of the Spartan hegemony.
78  
The 
                                                 
77
 Translation by George Norlin, accessed from  
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Isoc.+12+55&fromdo;c=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999
.01.0143 on September 28, 2012. 
 
78
 Isocrates, Speeches, vol. 2, 406-407; Papillon, Isocrates II, 182.  Relevant passage in 





similarity in explanations between the Panathenaeus and Xenophon’s Hellenica 
demonstrates at the very least that in fourth-century Athens there was a common 
understanding among Athenian intellectuals that Spartan pleonexia ended the Spartan 
hegemony. 
 Isocrates and Demosthenes do not, however, connect individuals acting on 
pleonexia to outbreaks of stasis in a systematic fashion—as do Thucydides, Plato, and 
Aristotle.  Isocrates links pleonexia to strife within a polis once in his works in the 
Busiris, a eulogy to a mythical king of Egypt written sometime between 390 and 385 
BCE as an example of how to write a eulogy.
79
  In his praise of Busiris, the mythical 
Egyptian king, Isocrates notes that the king correctly divided the people of Egypt into 
three classes: workers, fighters, and priests (11.15).  He contrasts this to Sparta, which 
similarly divided society between these classes, but then allowed its warrior class to prey 
on the property of the workers (11.19).  At the end of this comparison, Isocrates notes, “if 
all followed the example of the sloth and pleonexia of the Spartans, then Athens would 
perish due to lack of necessities and civil war” (

) (11.20).  In 
this construction, Isocrates Associates sloth with the idea of perishing from lack of 
necessities, and pleonexia with civil war, creating a causal relationship.  Sloth creates a 
lack of necessities, and pleonexia causes civil war, stasis.
 There are no speeches in the corpus of Demosthenes that link acting on pleonexia 
to stasis, but there are speeches that present pleonexia as a danger to civil society.  In 
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Against Phaenippus, written in the late fourth century but not by Demosthenes, the author 
claims that pleonexia is a danger to society.
80
  He wonders where the poor can go for 
justice if the rich can buy advantage (pleonektosin) in court (42.31).  On the Trierarchic 
Crown couples pleonexia with philotimia and presents both as desires that undermine 
society.  The writer, probably Demosthenes, argues that the jury should find in favor of 
the speaker, otherwise they will be opening the way for people to buy honor (philotimian) 
and pay the greed (pleonexia) of professional pleaders (51.22).
81
  This is the only pairing 
of philotimia and pleonexia in the corpus of Demosthenes, but it does not connect these 
ideas to stasis.  The writer casts the two motivations as a danger to Athens because 
allowing the defendants to buy the Trierarchic Crown, an award given to individuals who 
served the state, would devalue the award.  In this instance, pleonexia might refer to the 
monetary gain of the professional pleaders (they will be in greater demand), but it also 
might raise their standing in Athens since they could obtain the honors others sought 
through good oratory.  This increase in prestige would undermine the achievement of 
those who earned the honors, as opposed to those who simply paid speech writers to win 
it for them.  While not a political decline, acting on pleonexia and philotimia could create 
increased competition and devalue the award, consequences that Thucydides identifies in 
the Corcyraean stasis.   Thus, the pairing of philotimia and pleonexia in On the Crown is 
the closest that any Demosthenes or pseudo-Demosthenes speech comes to relying on the 
stasis model created by Thucydides.  So, while fourth century Athenian speech writers 
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portrayed pleonexia as a danger to society, they did not emphasize the link between 
pleonexia and stasis as Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle did. 
Conclusion 
 The speech writers of the fourth century, then, understood pleonexia to mean 
“gain at the expense of others,” but rarely used it to describe the outbreak of stasis.  
Isocrates used the term to describe acts of imperialism, gaining an advantage in war, 
manipulation of speech for one’s own advantage, general acts of injustice, or having 
advantages in life, either with or without hurting others.  Demosthenes deployed the term 
to refer to acts of imperialism, seeking financial compensation from another, or 
manipulations of law for one’s own advantage.  Both authors warned against acting on 
pleonexia in interstate relations.  They did not continue the internal paradigm of decline, 
started by Thucydides and continued by Aristotle and Plato.  Only in the Busiris does 
Isocrates connect pleonexia to stasis.  On the Trierarchic Crown notes that individuals 
acting on philotimia and pleonexia endanger a city, but it does not attach the two words 
to stasis. 
 The use of pleonexia in Isocrates, Demosthenes, and other Athenian speech 
writers demonstrate that pleonexia, and specifically the dangers of pleonexia, was widely 
understood by the Athenian population.  Its inclusion in court speeches with explanation 
indicates that the charge of individuals acting on pleonexia resonated with Athenian 
juries.  Demosthenes’ reliance on it to characterize Philip II reveals that members of the 
assembly understood how awful it was to act on pleonexia.  The fact that the authors did 
not tie pleonexia to stasis further shows the limits of the paradigm of pleonexia.  





unknown or unnecessary to use it with a general audience.  Examining pleonexia in the 
context of Athenian fourth century speech writers corroborates that fourth century writers 
understood the term to mean “gain at the expense of others,” and was presented as a 









Pleonexia and Decline in Polybius 
 
 
 This chapter will examine how Polybius understood pleonexia and how he 
applied the concept in his Histories.  Polybius was an Achaean statesman who turned 
historian when he was taken to Rome as a detainee at the conclusion of the Third 
Macedonian War in 167 BCE.
1
  There, while living amongst some of the most influential 
Romans of the time, he began his Histories, a work that set out to explain how Rome 
came to dominate the Mediterranean in only fifty-three years (1.1.5).  Polybius followed 
his classical predecessors in using pleonexia to signify the desire to gain at the expense of 
others and how acting on such an impulse caused the ruin of both individuals and cities. 
 First, this chapter will briefly discuss the problems of trying to find pleonexia in 
Hellenistic authors other than Polybius.  Second, it will assess how scholarship on 
Polybius has dealt with pleonexia, decline, and continuity between Polybius and fifth- 
and fourth-century Greek authors.  Third, it will review the instances of pleonexia within 
Polybius’ text to determine how he understood the concept.  Fourth, it will look at how 
Polybius tied pleonexia to ideas of stasis and decline, and recount how Polybius 
conceived of pleonexia as a driver of international events from the 220s to the 150s BCE.  
Finally, it will examine the continuity between Polybius and writers of the classical age 
and the implications of this continuity. 
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 Overall, I will show that Polybius, like his classical predecessors, understood 
pleonexia to be the desire to gain by taking from others and linked it to the outbreak of 
stasis and decline.  While Polybius continued certain conventional aspects of pleonexia, 
he did not associate it with the manipulation of the courts or military advantage.  He also 
paired pleonexia with philarkhian, desire for power, instead of philotimia, to explain why 
cities fall into civil strife.
2
  These differences demonstrate that language changes over 
time, and they illustrate that the specific pairing of pleonexia with a word meaning desire 
for power as a source of stasis remained constant as an analytical concept between fifth 
and fourth century Greek authors and second century Greek authors.  This continuity 
between authors suggests that the divide between Classical and Hellenistic world-views 
sometimes is more a construct of modern scholarship than an accurate depiction of a shift 
in Hellenic culture. 
Between the Fourth Century and Polybius 
 The fragmentary nature of written material from the third and early second 
century BCE makes it difficult to trace this paradigm of decline caused by pleonexia 
between fourth-century writers and Polybius.  Most of the texts of Hellenistic authors 
come from sections found or hypothesized to exist in subsequent authors, such as 
Diodorus Siculus, who wrote a history of the Mediterranean world in the first century 
BCE.  Pleonexia and ideas of decline caused by it can be found in these texts, especially 
in Diodorus, but it is difficult to determine whether the pleonexia is from the original 
source or from the later author.  For example, Jane Hornblower in Hieronymus of Cardia 
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argues that Hieronymus, a general under Alexander the Great who wrote a history that 
covered the wars following Alexander’s death, deployed pleonexia to rationalize the 
struggles of Alexander’s marshals after his death.
3
  She cites the prominence of pleonexia 
in Books Eighteen through Twenty of Diodorus Siculus’ Bibliotheke, which she believes 
were taken directly from the history of Hieronymus of Cardia, as evidence of 
Hieronymus’ reliance on pleonexia.
4
  Hornblower believes that Diodorus “followed his 
sources very closely; but it would be wrong to assume that he is a purely mechanical 
copyist.”
5
  Thus, she argues that the analysis found in Diodorus belongs to Hieronymus, 
but allows that Diodorus could have adapted the source material to suit his own purposes.   
In contrast to Hornblower, in Diodorus Siculus and the First Century, Kenneth 
Sacks contends that although Diodorus relied on other authors he constructed the 
Bibliotheke in accordance with his own thought.
6
  This included inserting pleonexia into 
passages where it had not previously existed.  In particular, Sacks points out that 
Diodorus injects pleonexia into a passage derived from Polybius 31.22, which laments 
the beginning of decline of Roman mores.
7
  The Polybian material does not contain the 
word pleonexia; Diodorus’ version does.  For Sacks, this insertion indicates that Diodorus 
amended his source material to suit his own analysis.  Therefore, the work of earlier 
authors cannot be reliably reconstructed from material found in Diodorus.  Sacks in fact 
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directly counters Hornblower’s assertion that Diodorus simply appropriated Hieronymus’ 
use of pleonexia by pointing out that Diodorus employs pleonexia almost fifty times in 
his text and only seven of those instance could be derived from Hieronymus.
8  
Thus, the 
existence of pleonexia in Diodorus’ text cannot be used to demonstrate that his 
Hellenistic sources, such as Hieronymus of Cardia, relied on the term.
 
 There is evidence from within the text of Polybius, however, that earlier 
Hellenistic authors applied the idea of pleonexia and a word for the desire of power to 
explain the cause of strife.  At the start of Book Three, Polybius states that the third- 
century BCE Roman historian Q. Fabius Pictor
 
claimed that Hannibal’s attack on 
Saguntum and Hasdrubal’s pleonexia and philarkhein caused the Second Punic War 
(3.8.1).  Polybius’ quotation is more reliable than Diodorus’ because Polybius identifies 
the analysis as belonging to Pictor.  Diodorus does not cite Hieronymus as the source of 
his analysis.  He may have relied on Hieronymus for information, but he presents the 
analysis about the successor kings as his own. Polybius, in contrast, quotes Pictor and 
cites him as his source of information.  As Polybius wanted his audience to know whom 
he was quoting, it is less likely that he would change Pictor’s words.  Also, because 
Pictor wrote in Greek there is less possibility that the pleonexia is Polybius’ interpretation 
of Pictor’s words.  So there is some evidence that Hellenistic writers relied on the notion 
of operating on pleonexia leading to strife in the third century BCE.  Given the 
problematic nature of determining authorship, and the general fragmentary nature of 
Hellenistic texts, I restrict my analysis to the ties between Polybius and fifth and fourth 
century authors. 
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Scholarship on Pleonexia, Decline, and Continuity in the Histories of Polybius 
 Although scholars have debated the influence of earlier Greek authors, such as 
Thucydides or Plato, on Polybius, they have overlooked the significance of pleonexia and 
decline in Polybius’ writings.  Weber’s and Balot’s studies of pleonexia do not extend 
past the end of the fourth century.  Scholars who examine Polybius’ moral world, such as 
Arthur Eckstein and Craige Champion, incorporate pleonexia in their evaluations of 
Polybius, but do not focus on it.  In Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius, Eckstein 
argues that Polybius evaluated historical actors according to a traditional Greek 
aristocratic moral code, which included a condemnation of pleonexia, and not 
“Machiavellian” standard of success or failure.
9
  In his inquiry into Polybius’ moral code, 
Eckstein lumps pleonexia together with words such as aiskhrokerdeian (shameful gain) 
in a broader discussion of Polybius’ views on greed.
10  
 Craige Champion commits similar elisions in Cultural Politics in Polybius’ 
Histories.  He posits that Polybius in the Histories used a matrix of Greek cultural values 
associated with either “Hellenism” or “Barbarism” in order to criticize Rome’s 
hegemony.
11
  When Polybius supported Roman actions, he attributed Greek virtues to 
them, but he portrays Romans as barbaric when he feels that they acted poorly.
12
 
Champion follows Balot in defining pleonexia as greed or covetousness, 
 
and he argues 
that Polybius associated it with barbarism.  Like Eckstein, Champion’s analysis does not 
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provide a precise definition of the term pleonexia, which leads him to inject the idea of 
pleonexia into parts of the text where it does not belong.  Also, his treatment of pleonexia 
mainly as a rhetorical tool weakens its analytical significance. 
 First, Champion’s broader interpretation of pleonexia as greed causes him to read 
pleonexia into inappropriate parts of the text.  He states that the innate pleonexia of the 
Gauls can be seen in 3.51 when Polybius describes Gauls leaving their village unattended 
in order to attack Hannibal’s troops in hopes of loot ([Hannibal]  
) (11).13  Neither pleonexia, 
the related form pleon ekhein, nor even the more distant epithumeō appear in the passage.  
The word to describe loot in the passage is ōpheleias, which as I have discussed in earlier 
chapters does not have the same connotation as pleonexia. In fact Polybius only connects 
the Gauls to pleonexia in Book Two, when he notes that the Gallic war band that raided 
Etruria in 299 BCE destroyed a greater part of itself when it fell into internal fighting 
over the spoils due to pleonexia (

) (2.19.3).  Polybius does not attribute this infighting to any 
pleonexia that was inherent in the Gallic character, but to the Gauls’ unrestrained love of 
drinking (oinophlugia) and satiety (plēsmonē) (2.19.4).
 Second, Champion’s insistence that Polybius used loaded language such as 
pleonexia as a rhetorical tool reduces the analytical importance of pleonexia.  It dismisses 
the possibility of Polybius using pleonexia as a serious causal explanation of events and 
insists that instances of pleonexia are rhetorical attacks.  I suggest that Polybius’ 
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employment of pleonexia is an act of psychological analysis; he deploys the term to refer 
to a natural impulse in individuals that causes them to act in a certain way.  He certainly 
condemns acting on pleonexia, but I think it is as much a causal agent in his Histories as 
a value judgment.  Thus, while authors such as Eckstein and Champion have recognized 
the existence of pleonexia in the text of Polybius, their analysis glosses over both the 
exact meaning of pleonexia and its role in Polybius’ Histories. 
 Correspondingly, scholars reduce the importance of Polybius’ discussions of 
decline.  In “The Idea of Decline in Polybius” Walbank dismisses the notion that 
Polybius had a well-thought out concept of decline in his Histories.  He argues that since 
Polybius’ emphasis was on the rise of Rome, any mention of decline would have been 
incidental.
14
  Walbank recognizes that Polybius had a theory of decline of Platonic 
origins that was based on a concept of a natural progression of change, but he argues that 
this political theory did not have any impact on Polybius’ presentation of historical 
events.
15
  This dissonance between the theoretical and historical representation disposes 




Walbank centers his argument on Polybius’ discussion of the cycle of 
constitutions in Book Six, his prophecy of the fall of Rome at the end of Book Six, and 
three selections of what Walbank calls “social decline”: Polybius’ discussion of 
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Cynaethea, Boeotia, and Greece (4.17-18, 20-21; 20.4-6; 36.17).
17
  While these are 
examples of decline, they are not representative of Polybius’ discussion of political 
decline.  Polybius applies the ideas found in Book Six, specifically that individuals acting 
on pleonexia transform democracies into mob rule, in his narrative in the accounts of 
Malpagoras at Cius (15.21) and Chaeron in Sparta (24.7).  He also narrates how in 
Achaea Critolaus and Diaeus played upon the sympathies of the mob to gain power, 
which resulted in the Achaean League’s destruction, but he does not include pleonexia in 
his analysis (38.10-18).  Critolaus implemented debt relief policies similar to those other 
Polybian demagogues, such as Malpagoras, used when acting according to pleonexia 
(compare 38.11.10 to 15.21).  The difference is that Critolaus canceled debts and taxed 
the rich, but he did not confiscate their property and re-apportion it to the poor.  In a 
broader sense of showing how pleonexia breaks down communities, a central point of the 
anakyklosis, Polybius ties pleonexia to outbreaks of stasis throughout the narrative: the 
disintegration of Gallic attack on Etruria (2.19.3), Lycurgus protecting Sparta from stasis 
by dispelling pleonexia from Spartan life (6.46.7), Cretan pleonexia disrupting social 
harmony (6.46.9), and the breakdown of Carthaginian power in Spain in Book Nine 
(9.11.3).  These are presentations of historical events in Greece that reflect Polybius’ 
theoretical decline model.   
In regard to Polybius’ prophecy of Roman decline, Walbank claims that Polybius’ 
inability in the last ten books to follow his own prognostication put forward in Book Six 
proves that Polybius did not have a coherent theory of decline.  Walbank admits that 
Polybius had an increasingly negative view of Rome in the last ten books, but he insists 
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that Polybius was still primarily concerned with the rise of Rome, not its fall.
18
  Eckstein 
and Champion agree that the books demonstrate Polybius’ belief in the decline of Roman 
morals, but neither argues, or tries to demonstrate, that Polybius applied his schema of 
decline at 6.57 to Roman actions in the last ten books.
19
  I think the books are too 
fragmentary to make a judgment.  It is possible that Polybius’ narrative in the ten books 
do not follow Polybius’ scheme, but that dissonance means that Polybius’ model failed 
for those particular events, not that it was poorly thought out.  As I will argue later in the 
chapter, the turbulent history of Rome in the first century BCE and the rise of Augustus, 
vindicate Polybius’ analysis at 6.57.  Thus, though Walbank downplays the existence of a 
general theory of decline in Polybius, even he acknowledges that Polybius included 
concrete ideas of decline, regardless of their flaws, in the text. 
 Finally, scholars debate the influence of fifth- and fourth-century Greek writers on 
Polybius.  In his article “Socrates Enters Rome,” Paul Friedlander argues that Polybius 
would have been educated in Plato and adapted Platonic material into his Histories; 
Friedlander points to Polybius’ emphasis on moral education as evidence of Platonic 
influence.
20
  In Metabole Politeiōn: Der Wandel Der Staatsverfassungen, Heinrich Ryffel 
argues that Polybius derived his anakyklosis, the cycle of constitutions, from Plato, but 
through an unidentified intermediary writer.
21
  Walbank in his commentary on Polybius’ 
Histories agrees that the roots of Polybius’ political theory originated in fifth- and fourth-
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century Greek thought, but he does not think Plato or other fifth- and fourth-century 
authors had a direct influence on Polybius; instead, Platonic thought trickled down to 
Polybius through a third- or second-century BCE philosopher.
22  
In regard to the idea of 
decline, he says that Polybius’ connection of pleonexia to changes in government and the 
forecast of the end of the Roman mixed constitution was a “commonplace theme” in 
Greek writing, found in Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides.
23
  In The Nature of History in 
Ancient Greece and Rome, Charles Fornara believes that Polybius’ theory on decline had 
Roman origins.
24  
He rejects that idea that any theory of decline could have originated 
from Greek authors, because he does not believe that Greek authors ever thought of 
decline in a systematic manner.
25  
In The Rise and Fall of State According to Greek 
Authors, Jacqueline de Romilly admits the authors such as Thucydides and Polybius had 
similar explanations for why states lost power, but she argues that such parallels are due 
the authors’ shared Hellenic world-view and not because Thucydides had a direct 
influence on Polybius.
26  
Walbank, Luce, and Marincola agree that Polybius used 
Thucydides as an ideological model for pragmatic history—a history focused on military 
and political events that would be educational to the reader. They reach this conclusion 
based on the similarities between Thucydides’ and Polybius’ discussions of historical 
causation; both distinguish between immediate causes of conflicts, the direct events that 
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lead to war, and the real causes, the sources of tension between two states that simmer for 
years before boiling over into open conflict (Thuc. 1.23.6; Polyb. 3.6.6).
27
   
 Recent scholarship has returned to examining the parallels between Polybius and 
other ancient historians.  An international colloquium in Leuven, Belgium, examined 
Polybius’ relations with other historians of his time, but the conference focused more on 
how we use Polybius as a source for other fragmentary authors and less on the continuity 
in thought between Polybius and earlier authors.
28
  In their respective chapters in 
Imperialism, Cultural Politics, and Polybius, Tim Rood and Georgina Langley argue that 
like Thucydides Polybius relied on discussions of human nature to explain historical 
events.  Tim Rood examines the textual and thematic parallels between Polybius’ 
descriptions of the Romans in the First Punic War and the Roman constitution and 
Thucydides’ analysis of the causes of the Peloponnesian War and the Sicilian expedition 
in his chapter “Polybius, Thucydides, and the First Punic War.”  He strives to prove that 
Polybius drew on Thucydides’ depiction of Athenian and Spartan characteristics to 
explain Roman expansion.
29
  In “Thucydides, Polybius, and Human Nature,” Georgina 
Longley shows that Polybius, like Thucydides, portrayed human nature as a causal force 
in history.
30 
 Eckstein’s 2012 review of Imperialism, Cultural Power, and Polybius agrees 
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that Thucydides and Polybius emphasized the power of human nature, but argues that 
Rood and Longley overlooked more obvious parallels.
  
He observes that Polybius’ 
discussion of why the Achaeans went to war with Rome in 146 echoes the language of 
Thucydides’ Melian dialogue.  Both declare that it is more disgraceful to fall into 
misfortune due to bad decisions and delusions about the chance of success than from bad 
luck.
31   
 
In her chapter “The Rise and Fall of the Boeotians,” in Polybius and his World, 
Christel Müller argues that Polybius’ treatment of the decline of Thebes and Boeotia in 
20.4-7 was derived from a long literary tradition of Theban decadence found in Greek 
thought.
32
  Müller’s chapter delves into Polybius’ narrative in order to show how 
Polybius drew on earlier literary tropes, for example characterization of Boeotians as 
drunk country-bumpkins in Attic comedy, to explain Theban decline in Book Twenty.  
For Müller, Polybius’ treatment of the Boeotians reveals Polybius’ model of decline due 
to moral decadence, specifically drinking and greed, which Polybius applied to other 
Greeks, such as the Acanthians.
33
   Thus, scholars have underappreciated Polybius’ use of 
pleonexia, his conceptualization of decline, and the influence that previous Greek authors 
had on him, but are currently debating previous assumptions. 
Pleonexia in Polybius 
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 Like his predecessors, Polybius utilizes pleonexia to characterize situations in 
which one party seeks to gain at the expense of another.  The introduction to Book Four 
contains his most graphic picture of pleonexia.  At 4.3.1, he notes that the Aetolians were 
unhappy with the affairs of Greece in the wake of the Cleomenes War (228-222 BCE) 
because without the revenues of war they lacked the resources to live as they desired.  
They lived like animals () always acting on pleonexia (aei 
pleonetikon), treating all as potential prey (4.3.1).  Polybius’ image of those who act on 
pleonexia, then, is that of a predatory animal: as an animal feeds on its victims, so too 
does the pleonektēs feed on its neighbors.
34
 
This image illustrates that pleonexia can operate without a stated objective.  
Scholars translate pleonexia as the desire for wealth and assume its object is material, e.g. 
money, gold.  Pleonexia is more versatile than that; as with the other authors surveyed, 
for Polybius its object can be wealth, but it can also be security or power.  The object is 
irrelevant.  What matters is that the desired object (whatever it is) is acquired by taking it 
from another.  At 4.3.1, Polybius states that the Aetolians “are accustomed to living off 
their neighbors” ().  Pleonetikon, then, could refer to 
any kind of rapacious activity: the taking of herds, loot, or crops.  Until the arpagē 
(booty) at 4.3.3, there is no specified object.  The image of pleonexia that Polybius 
invokes, then, is of an animal feeding off another, figuratively eating its opponent in 
order to gain sustenance, and more broadly of one group gaining at the expense of 
another. 
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 In terms of intra-community affairs, Polybius employs pleonexia to characterize 
situations where groups or individuals seek to gain wealth, land, or political power at the 
expense of others, especially fellow citizens.  In Book Ten, he uses pleonexia to contrast 
Greek and Roman practices of sacking an enemy camp or city in order to explain why the 
Romans are superior.  When sacking a camp or city, individual Greek soldiers take as 
much loot as each can get for himself ([]
) (10.17.1).  This policy endangers the army as a whole 
since the commanders lose control of the soldiers and risk allowing victory to become a 
disaster through an enemy counter attack (10.17.4).  
Romans, on the other hand, evenly divide loot among all the soldiers (10.16.5).  
At the start of a campaign, all soldiers swear an oath that they will not steal parts of the 
plunder (10.16.7).
35
  When sacking a city or camp, half the Roman force remains outside 
to protect those who are pillaging (10.16.8).  The soldiers left behind for guard duty have 
no incentive to desert their posts since they are secure in their knowledge of obtaining a 
fair share of the spoils (10.16.9).  On account of the oaths to divide the loot evenly, 
Romans do not risk suffering from pleonexia (
) (10.16.8).  Pleonexia in this instance, then, deals with the desire to 
acquire loot at the expense of others.  The Greek soldiers take whatever they can.  In 
doing so, they prohibit their fellow soldiers from obtaining an equitable share, and they 
put the entire army at risk of an enemy counter-attack.   By dividing the spoils, Roman 
soldiers do not risk being endangered by pleonexia.  So, at 10.16, Polybius deploys 
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pleonexia to refer to desire to take more than an equitable share, and he indicates that 
acting on such an urge is potentially harmful.
 The previous examples have shown that pleonexia in Polybius can refer to the 
acquisition of money or material goods, but it is not synonymous with words that denote 
the desire for money, such as philarguria.  When pleonexia refers to the acquisition of 
wealth, there must be a word that indicates that money is its object.  In the case of the 
Aetolians at the start of Book Four, it was booty (arpagē) (4.3.3).  In the case of the 
Greek soldiers it was loot (ōpheleia) (10.17.3).  Polybius’ treatment of Scopas in Books 
Thirteen and Eighteen further demonstrates that when Polybius uses pleonexia to 
describe the desire for wealth, he includes words meaning money.  In Book Thirteen, 
Polybius narrates how Scopas fled to Alexandria after failing to pass wealth redistribution 
laws in Aetolia in 204 BCE (13.2.1).  Scopas’ avarice only grew there (13.2.1).  Polybius 
compares him to a patient with dropsy (edema), who continually thirsts for more but 
cannot be satiated (13.2.2).  The court of Ptolemy paid Scopas as a mercenary 
commander, but his salary was not enough and he demanded more money (13.2.5).  
Ultimately, Polybius notes, Scopas lost his life due to his desire for money (13.2.5).  
While the passage discusses greed, Polybius does not use any form of pleonexia in it.  He 
does use the phrase to pleion epithumian, which in earlier authors was used in a similar 
fashion as pleonexia, but even then he designates the object of Scopas’ to pleion 
epithumian as money (khruseos) (13.2.5). 
 Polybius returns to Scopas and his greed in 18.55.1, where he uses both 
philarguria and pleonexia to describe Scopas and in doing so differentiates between 





notes that Scopas’ philarguria was well known during his life, because his pleonexia 




  The report of Scopas’ philarguria expanded after Scopas’ death when the 
Egyptians found large amounts of money and valuables that had been taken from the 
palace in Scopas’ house (18.55.1).  To obtain these treasures, Scopas had looted the 
palace like a burglar () (18.55.2).  Polybius’ 
inclusion of both philarguria and pleonexia in the passage indicates that the two terms 
are not synonymous.  The philarguria identifies the object of Scopas’ pleonexia, while 
pleonexia refers to the manner by which he obtained it—i.e., theft.  If Polybius thought 
that pleonexia was limited to the desire of money, he would not have needed to specify 
that Scopas was philarguria.  Polybius’ treatment of Scopas thus demonstrates that 
pleonexia was not limited to the desire for money, but denoted the manner of 
acquisition—gain at the expense of others—as opposed to the object.
 
Polybius also used pleonexia to characterize how individuals sought to gain 
power within a political community.  In Book Four, when elaborating on the 
machinations of Apelles, a senior adviser to Philip V, Polybius states that Apelles 
resorted to flattering Taurion, a rival adviser to Philip V, as opposed to personal attacks 
in order to delegitimize Taurion and gain more influence in the court of Philip (4.87.4).  
Polybius then states that such a tactic—the undermining an opponent through flattery—is 
a form of pleonexia that courtiers employ to get more power (4.87.4).  Polybius goes on 
to note that Apelles later came to ruin due to his schemes and pleonexia (4.87.10). 
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In Book Fifteen, Polybius labels Malpagoras of Cius a demagogue and a 
pleonektēs because he played upon the mob to eliminate political rivals for power and 
eventually gained it.
37
  In 15.21.1, Polybius describes how Malpagoras obtained power in 
Cius “by flattering the populace, by inciting the rabble against men of means, by finally 
killing some of the latter and banishing others whose property he confiscated and 
distributed among the people, soon attained by these means supreme power” (15.21.1).  
The first part of the description clarifies how Malpagoras was a demagogue, while the 
second explains how he was a pleonektēs because he a) implemented policies that took 
money from the rich and gave it to the poor and b) used these tactics in order gain 
political power for himself at the expense of his rivals.  Polybius then proclaims that 
humanity is more foolish than animals, because people will fall for the same trap time 
and again, whereas an animal will avoid repeating a mistake (15.21.5).  The trap, for 
Polybius, is policies of wealth redistribution, taking things from others for free and for 
one’s own benefit, and their use by individuals seeking political power from the mob.  He 
ends the section with the warning that such policies only bring ruin to a city (15.21.8).
38  
In Book Twenty-Four, Polybius attributes pleonexia to Chaeron, a Spartan 
magistrate, on account of his policies of wealth redistribution in order to gain political 
power.  Like Malpagoras, Chaeron gained power by flattering the mob (24.7.2).  He 
sought to cement his power in Sparta first by taking away land from the families of exiles 
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Paton translates pleonektēs here as “greedy for power.” Polybius, The Histories, trans. W.R. 
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 There is a lacuna in the text after 21.8, so it is uncertain how Polybius connects Malpagoras’ rise 
to power with the destruction of Cius.  The text resumes with Philip as the master of the city (22.1).  The 
rest of the chapter gives the reader a guess as to what transpired.  It states that Philip intervened on behalf 
of his son-in-law, unnamed in the text but who was in fact Prusias of Bithynia, to overthrow the 
revolutionaries (22.1).  Walbank comments that which side Philip intervened on is unknown, but that it 






and giving it to the poor without a regulated system of distribution (24.7.3).  He then 
supplemented his income by redirecting public funds for his own purposes without regard 
to the law (24.7.4).  When another magistrate, Apollonidas, threatened to audit Chaeron’s 
accounts and expose his pleonexia—the theft of public funds for private purposes and 
political power—Chaeron had Apollonidas killed (7.6).  Chaeron was eventually 
imprisoned for Apollonidas’ murder (24.7.7).
39 
 
In Book Eighteen, Polybius condemns Demosthenes for falsely accusing other 
Greek statesmen of being traitors because they sided with Philip II (18.14).  Polybius 
declares that the leaders of Greek cities in the time of Philip’s reign made the pragmatic 
choice to save their cities as opposed being destroyed.  Treachery, according to Polybius, 
would have been: 
Had they in acting thus either submitted to have their towns garrisoned by Philip, or 
abolished their laws and deprived the citizens of action and speech to serve their own 
ambition (pleonexias) and place themselves in power, they would have deserved the 









Pleonexia in this context refers to a politician giving away the independence of his city 
and the freedom of his fellow citizens in order to establish his own power over the city. 
 Finally,
 
in Polybius’ discussion of Greece during the Third Macedonian War, he 
narrates how two Acarnanian statesmen, Chremas and Glaucus, proposed to Popilius 
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Laenas, a Roman envoy to Greece, that Rome place garrisons in Acarnanian cities in 
order to control the region (28.5.1).  Diogenes, another statesman, disagreed.  He accused 
Chremas and Glaucus of supporting the garrisons in order to diminish the authority of 
their rivals and further their own political ambitions (pleonexiais) (
) (28.5.5).  Thus, in his 
treatment of power hungry politicians, Polybius applies pleonexia to describe actions 
through which politicians gained power by taking from others.  The desire to obtain 
money is not mentioned in the discussion.  It could be an indirect benefit of political 
power, but Polybius’ emphasis is on how pleonexic individuals sought power at the 
expense of others. 
When comparing the Cretan and Spartan constitutions in Book Six (6.45-46), 
Polybius relies on pleonexia to refer to both gaining money and political power at the 
expense of others.  In the following section, I will identify the four instances of pleonexia 
in the
 
text, and then explain how in each instance it makes more sense to translate 
pleonexia as “the desire for more at the expense of another,” as opposed to merely “the 
desire for wealth” as Paton  translates it.
41 
 Pleonexia first appears when Polybius notes 
that in Crete aiskhrokerdeian (covetousness) and pleonexia prevail so much that no form 
of financial gain is shameful (6.46.3).  The second appearance is at 6.46.7 where Polybius 
notes that Lycurgus understood that the security of a city depended on withstanding 
foreign enemies and maintaining internal cohesion, so he banished pleonexia through his 
constitutional reforms to ensure that the Sparta enjoyed internal harmony.  The third is at 
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6.46.9 where Polybius states that the Cretans are in constant conflict due to their 
pleonexia.  The fourth occurs at 6.47.4, when Polybius declares that the laws and customs 
of a city can be judged as bad if the citizens are pleonexic in their private interactions 
() and unjust in their public ones. 
 
Polybius’ first use of pleonexia in his discussion of Cretan society in 6.46.3-4 
illustrates that pleonexia is a specific way of obtaining wealth as opposed to just the 
desire for money.  Polybius begins by saying that the Cretans love money so much that 
its acquisition (ktēsis) is considered honorable (6.46.3).  He continues that “so much in 
fact do aiskhrokerdeia and pleonexia prevail among them, that the Cretans are the only 
people in the world in whose eyes no gain is disgraceful” (
’
 
) (6.46.3).42  The emphasis of the sentence is that the Cretans would do anything 
to obtain money, so it would be redundant for pleonexia and kerdos to refer to the desire 
to acquire it.  It makes more sense if aiskhrokerdeia and pleonexia each specified a form 
of kerdos (gain): gain that is shameful and gain that came at the expense of another.  In 
Chapter Three, I showed that Aristotle differentiated between aiskhrokerdeia and 
pleonexia while relying on both to describe a form of material acquisition, so it would 
follow that Polybius could make a similar distinction.  The sentence as a whole still refers 
to the acquisition of money, but pleonexia identifies how the money was obtained.
 
The pleonexias in sections 6.46.7 and 9 also could refer to the acquisition of 
wealth, but the passages makes more sense if they are translated as “desire for more at the 
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expense of another.”  At 6.46.7, Polybius notes that Lycurgus knew that the safety of a 
city relied on internal cohesion and that he secured that cohesion in Sparta by removing 
pleonexia.  To show how Lycurgus removed pleonexia, Polybius evaluates the Spartan 
and Cretan constitutions on three points: land acquisition, the value of money, and the 
stability of the government.  The Spartan system evenly distributes land, makes money 
meaningless, and reduces competition for office by having a hereditary monarchy and 
electing magistrates for life (6.45.3-4).  As Walbank observes, at the time Polybius was 
writing Sparta had no kings, so his discussion of Sparta’s constitution could only be 
referring to the constitution Sparta had in the fifth and fourth centuries.  Therefore, the 
elected magistrates, whom Polybius specifies, were members of the Gerousia, the council 
of warriors over sixty that were selected for life-long terms by acclamation.
43
  In Crete, 
people could own as much land as they desire, money is valued to such an extent that 
there is no shameful way to acquire it, and magistrates are elected annually and 
democratically (6.46.2-5).  The result of these two systems is that Sparta enjoys internal 
peace, whereas the Cretans suffer from constant public and private disputes on account of 
their pleonexia () (6.46.9).  If pleonexia was limited 
to the desire for money in these passages, Polybius would not need to include the 
acquisition of land and political power when discussing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the two systems.  If pleonexia refers to the manner of gain, not the object, as I argue, then 
it would refer to attempts to obtain land, money, or political power within a city.  
Translating pleonexia as the desire for more at the expense of others, then, illuminates 
why Polybius compared the Spartan and Cretan constitutions on all three points.   
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Polybius ends the section by noting that it is fair to judge a city on its customs and 
laws and that cities which function on pleonexia are paltry or weak (phaulēn) 
(

) (6.47.4).  Again, if 
pleonexia was limited to desire for money, this final critique would be less 
comprehensive; it would still be an indictment of pleonexia, and pleonexia would still 
refer to “gain at the expense of others,” but it would not engage with all the elements that 
Polybius discussed in his comparison of Sparta and Crete.  If pleonexia referred to the 
desire of the populace to enrich themselves at the expense of their fellow citizens in any 
aspect of community life, land, political office, wealth, then the sentence summarizes the 
entire comparison between Crete and Sparta rather well.  Pleonexia turns communities 
into free-for-alls, in which citizens fight each other for even the smallest gain.  Thus, in 
his discussion of internal affairs of a city, Polybius relies on pleonexia to describe the 
desire to gain something, money, land, or power, by taking it from another, and decries 
such actions, especially because they lead to social divisions.
 
In terms of foreign affairs, Polybius at times follows Demosthenes and Isocrates 
in depicting pleonexia as imperialism.  At the start of his discussion of the Cleomenes 
War in Book Two, Polybius uses pleonexia to describe the desire to conquer when he 
contrasts the territorial ambitions of Cleomenes and the Aetolians.  He states that 
Cleomenes desired only power over the Peloponnesus ( 
) so that he could control Greece; Aetolian ambition 






) (2.49.3-4).44  By contrasting 
the territorial ambitions of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, Polybius makes it clear that 
pleonexia in this context refers to annexation of territory.  Polybius reuses this meaning 
when describing the Spartan annexation of Messene in the sixth century BCE.  In Book 
Six, he states that though Lycurgus managed to curb Spartan pleonexia in domestic 
affairs, he did nothing to check their pleonexia against other cities (6.48.8).  This 
pleonexia led to the Spartan conquest and annexation of Messene (6.49.1).  The pleonexia 
at 6.48.8 does not directly refer to money and of course the Messenians were the losers to 
the direct gain of the Spartans. 
Finally, Polybius presents pleonexia as a trait inherent in specific groups, 
specifically the Aetolians, Cretans, and Carthaginians/Phoenicians.
45
  Not only might 
pleonexia be inherent in people, but it could also be avoided.  Lycurgus dispelled 
pleonexia from the domestic affairs of Sparta by equalizing all aspects of Spartan society 
(6.46.7).  Roman laws and customs forbid pleonexia, specifically in regard to wealth.  As 
stated earlier, Roman soldiers took a vow at the beginning of each military campaign to 
divide any loot evenly; this vow, and the upholding of the vow, keeps Roman soldiers 
from acting on pleonexia (10.16.8).  The Romans do not take bribes and avoid acting on 
pleonexia because they dislike shameful acquisition (6.56.2).  Roman approval for 
                                                 
44
 Paton translates this pleonexia as territorial aggrandizement. Walbank has no comment.  
Walbank, Commentary, vol. 1, 248. 
 
45
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making money through respectable means is only matched by their disapproval of the 
desire to gain through forbidden means (6.56.3). 
Polybius’ text at 6.56.2 and 3 present a challenge to my translation of pleonexia.
46
  
According to my literal translation, the sections would read “(Romans despise) the 
seeking of gain at the expense of others from improper sources” (
) (6.56.2) and “the desire to gain more at the expense of others from 
forbidden sources” () (6.56.3).47  These 
translations seem redundant; if pleonexia itself is a form of improper gain, why would 
Polybius include  (from improper sources) 
or  (from forbidden sources)?  Worse, could pleonexia be justified 
if the gain was from proper sources or from non-forbidden means?  I think the translation 
makes sense if one assumes that pleonexia was the worst kind of gain that Polybius could 
imagine.  The entire passage is one of contrasts: Rome versus Carthage, acceptable 
sources of income versus unacceptable forms of income.  To emphasize the disparity, 
Polybius would want to use language indicating the worst form of gain in order to 
contrast it with the merits he saw in the Roman system.  Therefore, it is not just pleonexia 
that Polybius imagine (itself an unpalatable form of gain), but pleonexia deriving from 
improper sources—in Polybius’ world view probably wealth redistribution.
48
  Such an 
emphasis strengthens the contrast: as much as the Romans like making money from 
proper sources, they hate money obtained from others via forbidden means.  I will admit 
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 Walbank has no comment on the use of pleonexia in these passages. Walbank, Commentary, 
vol. 1, 741. 
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that for translation purposes it would be best here to translate pleonexia as the desire to 
gain or greed, but the reader should keep in mind the kind of gain that pleonexia implies.
 
Polybius in the second century BCE thus employs pleonexia in a manner similar 
to the Greek authors of the fifth and fourth century BCE.  He understood it to mean “the 
desire for more at the expense of another.”  He applies it when referring to the acquisition 
of material objects (such as money or land) and also the acquisition of political power 
within a city.  In his text, it alludes to attempts to gain power, plunder, or territory at the 
expense of others in interstate affairs.   As in other authors, Polybius notes that following 
pleonexia often hurts the pleonexic agent, as was the case with Scopas the Aetolian, 
Chaeron the Spartan, Appelles the courtier, the people of Crete, and, as I will show, the 
Aetolians, Philip V,  and Antiochus III.
   
Decline in Polybius 
 Polybius relies on pleonexia to explain the transition of governments, to predict 
the fall of the Roman Republic, and to reveal why states lost power on the international 
stage.  In Book Six, Polybius digresses from his narrative into constitutional theory in 
order to explain why Rome persevered after the battle of Cannae and won the Second 
Punic War.  According to Polybius, Rome won because its mixed constitution, which 
granted all groups within Roman society power in the government, ensured that the 
groups worked together for the good of the state.  In order to understand the elements of 
the mixed constitution, Polybius first discusses his six government types: monarchy, 
tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and mob rule (6.3.5-4.6).  Polybius deemed 
three of these governments to be good: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and three 





another, he declares, as a result of excessive desire either for pleasure or political power 
on the part of the ruling class.
49
  The excessive appetites of the king’s children, their 
willingness to indulge in luxury, pursuit of passions, and abuse of power, transform 
monarchy into tyranny (6.7.6-8).
50
  This lack of restraint annoys the aristocracy, which 
leads to resistance and the overthrow of the tyranny in favor of an aristocracy (6.7.9).  
The aristocracy degenerates into an oligarchy when the children of the aristocrats follow 
their own desires instead of looking out for the state as a whole (6.8.4-5).  The children 
indulge in pleonexia, philarguria, wine, excess, or sexual desires for women or boys 
(6.8.5).
51
   These outrages alarm the people, and they replace the oligarchy with 
democracy (6.9.1-2).  Democracy remains until the grandchildren of the initial democrats 
grow tired of egalitarian ideas and instead desire to have more than others 
() (6.9.5).52  This desire leads those who want office 
(philarkhein) to burn through their money in attempts to buy the good will of the people 
(6.9.7).  A result of their pandering is that the people develop a desire and expectation for 
gifts, and are no longer ruled by law, but by violence; society thus descends into savagery 
as the people are ruled by their passions and seek to live off the property of others (6.9.8).  
Finally, the mob will unite under a leader who directs them in their desire for plunder, 
and in this process reestablishes a monarchy (6.9.10).    
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 Polybius notes that kingship declines because the children of the king are brought up in luxury, 
an idea that parallels Plato’s discussion of why the Persian kings, particularly Cambyses and Xerxes, were 
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 Paton translates the pleon ekhein as “to aim at preeminence.”  This translation demonstrates the 






 The whole cycle, then, is pushed by out-of-control passions and desires.
53
  The 
boundless desires of the king’s children destroy the monarchy.  The out-of-control 
passions of the aristocrats’ children subvert the aristocracy.  The desire for power at-all-
costs transforms democracy into mob rule, and mob rule becomes monarchy when one 
individual harnesses the collective pleonexia of society.  Admittedly, neither the word 
pleonexia nor the phrase pleon ekhein appear in Polybius’ discussion of mob rule (6.9.8-
9), but he does say that the mob, having become accustomed to living at the expense of 
others (
), will find a leader who will help them in these efforts (6.9.8).  Thus, to 
explain the transition from aristocracy to oligarchy, democracy to mob rule, and mob rule 
to tyranny, Polybius relies on pleonexia.  Polybius ends the section by saying that he has 
presented a natural (phusis) theory of state change (metabolē).  Whenever the political 
elite within a community begins to act on pleonexia and seeks to satisfy their desires for 
luxury or power at the expense of the city as a whole, their actions create resentment 
among the governed, resistance, and the overthrow and the replacement of the 
constitution.
54
 At the end of Book Six, Polybius also applies his ideas on decline and pleonexia 
to his discussion of how and why the mixed constitution of Rome will eventually 
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transform into mob rule and tyranny.
55
  According to Polybius, the mixed constitution of 
the Roman Republic will fall when, after a long period of peace and prosperity, 
competition among the elites for offices or other objects becomes too intense (6.57.5).  
The drivers of this change will be the desire for office (philarkhein), the fear of disgrace 
(), flamboyant displays of wealth (
), and extravagance (poluteleia) (6.57.6).  In reaction, the people will turn on 
the aristocrats, and either attack those whom they perceive as pleonexic or support those 
who pander to the mob for power (
) (6.57.7-8).  
Polybius does not identify the form of pleonexia in the passage.  He does, 
however, state that aristocrats will seek to expand their own wealth, so the implication is 
that they will do so in a manner that hurts, or is perceived to hurt, the Roman populace.  
Feeling that they are injured by certain aristocrats, the mass will turn to those whom they 
perceive as supporting them; in Polybius’ reality, the politicians who pander to the mob 
are actually just feeding the collective desires of the people as opposed to putting forward 
good policy.  The people will thus allow themselves to be ruled by passion as opposed to 
reason and seek to control the government (6.57.8).  Thus, Rome will degenerate into the 
worst form of government: mob rule (6.57.9).  Though Polybius does not identify 
pleonexia as a cause of the change, it plays an important role in this transition.  The 
people’s fear of the pleonexia of the elite, in addition to the actual philarkhein of 
aristocrats, will motivate the populace to follow politicians who pander to them.  This 
will lead to poor policy, mob rule, and the end of Rome’s mixed constitution. The 
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collapse of the mixed constitution was a decline according to the theory that “decline” 
involves transition from more complex socio-political systems to simpler systems.  Gone 
was the complex balancing act of divided governance which sought to incorporate as 
many groups in political decisions as possible (6.11-14).  Gone were the ties of 
dependency based on reciprocity (6.15-17).  They were replaced with the direct control of 
a single individual who held a monopoly on violence. 
 Outside of his general discussions of why governments change, Polybius links 
pleonexia with outbreaks of stasis throughout his narrative.  In Book Two, Polybius 
describes how after a successful Gallic raid against Etruria, a greater part of the Gallic 
host destroyed itself when the Gauls began to fight amongst themselves (stasiasantes) for 
the spoils of the raid on account of pleonexia (2.19.3).
56
  In Book Six, he declares that 
Cretan pleonexia in private and public affairs leads to murder and stasis (6.46.9).  In 
Book Nine, stasis broke out between the Carthaginians and Spanish tribes loyal to 
Carthage after they defeat a Roman army, because the Carthaginians began to act on the 
pleonexia and philarkhein inherent in their Phoenician character (9.11.2).  The 
Carthaginian commander, Hasdrubal, wanted a large sum of money from a loyal Spanish 
leader, Andobales (9.11.3).  Andobales refused, Hasdrubal brought false accusations 
against him, and eventually Andobales gave his daughters up as hostages (9.11.4).  The 
result, while superficially in Hasdrubal’s favor, in the long-term bred Spanish hostility to 
Carthage, of which Scipio would take advantage by military success and by not showing 
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Like Plato, Polybius also identifies pleonexia as a corrupter of men’s souls.
58  
When describing the mercenary revolt at the end of the first Punic War, he explains how, 
like cancer, certain psychological drives eat away at men (1.81.7-8).  If left unchecked, 
these drives will turn men into animals (1.81.10).  Polybius identifies several causes: bad 
manners, bad customs, poor education, and the hubris and pleonexia of leaders (1.81.10).  
The pleonexia in the passage refers to the plan of Mathos, Spendius, and Autaritus, 
leaders of the mercenary revolt, to cement their control over the rebel mercenaries by 
killing the Carthaginian prisoners.  The three feared that the Hamilcar’s clemency to the 
prisoners from a recent battle (1.78.11-13) would weaken the resolve of the rest of the 
mercenaries to continue the war until Carthage was captured (1.79.6).  The three 
therefore fabricated a letter saying that the Carthaginians, who were prisoners of the 
mercenaries, were plotting an escape (1.79.10).  They used the letter as a pretext to 
suggest to their troops to torture and kill their Carthaginian hostages (1.79.11-80.4).  
When other leaders came forward to counsel leniency, they were stoned (1.80.9-10).  
Mathos, Spendius, and Autaritus thus cemented their control over the mercenary army.  
The pleonexia in 1.81, then, refers to the ambition of leaders to gain more power for 
themselves.  In this process, they push men to commit horrendous acts, and hasten the 
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decline of individuals spirits.  Thus Polybius identifies pleonexia as a drive that 
dehumanizes those who are characterized by it.
 
 Polybius also notes how pleonexia corrupts states or causes them trouble.
59
  In 
Book Six, he scolds the Spartans for operating on pleonexia when dealing with other 
cities (6.48.8).  He designates the conquest of Messene as their first act of pleonexia 
(6.49.1).  As long as they remained within the Peloponnesus, they were secure in their 
control of other cities (6.49.7).  Their lack of currency and a commodities market, 
however, meant that they did not have the resources to control the rest of Greece 
sustainably (6.49.8-10).  Their desire for power and the lack of resources to obtain it, 
however, led the Spartans to impose a tribute on Greek cities and islands, and to ask for 
assistance against Athens and others from Persia, which they had defeated in the Persian 
War (6.49.3-10).  This dependence on outside assistance from Persia in order to maintain 
control of Greece meant that the Spartans risked their liberty in order to satisfy their 
pleonexia (6.50.5). 
 My assessment that Polybius disliked states acting on pleonexia in foreign affairs 
coincides with Donald Baronowski’s view that Polybius accepted justified acts of 
imperialism.  According to Baronowski, in Greek thought justified acts of imperialism 
were acts that had acceptable causes or pretexts.  An acceptable cause of imperialism was 
retribution; one state could attack another in retaliation for a previous attack.  Acts of 
imperialism were also justified through citing acceptable pretexts, such as one state being 
defying another or breaking a treaty.  Acts of pleonexia were not justified—the power 
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simply acts to take from another without either justification or pretext, so it would fit that 
Polybius condemned the practice in international affairs.
60
 
 Polybius depicts individuals acting on pleonexia with the result that they hurt the 
relationship of their polity with Rome.  He claims that Aetolian pleonexia and boasting 
about their role in defeating Macedon at Cynoscephalae annoyed Flamininus when he 
was settling the affairs of Greece after the second Macedonian War (18.34.1).  This 
annoyance caused Flamininus to distance himself from the Aetolians and seek stronger 
relations with Philip (18.34.3-5).  This distance between Flamininus and Aetolia, and his 
refusing them almost all their territorial ambitions (only granting some of them), in turn 
created resentment and anger (orgē) among the Aetolians; Polybius singles out this anger 
as a cause of the alliance between Aetolia and Antiochus III, and eventually the Roman-
Syrian War of 192-188 BCE (3.7.1-2).
61
  Rome’s victory over Antiochus and the 
Aetolians in the Roman/Antiochan War in turn resulted in the removal of Aetolia as a 
factor in Greek affairs.   
 When recounting how Rome was asked to arbitrate a war between Eumenes, king 
of Pergamum, and Pharnaces, king of Bithynia, Polybius records that the Roman Senate 
looked favorably on Eumenes because of his moderation and because the august body 
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was put off by Pharnaces’ pleonexia and over-bearing character (uperēphania) (24.1.3).  
The Senate decided to send legates to Asia to settle the issue (24.1.3; 5.7-8).
  
Polybius 
does not elaborate on the form of Pharnaces’ pleonexia, but in the context of the passage 
(the war between him and the Attalids of Pergamum), it could refer to his capture of 
Sinope in 183, which started the war.
62
  Due to the fragmentary condition of Book 
Twenty-Four, the ruling of the legates is unknown, but section 14 begins with the phrase, 
“In Asia King Pharnaces, again defying the terms of the Roman verdict,” so it can be 
assumed that the legates ruled in favor of the Attalids (24.14.1).  The war between the 




The pleonexia of Ptolemy Philometor, when he refused to concede the island of 
Cyprus to his younger brother, Ptolemy Euergates, annoyed the Roman Senate to the 
extent that they broke off relations with the elder Ptolemy (31.19.2).
64  
This breaking off 
of relations placed Ptolemy Philometor in a precarious international position.
65  
First, 
upon hearing that his brother was no longer a friend and ally of Rome, Ptolemy Euergates 
began to recruit mercenaries to invade Cyprus.
66  
Second, Rome had recently prevented 
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Antiochus IV from conquering Alexandria because of its friendship with the house of 
Ptolemy; the breaking of ties between Ptolemy and Rome meant that Ptolemy was 
potentially at the mercy of its neighbors.
67  
Though Ptolemy Philometor remained active 
and effective in the affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean without the support of Rome, 
indeed invading Syria and almost becoming its king, he had to proceed carefully in his 
foreign policy.  He was always aware of the possibility of Roman intervention against 
him, and at times sought to regain his standing with Rome.
68
  In all these instances, a 
community or individual acting on pleonexia annoyed Rome, which hurt that entity’s 
relation with Rome—at least in the eyes of Polybius.  Thus, as previous authors, Polybius 
linked pleonexia with the change of governments, with stasis, and shows how acting on 
pleonexia hurt powers on the international stage. 
Pleonexia as a driver of events in Polybius’ Histories 
 According to Polybius, pleonexia not only hurt states on the international stage, 
but Greek powers acting on pleonexia helped bring about Roman domination of the 
Eastern Mediterranean.  Polybius identifies Aetolian pleonexia as the cause of the 
Cleomenes War of 228-222, and the Social War of 220-217; these wars resulted in 
Macedonian domination of the Greece.
69  
Macedon’s power over Greece whetted Philip 
V’s appetite for conquest, which led him to wage war in the Aegean in the late 200s 
BCE.  These campaigns, propelled in part by pleonexia, provoked resistance from other 
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Hellenistic powers.  Pergamon, Athens, Egypt, and Rhodes appealed to Rome for 
assistance against Philip V.  Rome agreed to intervene and the result was the Second 




In Book Two, when describing the origins of the Cleomenes War, Polybius 
associates the Aetolians with pleonexia three times, two of which occurred in discussion 
of the start of the war.
71
  At 2.43.9, Polybius notes that throughout his career, Aratus 
provided effective opposition to both the meddlesomeness of Antigonus Gonatus of 
Macedon and the pleonexia of the Aetolians.  He next claims that due to their natural 
pleonexia the Aetolians entered into a secret pact with Macedon and Sparta in order to 
conquer Achaea and divide its cities between the three powers (2.45.1-2).
72
  On account 
of this pleonexia, the Aetolians ceded three member cities, Tegea, Orchomenus, and 
Mantinea, to Sparta in order to strengthen Sparta so that it could challenge Achaea 
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Thus, Polybius cited Aetolian pleonexia as a cause for the Cleomenes War, 
even though the Aetolians did not participate in the conflict.  The war resulted in an 
alliance between Achaea and Macedon, on account of which the Achaeans ceded the 
Acro-Corinth to the Macedonians (2.52.4).  Control of the Acro-Corinth allowed 
Macedon to intervene in Peloponnesian affairs and exert control over Greek affairs.  
 In Book Four, when he returns to Greek affairs after discussing the Hannibalic 
War in Italy and Spain, Polybius claims that the Aetolians, unhappy with their situation in 
Greece because of the paucity of their resources, started the Social War in order to satisfy 
their pleonexia (4.3.1).
74
  The casus belli was Dorimachus, an Aetolian envoy who 
suffered from the pleonexia innate in the Aetolian character, allowing mercenary soldiers 
in his service to plunder Messene, an Aetolian ally (4.3.5-8).  The Messenians 
complained to Dorimachus about the raid, but when he went to Messene to address their 
grievances, he derided them (4.3.12).  After another attack, in which a Messenian farmer 
was killed, a Messenian leader insulted and shamed Dorimachus into paying for the 
damages done by the mercenaries; on leaving the city, Dorimachus swore he would wage 
war against it (4.4.4).  Upon returning to Aetolia, Dorimachus made plans with Scopas, 
the leader of the Aetolians, to attack Messene (4.4.5).  Polybius states that the Aetolians 
were so excited at the prospect for war that they declared war on Messene, Epirus, 
Achaea, Acarnania, and Macedon all at once (4.5.10).  Thus, Polybius places 
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responsibility for the Social War on the Aetolians because it was their innate pleonexia 




 The Cleomenes War and the Social War resulted in Macedonian domination of 
Greece.  That was bad enough for Polybius, who favored the independence of the Greek 
states,
76
 but Polybius portrays Macedonian success in these wars as a cause of Roman 
intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean.  The Cleomenes War brought about 
Macedonian re-occupation of the Acrocorinth, Corinth’s citadel (2.52.4), and an alliance 
with Achaea.  The occupation and alliance allowed Macedon to once again influence 
Peloponnesian affairs, demonstrated by its involvement in the Social War.  Macedon’s 
victories in the Social War, a war started by Aetolian pleonexia, made Philip V the most 
powerful individual in Greece (5.105.5).  Polybius breaks into his narrative of the peace 
conference that resolved the Social War to declare that the conference was the first time 
that the affairs of the entire Mediterranean were drawn together (5.105.4).  As a result of 
Hannibal’s success at the battle of Trasimene, Ptolemy’s success at Raphia, and Philip 
V’s successful conclusion of the Social War, powers across the Mediterranean were 
looking for new allies; Greek cities looked to Rome and Carthage for help against Philip 
and Attalus and Rome looked to the east to prevent Philip from going west (5.105.7). 
Following the conference, the young Macedonian king prepared for a campaign in 
Illyria, then under Roman influence, and made an alliance with Hannibal as a precursor 
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for an invasion of Italy.
77
  Philip’s actions resulted in the first war between Rome and 
Macedon.
78
 Philip did not, however, invade Italy; instead he focused his attention on 
expanding his power in Greece.  According to Polybius, it was at this time that Philip 
began to transform into a tyrant (7.11).  Due to the bad counsel of Demetrius of Pharos, 
Philip began to abuse his power in Greece and alienate the Greek cities, which up to this 
point had been loyal allies (7.13).  Polybius does not ascribe pleonexia as a motive of 
Philip’s actions at this point, but later in the narrative he portrays Philip as a man 
overcome by his desires.  In Book Ten, Polybius describes how Philip aggravated the 
Argives while attending the Nemean games by sleeping with any woman he chose 
(10.26.3).  If the woman refused, he threatened her husband or sons (10.26.4).  Thus, 
Polybius portrayed Philip in the post 217/15 period as a man at the mercy of his passions.  
Following these passions hurt Philip’s relations with subordinate Greek cities.
79
  In 201, 
Philip began conquering Egyptian holdings in the Aegean with a view to invade Egypt 
proper, and his forces were besieging Athens.  Polybius explicitly attributes Philip’s 
desire to conquer Egyptian possessions to pleonexia in his narrative (15.20.4). 
 At 15.20, Polybius foretells the defeat of both Philip V and Antiochus III at the 
hands of Rome.  In the section, he notes that the two kings acted like animals when they 
made a pact to divide Egypt’s territory between their two kingdoms by taking it from the 
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new child king of Egypt (15.20.1).
80
  Polybius ascribes their actions to pleonexia 
(15.20.4).  On account of this pleonexia, Fortune informed Rome about the actions of 
Philip V and Antiochus III, which resulted in Rome entering the conflict like an avenger 
(15.20.4).  This is one of the rare occurrences in Polybius in which Fortune takes an 
active role in specific events in the text (as opposed to general developments).
81
  In the 
passage, Polybius directly links the kings’ pleonexia to Roman intervention.
82
  If the 
kings had not been pleonexic, then Fortune would not have punished them with Roman 
intervention.  This link reinforces the idea in Polybius of the danger of acting on 
pleonexia on the international stage.  Not only will it cause states to fall, but greater 
powers might ensure that the pleonexic power fails. 
 Finally, Polybius presents pleonexia as the cause of Rome’s war with Antiochus 
III.  At the start of Book Three, Polybius notes that the orgē (anger) of the Aetolians at 
the Romans caused the war between Rome and Antiochus because the Aetolians felt that 
they had not been justly rewarded for their service to Rome in the Second Macedonian 
War (3.7.1-2).  Their anger caused the Aetolians to invite Antiochus III into Greece in 
192, which precipitated the Antiochan War.  The source of the Aetolians’ anger towards 
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Rome was Roman treatment of Aetolia at the end of the Second Macedonian War.  At the 
end of the war, T. Quinctius Flamininus, the Roman commander in charge of peace 
negotiations, snubbed the Aetolian territorial demands and allowed Macedon to retain 
some of its power and territory partly in order to prevent the Aetolians from becoming 
the dominant power in Greece (18.34.1).  Flamininus wanted to limit Aetolian gains, 
according to Polybius, because he did not want to see them replace Macedon as the 
hegemon of Greece and was put out by their pleonexic conduct following the battle of 
Cynoscephalae (18.34.1).  After Cynoscephalae, Polybius claims, the Aetolians claimed 
an excessive part of both the loot and credit for winning the battle (18.34.2).  They also 
desired territorial gains that would have made them the dominant power in Greece.  Their 
arrogant attitude and desires annoyed Flamininus, which in turn led him to be more 
lenient toward Philip and Macedon (18.34.1-5).  His leniency towards Philip and his 
refusal to grant them more territorial concessions angered the Aetolians.  In retaliation, 
the Aetolians began to court Antiochus III, and sought to replace Roman influence over 
Greece with Seleucid.  Antiochus’ arrival in Greece in 192 led to war between Syria and 
Rome, a war which ended with Roman victory and Roman domination of the eastern 
Mediterranean. 
 Thus, Polybius presents pleonexia as a major cause of the wars that led to Roman 
domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.  The pleonexia of the Aetolians initiated both 
the Cleomenes and Social War.  These two wars resulted in Macedon becoming the 
dominant power in Greece.  Due to his success in the Social War, Philip V, king of 
Macedon, became corrupted, and at the end of the third century BCE, he began to act on 





Aegean.  These acts, Polybius writes, caused Fortune to bring the kings’ pleonexia to 
Rome’s attention, which resulted in the Second Macedonian War.  At the successful 
conclusion of the Second Macedonian War, Aetolian pleonexia again caused conflict 
when it annoyed Flamininus and soured relations between Rome and Aetolia.  The 
Aetolians then sought an alliance with Antiochus III to counterbalance Rome, leading to 
the war between Rome and Antiochus.  With the defeat of Antiochus III, Rome became 
the power in the Eastern Mediterranean, but Greek powers acting on pleonexia had 
prepared the path. 
Continuity and the paradigm of Decline in Greek Thought 
 Unlike Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, or Isocrates, in which influence by other 
authors is only inferred through textual comparisons (or where references to others 
authors are few), Polybius openly acknowledges his fourth century sources.  He names 
Plato, Xenophon, and Demosthenes as some of the authors to whom he is responding 
(Plato: 6.5.1; Xenophon 6.45.1; Demosthenes: 18.13.1).  He even mentions Thucydides, 
though it is only to note that Theopompus’ Histories begins where Thucydides’ ends 
(8.11.3). 
 More than just citing previous writers, however, Polybius relied on Thucydides 
and Plato and their analysis of how a city falls into stasis due to pleonexia when he 
forecasts the degeneration of the Roman mixed constitution into mob rule at 6.57.  The 
parallels in language, theme, and presentation prove that Polybius read and incorporated 
the thoughts of Thucydides and Plato in his narrative.  Scholars have used similar criteria 
to demonstrate Thucydidean influence on Polybius in other areas of the text.  Eduard 







  Scholars accept such ties as proof of Thucydidean influence, but 
they consider Plato’s influence indirect, even though Polybius cites him by name.
84
  
Walbank admits that at 6.57.5-9 Polybius uses ideas about the decay of constitutions, 
including the use of pleonexia, that are similar to discussions in Plato’s Republic Book 
Eight and Thucydides 3.82.8, but he passes the similarities off as simply “commonplace 
themes.”
85
  A reason for these themes to be common, however, is if succeeding authors 
read previous ones!  By applying the above criteria to the relevant passages of, 
Thucydides, Plato, and Polybius, I will demonstrate the influence of both Thucydides and 
Plato on Polybius. 
Polybius draws on both Thucydides’ stasis model from 3.82 and Thucydides’ 
discussion of how Athens will fall in 2.65.
86
  The first half of Polybius 6.57 follows the 
structure and thought of Thucydides 3.82.  First, both start with a universalizing message.  
Thucydides begins 3.82 noting that the upheaval caused by revolution is terrible, and will 
remain terrible as long as human nature remains the same (3.82.2).  Polybius begins 6.57 
by stating the destruction and change () happens to all things in 
nature, and that the process of how states collapse internally is a fixed occurrence 
( … 
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 … ) (1-2).87  Second, the two 
authors discuss what impels this change.  According to Thucydides, the stresses of war 
strain relations within a city, which led to revolution.  According Polybius, success and 
the absence of strife, after a long series of wars, will intensify struggles within a 
community, which will lead to decline.  
Polybius continues to follow Thucydides’ thought, but he reverses the structure of 
the analysis.  Thucydides outlines how society becomes radicalized, leading to violence 
(3.82.2-7).  Then he announces that pleonexia and philotimia drove the chaos (3.82.8).  
Polybius switches the order.  He first announces the four causes of the fall of the state: 
love of office (philarkhia), the disgrace of obscurity (), 
extravagance (poluteleia) and proud display () (6.57.6), 
and then outlines the course of events.  Polybius’ reversal of a period of peace causing 
the stresses on society as opposed to war, and his inversion of the order (causes first and 
then results) demonstrates that Polybius adapted Thucydidean material for his own 
purposes.
 
 The differences in the passage illustrate both that Thucydides was a template 
for Polybius and that Polybius adapted the template for his own purposes. 
 At 6.57.7 Polybius begins to parallel Thucydides 2.65.  Thucydides’ 2.65 
articulates that Athens lost the Peloponnesian War after the death of Pericles because the 
leaders of Athens spent most of their time fighting with each other for political 
supremacy and resorted to demagoguery in order to win over the crowd (2.65.10).  They 
pushed policies that enriched themselves at the cost of the state (6.65.7).  This led to poor 
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policy decisions, such as the Sicilian expedition (6.65.12).  Polybius’ presentation of the 
future fall of Rome at 6.57.7 echoes Thucydides.  He declares that intensifying 
competition among the elites for money and office will empower the mob, which will 
either be annoyed at the perceived pleonexia of the rich, or will fall for the blandishments 
of those seeking office (6.57.7).  The people will then be ruled by their passions, and 
demand to have sole power in the city (6.57.8).  In the end, the Republic will fall to mob 
rule (6.57.9).  For Thucydides and Polybius, thus, it is the competition within the elite, 
coupled with their desire for wealth or power, that leads politicians to court the mob.  
Once the mob has power over the state, then policy becomes short sighted and unlikely of 
making profitable decisions.  Such a process leads to the ruin of the city.  Thus, Polybius 
6.57 appears to be an amalgam of the ideas found in Thucydides’ two passages regarding 
decline. 
 Polybius’ anakyklosis and the end of 6.57, especially the descent into mob rule, 
also exhibit Platonic influences.  According to Polybius, aristocracy transforms into 
oligarchy when individuals’ unbridled pursuit of various pleasures, including acting on 
pleonexia takes control of them (6.8.5; Plato, Rep. 8.551a, 563e).  In democracy, 
individuals grow tired of equality and freedom of speech, and desire for more at the 
expense of others (zētousi pleon ekhein tōn pollōn); this desire leads to mob rule (6.9.5).  
Polybius even makes the same charge that Plato does in the Republic against tyrannical 
man: that the individual pursuing political power will bankrupt his own estate in order to 
satisfy their desires (Polyb. 6.9.6; Plato 8.568d).
88
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At 6.57, Polybius applies the theory in his anakyklosis to his discussion of the 
decline of the Roman Republic.  As the republic continues to function, competition 
among the elite will intensify and the desire of the political elites for power will cause 
them to pander to the mob (6.57.6-7).  This will lead to the mob at Rome demanding all 
the political power for themselves: mob rule (6.57.8-9).  The parallel ends here; Polybius 
does not predict the emergence of a Roman tyrant.   One might infer from his discussion 
of the cycle at the beginning of Book Six that after mob rule Rome would fall to tyranny, 
but Polybius himself does not close the cycle.  He merely states that Rome will fall to 
mob rule, and he ends the book by saying that the strength of the Rome in 216 allowed it 
to survive the disaster of Cannae (6.58).  His failure to foretell the rise of a Roman tyrant 
is puzzling.  This omission shows that even though he was willing to scold the Romans 
when it came to poor conduct, he was still cautious enough about a possible Roman 
audience not to predict its inevitable (according to his own schema) fall to tyranny.  If he 
had, the rise of Augustus would have proven him right.
89
  So, in his discussion of the 
anakyklosis and the end of the Roman state, Polybius parallels Plato setting decline as a 
series of constitutions that end with mob rule and tyranny. 
The similarities in theme, language, and presentation, then, suggest that Polybius 
read both Thucydides and Plato and incorporated their thought in his discussions of 
decline due to pleonexia. Even if Polybius drew on other writers, such as Aristotle, 
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Theophrastus, Dikaiarchus, or Panaitios, who themselves read Plato and Thucydides, as 
Ryffel, Walbank, and others argue, such a reliance still demonstrates a continuity in 
Greek thought about decline.
90
  Thucydides and Plato created a paradigm that was passed 
down among Greek writers, reaching Polybius, who applied it in his analysis of the fall of 
Rome.  The similarities then are a direct result of author assimilating the ideas of others 
into their own narrative and not the product of simply having a shared “world-view” as 
de Romilly argues or of Walbank’s “commonplace themes.”
91
 
 Polybius’ use of pleonexia is not an archaism.  He does not simply copy his 
predecessors.  He does not use pleonexia to refer to the manipulation of agreements or 
judgments or to gaining an advantage (in terms of military affairs or otherwise).  He pairs 
it with philarkhein as opposed to philotimia when discussing the drivers of stasis.  He 
changes the conditions under which stasis happens.  These differences demonstrate that 
Polybius did not simply imitate his predecessors when using pleonexia, but rather that he 
had his own understanding of the term that he applied critically in his narrative.  He read 
Thucydides and Plato and then wrote what he saw happening in the world being 
influenced by them.  In that way, he is recording, as accurately as possible, the events he 
covers, while still being influenced by the analysis of others. 
 Polybius’ prediction at 6.57, then, is the final manifestation of the internal 
paradigm of decline that I have sketched out in the course of this dissertation.  The 
paradigm started with Thucydides who identified the cause of stasis as individuals 
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seeking to gain power on account of pleonexia and philotimia.  Plato took from 
Thucydides the idea of the individual acting on pleonexia causing stasis and built his 
scheme of constitutions around it.  Polybius drew on both to predict the fall of Rome in 
6.57.  From Thucydides he took the concept of individuals acting on pleonexia and 
philarkhein and that a city falls when those politicians pander to the mob.  Then he put 
those ideas into his anakyklosis, of Platonic origin, to show how Rome would cease to be 
a mixed constitution and would descend into mob rule, and eventually tyranny.  In doing 
so, he applied a Greek theory on the nature of the polis to Rome.  This Greek theory of 
decline focused on psychological and cultural factors.  What drove decline was changing 
attitudes within a city, and specifically within individuals.
92
  When it became acceptable 
to act on pleonexia, to seek more at the expense of others, then the city started to become 
a battleground.  The harmony, civility, and respect that allowed cities to prosper 
vanished, replaced with discord, acrimony, and violence. 
While Polybius followed previous authors in linking pleonexia to the decline of 
powers on the international stage, the connections are not clear or direct enough to 
suggest as complex adaptation.  Xenophon and Polybius saw that fortune had a role in 
bringing down pleonexic powers, Sparta and Macedon respectively (Xen. Hel. 5.4.1, 
Polyb. 15.20.4).  Polybius also used pleonexia in a manner similar to Demosthenes and 
Isocrates by employing it to describe a state’s desire for territorial acquisition.  As an 
example, Demosthenes and Polybius considered the conquest of Messene to be an act of 
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Spartan pleonexia (Dem. 61.21; Polyb. 6.49.1).
93
  These few parallels are not enough to 
say anything more than Greek authors decried foreign policy based on pleonexia. 
Polybius, Pleonexia, and Continuity in Greek Thought 
The existence and transmission of this paradigm of decline based on pleonexia 
from Thucydides to Polybius demonstrates the artificial nature of the divide between 
Classical and Hellenistic Greek thought.  Scholars argue that the conquests of Alexander 
ushered in a new age of Greek thought, one in which the individual mattered more than 
the community.
94
  They argue that the Hellenistic Age saw a greater emphasis on the 
individual, as reflected in the rise of oriental and mystery religions and ethical 
philosophies, such as hedonism and cynicism.  These new cults and philosophies focused 
on how an individual may find happiness themselves and not through service to the 
polis.
95
 Scholars argue that this view is at odds with view of the Classical Age of Greece, 
which focused on the primacy of the city.  I disagree.  I argue that my investigation of 
decline caused by pleonexia exhibits that fifth and fourth century Athenian writers were 
just as concerned with issues of controlling the individual, and how individuals could find 
happiness for themselves, as later authors were.
96
  Conversely, my study of pleonexia 
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shows that Polybius was just as concerned with the preservation of the community as 
earlier authors had been.  Polybius understood how destructive it was to allow one’s 
passion free reign.  In this respect, de Romilly is right; Thucydides, Plato, Isocrates, and 
Polybius had a similar concept of decline because of their shared worldview, though they 
shared this worldview because the earlier authors influenced later ones, in particular 
Polybius. 
The tensions between individual desire and the needs of the community existed in 
both fifth- and fourth-century Athenian authors and in Polybius, as my survey of 
pleonexia shows.
97
  Thus, the divide is artificial because all these Greek authors dealt 
with issues of how to restrain individual desire within the community, at times in the 
form of warning against pleonexia, and such tensions were not a uniquely a classical 
concern.  Hellenistic writers may have come up with new strategies on how to manage 
individual desire, such as Cynicism or Stoicism, but they were just as aware of the danger 
of the ambitious individual and concerned with curbing individual ambition as the fourth 
century Athenian authors had been. 
 Athenian writers were no strangers to the theme of dangerous desire.
98
  
Thucydides tied decline to individuals acting on pleonexia, both in the Corcyraean stasis 
narrative and in his explanation for why Athens lost the Peloponnesian War.  In the 
fourth century, in the wake of the Thirty Tyrants, writers struggled with how to control 
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individual desire.  Plato centers the Republic on the question of why it is good for an 
individual to control his or her passions, as the person who cannot control will destroy 
himself or herself and the community as well.  Isocrates, Xenophon, and Demosthenes 
include similar warnings against individuals acting on pleonexia.  In the Politics, 
Aristotle states that pleonexia causes stasis and changes of government within cities.  
Thus, the concern for regulating personal behavior within communities, so that 
communities were not disrupted, existed in Athenian thought before the “Hellenistic 
Age.” 
 Polybius relies on these same ideas in his Histories.  He attributes pleonexia to 
individuals who, in their reckless bids for political power, damaged their communities: 
Chaeron of Sparta, Scopas the Aetolian, and Dorimachus the Aetolian.  In his 
anakyklosis, he recounts how individuals who lose control of their desires turn their 
community’s constitution into the worst form of that constitution, for example individual 
desire for more transforming democracy into mob rule.  All these individuals brought 
harm to their community and ultimately themselves because they allowed their desires to 
override their reason.   
 One difference between how the Athenian authors applied pleonexia and how 
Polybius uses it is scope.  Fourth-century Athenian authors such as Plato, Isocrates, 
Xenophon, warned against pleonexia due to the collective experience of Athens and 
Athenians with the Thirty Tyrants of Athens.  They were writing from the perspective of 
one city, under the impact of one particular event (and it took them almost half a century 
to get over the shock).
99
  They were also focusing on either the affairs of individual cities, 
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as in the writing of Plato and Isocrates, or on the affairs of Greece and Asia Minor, in the 
case of Xenophon.   Pleonexia is a more powerful force in Polybius’ narrative because 
his focus was on the entire Mediterranean, as he states at beginning of his Histories.  
Polybius’ text portrayed a world in which every city or kingdom could suffer from a 
Thirty Tyrants, or where every king could dream of universal domination.
100
  He saw 
how acting on pleonexia hurt not just individual communities, but how entire groups 
acting on pleonexia resulted in Roman domination of the eastern Mediterranean.  While it 
would be tempting to claim that Polybius’ broader view represents a “Hellenistic 
worldview,” such a statement would be over-reaching; he was just one writer.  Instead, I 
argue that Polybius had a larger view because his perspective was broader.  He wrote a 
history of the entire Mediterranean. 
This change in perspective also explains why Polybius did not use pleonexia to 
refer to the manipulation of contracts, as it had been employed by the Athenian writers.  
Such manipulation could occur in oligarchies or democracies, in which certain groups 
were equal through the law.  Manipulation of the law for one’s own advantage meant 
taking from another, pleonexia.  Such manipulation could not occur in monarchies.  
Polybius recognizes that pleonexia undermines the equality guaranteed by democracies 
(6.9.5), but his focus was less on the technical and legal aspects of pleonexia and more on 
the larger picture of how acting on it hurt undermined communities.  The implication that 
pleonexia was the manipulation of laws might have remained in Hellenistic thought but 
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does not exist in Polybius because he rarely discusses matters of law or contracts.
101
  If I 
had looked at court speeches, a third-century Demosthenes or Isocrates, for example, I 
might have found that pleonexia indeed still referred to the manipulation of law for 
personal gain. 
Polybius’ use of pleonexia reveals a greater Platonic influence on him than earlier 
scholars have credited.  I have shown how Polybius adapted Plato’s thoughts on the cycle 
of constitutions in his anakyklosis and in his foretelling of the end of the Roman Republic 
in 6.57.  Polybius also uses the same imagery as Plato when describing what happens to 
individuals who allow their passions to take control of them.  In Book Nine of the 
Republic, Plato compares those who act on pleonexia to cattle (9.586c-d) and later 
describes passions as the animalistic (thēriōdēs) part of the soul (589d).  In the course of 
his narrative, Polybius describes how humans who allow their passions to take control 
turn into animals.  The Aetolians are like animals because they act on pleonexia in 4.3.1.  
At 7.13.7, Polybius states that Philip V transformed not into a beast, like the werewolf in 
Plato (Rep. 8.565d-e), but a tyrant because he allowed his passions to take control of him.  
Walbank sees Polybius’ reference as a snide criticism of Plato, since Polybius states 
directly what Plato describes through imagery: the transformation of man into a beast.  I 
see the inclusion as recognition of Plato’s influence, not contempt.
102
  Polybius continues 
to rely on animal imagery when he likens Philip V and Antiochus III to sharks at 15.20.4 
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because they plan to divide Ptolemy’s realm between themselves on account of their 
pleonexia.  Polybius’ world, thus, is Plato’s nightmare: individuals losing all humanity 
and becoming animals because they are controlled by unbridled desire. 
These warnings against pleonexia and the desire to curb individual action prove 
that Greek authors understood that social or cultural pressure was at times not enough to 
control an individual—what was needed was an individual’s ability to control oneself, 
explored by Eckstein in Moral Visions in the History of Polybius.
103
  This explains 
Polybius’ emphasis on morality and moral education, including the study of history.  
Morality was important for Polybius not just because he was a Greek traditionalist, but 
because morals, and a strong internal moral compass, could curb the excesses that existed 
within Greek society.
104.
  It provided the final check on an individual from pursuing his or 





Polybius, while relying on the same core definition of pleonexia that fifth- and 
fourth-century thinkers had, expanded its use in his Histories and tied the concept to the 
eventual decline of the Roman state.  He understood pleonexia as a specific form of 
acquisition in which one gained by taking from another.  In intra-city affairs this gain 
could be in the form of wealth, land, or political power.  In international affairs this gain 
came in the form of territory, or sometimes plunder.  In both instances, pleonexia was 
detrimental to those one operating on it.  Through the over-arching course of his 
                                                 
103
 Eckstein, Moral Vision, Chapter 9. 
 
104
 Forsdyke makes a similar conclusion in her discussion of why fourth century theorists, Plato, 






narrative, he showed that the pleonexia of certain Greek powers led to Roman 
involvement in and thus to eventual domination of the Eastern Mediterranean.  Polybius’ 
use of pleonexia to explain why cities declined was based on his knowledge of Plato and 
Thucydides.  Overall, his reliance on pleonexia and insistence that individuals should 
control their own desires for their own good and the good of the community demonstrates 









In the course of this dissertation, I have demonstrated that pleonexia should be 
understood as “the desire for more at the expense of another,” and that Greek authors 
from Thucydides to Polybius used it to explain both how cities lost internal cohesion and 
how they lost power on the international stage.  In addition, I have shown that Polybius 
relied on Thucydides, Plato, and earlier authors to explain the eventual decline of the 
Roman Republic. His reliance on earlier ideas demonstrates that Greek authors had a 
systematic concept of decline; the persistence of this concept suggests a degree of 
continuity in Greek thought across the supposed Classical and Hellenistic divide than 
previous thought. 
 Chapter one reviewed scholarly concepts of pleonexia, decline, and continuity in 
contemporary scholarship.  In regard to pleonexia, scholars translate it and associated 
words as “greed,” “excessive covetousness,” or “advantage,” but these translations fail to 
capture the full nuances of the word group.  In regard to decline, ancient historians debate 
whether the end of socio-political entities, such as the Roman Republic and the Western 
Roman Empire, is decline or transformation.  Archaeologists, social anthropologists, and 
political scientists seek to understand such events as the rapid loss of socio-political 
complexity.  This loss of complexity manifests itself when as a central political 
organization loses authority over similar entities or its own citizens.  Scholars 
hypothesize many reasons for this loss of complexity, but most involve the depletion or 





authors, scholars rely on similarities of language, syntax, content, and theme in passages 
of different authors to determine influence. 
 Chapter Two examined how Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon used the 
pleonexia word group in their respective histories.  All used pleonexia to describe 
situations in which one group sought gain or advantage over another.  Herodotus and 
Thucydides differed in their use of the noun pleonexia and verb pleonekteō and the 
phrase pleon ekhein.  Pleonexia and pleonekteō referred to the manipulation of 
agreements, contracts, or power imbalances in such a way as to benefit one party over 
another.   Pleon ekhein or pleon epithumian denoted acts of aggressive territorial 
annexation.  Herodotus used it to characterize Xerxes’ expedition against Greece, and 
Thucydides employed the term to describe Athenian motivations for its disastrous 
campaign against Sicily.  Xenophon did not make such a distinction; he relied primarily 
on pleonexia or pleonekteō to discuss how governments or individuals abused their power 
for selfish gain.  He also used the words more neutrally to denote situations in which one 
side had a military advantage. 
 Chapter Three explored how Plato and Aristotle used pleonexia in their 
philosophical writings of the fourth century BCE.  Plato characterized it as an urge to 
gain more in ways that disturbed the balance of the universe and divine law.  He also 
employed it less grandly to refer to gaining advantage.  Aristotle defined it as a conscious 
desire to have more wealth, security, or power in a way that violated distributive justice.  
The two philosophers tied pleonexia to outbreaks of stasis and changes in government.  
Plato described pleonexia as a disease of the soul and tied it to outbreaks of stasis in 





acting on pleonexia caused the corruption of governments.  Aristotle in his Laws stated 
directly that pleonexia caused of stasis and was a reason why governments changed from 
one form to another. 
 Chapter Four reviewed how pleonexia appeared in the writings of Isocrates, 
Demosthenes, and other fourth century Athenian rhetors.  In interstate relations, Isocrates 
used pleonexia to refer to abuse of unequal power relations, and Isocrates and 
Demosthenes used pleonexia to describe acts of aggressive territorial expansion.  In their 
discussions of pleonexia within a city, Isocrates and Demosthenes continued to use 
pleonexia to mean the manipulation of speech and law. They portrayed pleonexia as 
dangerous to the community, but only Isocrates connected it to stasis.  He also presented 
a positive form of pleonexia in his writings, one in which an individual gained without 
hurting others, but he acknowledged that this was his own revision and that the common 
understanding of pleonexia was gain by taking from another. 
 Chapter Five analyzed the role of pleonexia in the Histories of Polybius.  He 
portrayed it as a desire to gain wealth or power at the expense of others, either in 
community or in international affairs.  In terms of domestic affairs, Polybius continually 
linked it to outbreaks of stasis.  In regard to the history of the Mediterranean, the 
pleonexia of the various powers in the Eastern Mediterranean set in motion the series of 
wars that resulted in Roman intervention and supremacy.  Finally, Polybius used the 
concept of pleonexia to help foretell the end of the Roman Republic; eventually, he 
predicted, the people will be annoyed at the perceived pleonexia of the political elite and 





Thus, classical Greek authors shared a similar concept of pleonexia with the 
Hellenistic historian Polybius. It meant the desire or act to gain something (political 
power, material goods, status) in such a manner that it limited another’s ability to gain 
access to that same resource.  It was a conscious decision on the part of one actor (an 
individual, a group, or a city) to operate in such a way that would seek to gain on the one 
side and impose a loss on another.  In terms of politics, it could be one party attempting 
to dominate the government in such a manner as to disenfranchise another party.  In 
terms of the courts or contracts, it could be one speaker relying on clever speech to 
persuade the jury in an unfair or unjust manner.  In military affairs, it could be the use of 
tactics or weapons to put the opponent at a disadvantage.  In terms of inter-polis relations, 
it could be one city taking the territory of another, or a hegemonic city imposing its will 
on the internal affairs of a dependent or allied city. 
Greek writers deployed pleonexic language to discuss processes that modern 
scholars would consider decline: an imperial power’s loss of influence over its periphery 
or its subjects, the descent of a political community from political to civil disorder 
(stasis), and the transition from more complex forms of government, the mixed 
constitution, to more simple forms, individual rule.  Authors connected unjust expansion, 
characterized by some form of pleonexia, to the loss of power on the international stage.  
For Herodotus, the pleon ekheinof Xerxes led to the Persian War (7.16a).  Athenian 
pleon ekhein inspired the Sicilian expedition in Thucydides’ text (6.24.3).  Spartan 
pleonexia, in the form of abuse of allies, precipitated the battle of Leuctra and the end of 
the Spartan hegemony, according to Xenophon and Isocrates (Xen. Hel. 5.4.1; Isoc. 





them constantly fighting, allowing kings such as Philip II to manipulate and control them.  
According to Polybius, states acting on pleonexia not only brought ruin on themselves, 
but led to the subordination of the Eastern Mediterranean to Rome. 
In his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides linked acting on pleonexia 
to the eventual self-destruction of a political community.  Xenophon applied Thucydides’ 
model to his analysis of the Thirty Tyrants, the oligarchy that assumed control of Athens 
government after the end of the Peloponnesian War, in his Hellenica.  In the fourth 
century, Plato adapted Thucydides’ idea and in the Republic outlined a process by which 
the pleonektēs, the individual operating on pleonexia, in unbridled pursuit of desires 
caused stasis and change in government.  Aristotle, Plato’s student, continued to use the 
idea that groups functioning on pleonexia caused stasis and the change of constitutions in 
his Politics. 
In his Histories, Polybius narrated how pleonexic individuals caused civil unrest 
in the third and second century Mediterranean world.  He also applied Thucydides’ and 
Plato’s idea of groups acting on pleonexia causing changes in government, and employed 
the idea to foretell the end of the Rome’s mixed constitution and Rome’s descent to 
tyrannical rule.  This is decline because in the change, Rome would lose its more 
complex government, in which all elements of society were given a voice through the 
popular assemblies, magistracies, the senate, and courts, and revert to a simpler form of 
organization—the rule of a single individual, the monarchos, through a monopoly of 
violence and political favors. 
 Such an analysis demonstrates that Greek authors saw individuals as the cause of 





mismanagement, or structural failings within society.
1
  They minimize human agency and 
the role of human psyche to focus on how societies rise and fall based on their allocation 
of material wealth. Greek analysis centered on individuals.  Pleonexia was an innate 
psychological urge within individuals.  Regardless of how much power or money an 
individual had, it was the desire for more, specifically the desire to obtain these goods by 
taking it from others or by limiting their access to them, that was dangerous to society 
and Hellas.  Acting on these desires introduced an escalating retribution cycle into city 
politics, in which political factions sought power by depriving their opponents of it.  If 
and when the rivals returned to power, they introduced their own punitive measures on 
their enemies. 
Greek authors learned that individuals caused decline through personal 
experience. Having endured the excesses of both democracy and oligarchy, fourth-
century Athenian writers, Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato in particular, warned against 
acting on it as a way to avoid the chaos that characterized Athens near the end of the 
Peloponnesian War.  In international affairs, pleonexia drove Greek cities to constantly 
fight each other, which allowed for the interference and domination of non-Greek 
powers, such as Persia or Macedon.  Not only did they realize that individuals caused 
decline, they understood that they could try to prevent decline by changing the 
individual.
2
  For these authors, internal restraint, obtained through an education in 
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philosophy, would inhibit the pleonexic urge and would lead to peace within cities and 
the subjugation of the barbarian without. 
The conquests of Alexander and rise of the successor kingdoms did not stop 
Greek writers from fearing pleonexia.  Living in an age where every king or tyrant could 
(or worse, did) have aspirations to be the next Alexander and having read Athenian 
authors such as Thucydides, Plato, Demosthenes, and others, Polybius perceived 
pleonexia as a threat to the entire Mediterranean.  He recognized that individuals acting 
without restraint, especially individuals in power, endangered the stability of a city, a 
league, or even the Mediterranean.  His own beloved Achaean League fell to the might of 
Rome because such men took control of it.  The only true restraint on individuals had to 
come from within.  Custom was ineffective.  It could restrain the masses (Polyb. 4.20-21; 
6.56.6-15), but individuals born to power with outstanding ability could and would ignore 
it.  These were the men who, if allowed to follow their passions without restraint, would 
burn temples, annihilate cities, incite mobs, attack the wealthy, and in general wreak 
havoc according to their passions.  Polybius, like the Greek writers of the fourth century, 
understood that the only way to restrain these individuals was to educate them on how 
and why they should constrain their passions.
3
  Morality and ethics mattered to Polybius, 
then, not only out of a belief that it was better to act for the good of others, but also out of 
a very real fear of the individual without restraint. 
 Rome witnessed the destructive effects of individuals acting on pleonexia less 
than fifty years after Polybius’ death.  Roman civil wars occurred throughout the first 
century BCE and the greatest of them, between Julius Caesar and the boni, was fought 
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around the entire Mediterranean basin.  The wars devastated Italy, brought an end to 
many old senatorial families, and resulted in the establishment of the Principate.  Aware 
of the Greek paradigm of decline, Sallust incorporated elements of it in his Conspiracy of 
Catiline and Jugurthine War when describing the fragmentation of Rome’s political 
community (Cat.10-11; Jug. 41-42).
4
  Other Roman aristocrats of the late first century 
BCE, similarly educated in Greek authors, may have seen Augustus’ Principate not as the 
permanent end of the Republic, but merely as the next step in the constitutional cycle.  
Augustus was the wise monarch who would restore peace and order to the Roman world; 
eventually he would be replaced by another Republic when society was ready.  The new 
Republic never materialized.  As Tacitus lamented at the beginning of his Annals, the 
ascension of Tiberius and the following Julio-Claudian emperors marked the end of the 
possibility of a restored Republic (Ann. 1.3-5).  The cycle laid out by Polybius and others 
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Pleonexia in Herodotus 
 




Egyptians Egyptians were divided into 
twelve kingdoms, and the 
kingdoms made others not to 
gain more at the expense of 
others; 
 
neutral, though generally 
shown to be a good thing 
to avoid.  It is also 
interesting that this is not 






the Spartans Argives claim that it would be 
better to be ruled by foreigners 





the Greeks speech of Gelon—the Greeks 
ask for help with a logon … 
pleonekten—a grasping 
speech—they did not help him 
in the past and he is not inclined 





Themistocles There was no stopping 
Themistocles’ desire for 
more—proceeds to extort 
defense fund from neighboring 
islands 







Pleonexia in Thucydides 
Section/form The pleonexic Context Associations 
1.37.4 
pleon ekhoisin 
Corcyraeans speech of the Corinthians 





The Corcyraeans speech of the Corinthians 
talking about the Corcyraeans: 
explaining why the Athenians 







speech of the Corinthians 
talking about the Corcyraeans: 
better to be just toward other 






general Athenians addressing the 
Spartans at the Spartan 
congress - people do not 
discuss justice when they can 
take something by might 





The Athenians Trying to appear equal under 
the law makes the Athenians 





General rule – 
people who are 
pleonexic 
Speech of the Athenian 
ambassador: Men are more 
indignant at legal violence 
over actual violence – hurts 
more to be mistreated by an 







(for states and 
individuals alike – 
3.45.3) 
Speech of Diodotus – 
pleonexia instills in people 





 General rules of stasis 
Party affiliation caused by the 
desire for more 
Against law, 








Driver of stasis The driver of the Corcyraean 
stasis was the desire for power 






who participate in 
stasis in general 
End of the stasis narrative –
those who engage in stasis do 
so either for gain or because 





ti Speech of Hermocrates - 






The Athenians Speech of Hermocrates – 
describing the Athenians – 






indefinite Speech of Hermocrates 










Indefinite – those 
who act on 
pleonexia 
Speech of Brasidas to (?): 
Manipulation/trickery worse 









Oligarchs Speech of Athenagoras in 
Sicily 
In oligarchies – the leaders 
take not just the unequal part 











Pleonexia in Xenophon 
Hellenica  
 
Section/form Speaker Context Associations 
2.3.16 
pleonektein 
Critias advice to Theramanes 
- right to act according 




Critias trial of Theramanes 
- it is right to punish 
the person who tries to 
get more at the 





Critias Critias gave a speech 
about how the 30 
would act and the 
spartans and the 









The pleonexia of 
Sparta will be easier 
to otherthrow than the 
Athenian Empire 
labels the hegemony of 







The Spartans, being 
few, have grasped 
over more than they 
can handle 






the Spartans wanted 
the Boeotian states to 
be ruled under their 
own laws, but 
imposed its own 
system on Thebes 
interesting - points out the 
paradox of the Spartan 
hegemony - Greek states 
may only be independant 
under Spartan leadership - 
and to be under Spartan 
leadership, they have to 






pleonexia is wrong - 










the Thebans they wanted the 
hegemony over 
Greece and tried to 
obtain it through the 
Persians 
 





Xenophon Epamimondas situated 
his troops in such a 
way that did not give 
his enemies an 
advantage 





Epamimondas Epamimondas situated 
his troops in such a 
way as to give him 







 Cyrus’ father will never teach 
him to desire more (his 
grandfather has taught the 
Medes to have less as 






 in campaigns, generals must 
show that they can endure 
more heat than their soldiers, 
in the winters, more cold 
a positive attribute of 
pleonexia - still idea of 
having more than others, but 
not at their expense 
1.6.27 




 a) how in war does one gain 
and advantage over the 
enemy, father? 
 
b) (reply) one willing and 
able to overreach his enemy 
all times possible, but still be 
law-abiding 
contrast in idea of pleonexia 
- in war it is expected, but in 
peace and in society do not 
1.6.28 
 
 when learning to hunt 
animals as a youth, taught 
again idea of advantage in 










always to have an advantage 
against them through 
weapons and traps 
however, that Cyrus was 
taught this was acceptable 
toward animals, but not 
people; again presents idea 
that pleonexia is natural, but 




Cyrus take advantage of your 
enemies 
-take advantage of beasts not 
men so to have an edge in 
war; 
taught skills in war to be 
ready, but not necessarily to 
use them 
again carries the idea of 
neutral/positive pleonexia - 






 a teacher used to teach his 
students to take advantage of 
enemies and sometimes 
deceive friends, if for good 
cause, but led to people 
taking advantage of friends, 
therefore the Persians passed 
an ordinance that no one 
should take advantage of 
others (33) 







 Cyrus decides he needs to 
learn how to take advantage 
(pleonexiōn) of his enemies, 






 use the same tricks you use 
against small game against 






 you will have the advantage 
in the open field if your 
troops are well versed in the 





 a) Cyrus put through a 
motion that the best should 











b) even the bad will think that 





 someone comments on 
Cyrus’ proposal that he has a 
messmate who always seeks 
a larger share, but does not do 
the necessary work; he agrees 









 two kinds of bad people - 
those who are indolent and 
lazy, and those who desire 
more than they should 
deserve (pleonektein); they 
are truly dangerous to society 
because they demonstrate 
that vice has some advantage 
(pleonektousan) 
parallels to plato - describe 
the man who wants a larger 
share for less work as a 





 to secure present advantage 
(pleonektēsai) would gain 
some profits, but it would be 
short-lived; getting the source 
of the wealth would gain long 
term profit 
pleonexia short term reward 





 If Cyrus learned to ride a 
horse, then he would have the 





 Cyrus talking with Cyaxares - 
can you see any selfish gain 
from me in distributing the 
loot 
again distributive context 
 
though these seem to be in 
the minority ... 
6.1.55 
pleonexian 
 it seemed safe and happy and 
just to him to take advantage 
of the enemy  
lot of pleonexia being used 





 in an attack, Cyrus managed 
to envelope the flank and had 
his opponents at a great 










 Cyrus could not bear to see 






 Chaldeans - give your reward 
to those who remained at 
their post, so that men see 
that those who follow orders 





 Cyrus did not want to give 
the city over to looters as it 
would destroy many good 
things and probably only the 
worst men would get the 
larger share 
Polybius also uses pleonexia 
in regard to looting - 
reinforces idea of zero sum - 




 Cyrus’ men may feel 
ashamed if they live inside 
while he lives outside, else 
they think that they have an 







 in terms of the science of 
war, the persians do not need 
to share their superiority with 





 if any will order such results 
for himself they would enjoy 
it, so why should we not 
enjoy the advantages given us 
over others … (?) 
essentially god has given us 
such advantage over others, 
why not enjoy it? 
 
Someone talking to Cyrus 
about how he should enjoy 
the fruits of victory … no 
idea what the reply is - 
actually part of the reply - 
they way to enjoy good 
fortune is not to revel in it, 
but maintain the virtues that 









 the people will emulate those 
who receive the most reward; 
so it is better that the most 






 Cambyses warning to Cyrus - 
do not seek to rule the 
Persians as you do conquered 
people, nor should they try to 
gain advantage over you … 
otherwise bad things happen 
acting on pleonexia in 







Pleonexia in Plato 
Laws 
 






herdsmen and those 
who escape 
destruction (?) 
unfamiliar with the 








should see if in 
other instances 
a concept such 
as philomatia 












recapping  first time seen 
in a non-
negative sense; 





Athenaios discussion of the 
behavior of kings - 
first crime (?) of a 
kimg is to get the 
better of established 
law 




Athenaios the benefit of musical 
instruction - both 
kinds are good and 
have no advantage 
over the other 
 again no 
negative 
association per 







Athenaios in order to 
differentiate from 
animals, man needs to 
learn (for it is not 
innate) how to 
percieve and act for 






















great sin - 
trying to get 
more without 









still men in 
general 
unjust men will always 
have an advantage over 
just men - those who act 
on pleonexia  
ultimate form of 
pleonexia - tyranny - 
which, according to 







Socrates the just man would never 
abuse another just man - 
but would abuse an 
unjust man - according to 
Thrasymachus 







Socrates Would the just man 
attempt to overreach 









ditto unjust man will act the 
same way toward all; the 
just man will only be 








 Would the musical or 
unmusical man attempt 
to overreach 
(pleonektein) or think to 











ditto re-examine, but in 
section, Socrates proves 
the just man is good and 
wise, and that the unjust 
man is foolish (in 
contrast to 
Thrasymachus) 























Socrates Will the wise man 
overreach others or just 






 The just man will only 
seek to overreach the 
unjust 










men in general 
all men would act 
according to pleonexia if 
they could 
- two kinds of men, just 
and injust (or those who 
can rule through strength 
















Glaucon the unjust man is better 
adapt at life because he 










gives the appearance of 
justice - thus gets all the 
benefits, without the 








Glaucon still the best stratetegy is 
to be unjust and look out 
for number one - even if 
gods exist (sacrifice and 









Socrates The tyrannical man will 
get the better of first his 
parents, and then their 









those who give 
themsevles over to 
pleasure fight (literally) 


















Phaedrus  the despotic seek to destroy 





same love can be destructive 
when it enroaches on others 
- like other natural 
phenomena 
 









better of Socrates by 











again the argument - 
power/injustice good - 
weaker rely on laws and 
say pleonexia bad 
adikion a few pleon 





Socrates Should the shoemaker get 






Socrates Should the farmer get the 









Socrates Should the best justly 
having more act to gain 
more? 
 
pleon ekhōn dikaiōs 
pleonektei 
 in the past three, 
Socrates goading 
Callicles - trying 
to determine who 
is the best, and 










Socrates good order in the universe 
is geometric, and pleonexia 








Socrates those having more ability (?) in athletic 






Laches those knowing/pursuing knowledge have 
advantage in war 
nuetral - maybe 
negative, need to 











 man in the beginning was filled with desire 
for more and amibition - Zeus strove to 








 body made up of four elements in equality - 
exceeding these bonds - bad 









Pleonexia in Aristotle 
Politics 
 




despite education, part of 
nature for people to desire 
more of money and honor or 
both 







the starting point of good 
governance (?) is curbing of 





should certain individuals 
based on ability receive more 
than their share of offices? 





gaining small advantages 






discussion of various forms of 
democracy 
in subversion to oligarchy - 
once the oligarchs become 
strong they change the laws to 




a constitution must be 
balanced - pleonexia of wealth 
(must be specified - again 
more specific than simple 














oligarchs desire a larger, 
unequal share 
 among the 





those that do 
not, when the 











in a roundabout way - 
philotimia kai pleonexia cause 
stasis 
stasis - caused by feelings of 
inequality - which are caused 




this instance one 





hubris and pleonexia among 




greed prays on private and 
common property alike 
 whole section - 
how pleonexia 




pleonexia caused stasis among 
the Sybarians when some 
settlers took more than their 
share 
 giving an 
example of what 
he has been 
discussing 





Governments are overthrown 
when the participants act on 
pleonexia 







essentially weaker parties rely 
on law in disputes - those who 
are able to act on pleonexia are 







laws of cities and nations (?) - 
eye toward gaining more 
(pleonexia) in war 
 moving away 
from discussion 
of stasis toward 
pleonexia in war 




cities that do not wish the 
profits (pleonexias) of a sea 
trade, do not need a port 
 again neutral - 
here simply 













attacks of a city seek an 
advantage  








the unjust man is the one who breaks the 
law and takes more than his share - 
pleonektes 






the unjust man and pleonexia - not taking 
too much, but rather taking/recieving 
undeserving of one’s due (unfair - takes 





pleonexia is a lesser injustice - there are 
others, like cowardice, but those do not 
involve hurting others 
 more definition of pleonexia 
 
see if Aristotle discusses 
greed (the desire to 
accumulate goods) as a 
distinct evil 
1136b the man who gives up his share of 
something else, receives a greater share 
(pleonekei) of something else 
 nuetral or even good use - 
gets something better in 
return for giving up 
something 
 
a pleon ektein in the section 
as well 
 
taking of more - originates in 
the actor - so if someone 
recieves more of something 
he is not necessarily unjust 
himself 
1137a a judge who makes a bad judgement (or 
an unjust/pleonexic judgment) is just as 
guilty of pleonexia 





1167b the good men are able to live in concord, 
the base are not because they are always 
looking for their own advantage 
(pleonexia) 
  
1168b a man who takes more than his share to 
satisfy his own desires can be described 
as a lover of self 
- but he is not pleonexic 
 could this be the section to 
distinguish greed from 







the politikos man choses noble actions for 
their own virtue; the base live according for 
money and gain 
 differentiates between 
desire for money and 
gain (pleonexia) 
 






Solon in his poetry extorted the rich 





When re-ordering Athens, Solon acted 






Peisistratus - administered the state 




Virtues and Vices 
1251a 
pleonexia 
three vices exist - impiety, 
pleonexia, and ubris 
pleonexia - taking more than one’s 
share in contracts 
 Examine history of Virtues and 
Vices is it Aristotle? 








an orator should know whether his state has 
advantage (pleonektein) or is weaker in a 
situation 
 again neutral use, but 









those who have more luck (pleonektein 
check) better than those with more goods or 
children 
 again neutral but still 
possibly an idea that all 






by using a logical fallacy the defendant 
always has advantage over accuser 
 sense of advantage 
3.17.17 the man who is sensible in good fortune has 
more advantage 
















 If the Athenians follow 
the sloth and greed 
(pleonexian) of the 
Spartans, then they 
would perish due to lack 
of necessities of daily life 






 Spartans led themselves 
to internal and external 






 the government will 
reflect those men in 
charge, especially if those 








 the Great states of the 
Greece seek to gain 
(pleonexias) from the 
Great King; without 
realizing that he treats 





 it is shameful to present 
arguments that are 
advantageous, but 
supposedly it is good to 
philosophize (though 




 earlier accounts paint the 






 the eulogists of Sparta 
think it good that Sparta 
acts on pleonexia - the 
same way that men in 








 sophists became nothing 








 what man would not 
detest the greedy 





 no advantage ever went 
to those who sought 
greedy gain 
 








accuses him of teaching 
too well and teaching 
young men to gain 
advantage (pleonektein) 
in the law courts 
15.89 
pleonektēsousi 
 indicting Isocrates for 
teaching people to speak 
to their advantage (but 




 his attackers - kind of 
people who recognize 
that people like Isocrates 
engage in likeable 
activities, but this does 





 accuse men who strive 
through study of trying to 





 those who set their heart 







 no one who works on 
pleonexia is happy - in 





 those who gain advantage 
(pleonektesein) are 





 the mass call people who 
take small advantages 
pleonektein but not those 
who take a greater share 











Nicocles or the 
Cyprian 
 
3.1 two instances 
pleonexias 
pleonexiai 
 people are accused of 
engaging in philosophy 
not out of the desire for 
virtue, but for advantage; 
second part advantage is 





 we should not attack 
those who gain advantage 
(pleonektēseien) without 




 Monarchies have the 
advantage (pleonexias) in 





 rulers of cities who are 
stronger than their 
neighbors seek to take 





 political societies or 
unions maybe have 
advantages in other 







 the orator needs to 
convince Athens and 
Sparta to work together 
in order to remove the 
advantage (pleonexias) 
that the Barbarians have 




 (I think) philosophy has 
given men the 
advantage/ability to 
excell over others and 





 Athens did not send out 











 being an Athenian 
apologist - claimed that if 
Athens really was 
seeking advantage 
(pleonektein), it would 




 Through the treaty the 
persian king has gained 
more by dividing the 
world and taking half of 




 rhetorical question - men 
should wage war not for 
aggrandizement 
(pleonexia) but in order 






 The great states of Hellas 
need to come together to 
end their common 
struggles in order that 
they wrest the advantages 





 Spartans and Thebans are 





 Athens and Sparta would 
prefer mutual benefit as 
opposed to pursuing 
policies of pleonexia 





 the monument at 
Thermopylae (a defeat) is 
reverred as a monument 
of valor, while others are 











 The Spartans (?) in their 
selfish greed think the 





 Any of these reasons is 
enough to prove that we 





 Niether the Great king 
nor Athens accused 





 I would take too much 
time if I were to list all 
the advantages 







 The Areopagus kept the 
Athenian state in line and 
kept greed out of hte 




 (Isocrates) spent his 
career attacking 
oligarchies and those 





 re- affirms that he is 
against oligarchies and 
special priviledges 
(pleonexiwn) and that in 
general democracies are 
better than oligarchies 
 




 We (the Athenians) are 
filled with hopes and 
insatiable desire that even 
people with great 




 he will show in his 











 those who practice piety 
and justice will have true 
advantage over others; 
while those who use the 





 The Athenians of 
Isocrates day fall short of 
their predecessors  who 
sacrificed themselves 
for  the good of the state; 
now Athenians will not 





 Athens brought 
misfortune on itself by 
taxing its allies and 







 put yourself in a place 
where you have the 
ability to  take advantage 
(pleonektein) but refrain 
out of equality … ;prefer 





 if the just have no 
advantage 
(pleonektousin) over the 
unjust, they still surpass 






 if poetry has great 
advantages, we should 
not shrink from the task, 




 (someone) used to acting 
according to pleonexia 






took control, and gave 









 Callimachus seeks to 
have more than you 
(people living in Athens, 



























Athenians nature has not equipped you to 



















Philip II whenever a man gains power 






Athenians You Athenians have had the 
opportunity of self-




general rule Those who operate on pleonexia 














Philip II Philip II acted according to 









Philip II chose to ally with others in order 







Philip II Philip - did not out out of 
ambition (pleonexia) rather 
because the Thebans provided the 







Philip II Philip II is playing upon the 
desires (pleonexia) of the 
Thebans and Spartans in order to 







Athenians for nature has not equipped you 








States allied to 
Philip II 
States allied with Philip gained 





Philip II The world is not being enough for 














Philip II Philip’s alliance is characterized 








Philip II It is no suprrise that he has gain at 
our expense … but that we still 
think we are going to defeat one 










Philip II   








 No one could go to war as readily 
for pleonektein as in order defend 
their own property; … men go to 
war for pleonektein but do not 











general law Other cities are inconsistent since 
they at times operate on 





Sparta better to ally with the Thebans 










Thebeans If the megapolitans stay with 
Thebes they prefer the ambition 
(pleonexian) of Thebes 
 







 Which side should Athens have 
joined - those who caused 
disaster and dishonor to fall on 
Greece, or those who allowed the 
disasters out of ambition 
(pleonexia) 
 








 (essentially) the claims of my 
opponents serve private amibtion 









Philip II (I think) if you acknowledge his 
perfidious and grasping 
(pleonexia) in taking far and 
distant places, then you will know 








Demosthenes If I have given up the profit 
(pleonexian) of a private suite 











 The leniency of Athenian juries is 
a great asset and advantage to 








 no successful man has ever 
limited his desire for more; yet 
that is why many destroy waht 





 those who act on pleonexia do not 
the difficulties of their actions but 






 those who desire Athenian 
citizenship out of advantage 
(pleonexian) … soon they will act 















 Charidemus sought the decree for 
his own advantage (pleonexia) 






the defendant out of his own ambition 
(pleonexias) runs afoul of 
everyone he meets, and expels 
from the alliance those who 





 These men have have taken 
















Aristogiton the one was fair and equal for all 
citizens alike, but this is unfair 
and brings profit (pleonexian) to 





 (second sentence) the fruits of 
lawlessness are madness, 
intemperance and greed, but from 









 He will claim that not all the 
clauses in the will are valid, but 










 Men who have lived good lives 
will have an advantage over those 
that do not and will be of more 
service to the city 
 





Boeotus men of the jury do not let this 
man who gained many advantage 
to which he had no right now 








Spudias Spudias claims to have been 
taken advantage of to the tune of 












 Where can one go if the rich can 








 What they have done proves them 
to be lawless, abominable, and 













Leochares his impudence (avaideia) and 
ambition (pleonexia) are such that 
he thinks he can return to Eleusis 
and reclaim his ancestral 
estate … 
I urge you, men of the jury, not to 
support men who seek to gain 
over others, but support those 






Leochares His greed caused him to claim a 






Leochares sought his admission fee (while 
belonging to another deme) and 









Stephanus (Stephanus) Acts according to 
greed (aiskrokerdia), 
covetousness (pleonexia) and 
pride (ubrei) and resolve to make 













Theophemus (second sentence) The greediness 
of the man’s character in matter 






Alcimachus (third sentence) mirrors sentiment 
last time - the graspiness 
(pleonexia) of his disposition, 
when it is a question of more or 








 We drew up an agreement and 
made solemn oaths which stated 
that we would not try to take 















Timotheus You (Timoetheus) did not 
produce witnesses to testify that 
the timber was delivered;  …. you 
seek to rob us while enriching 
yourself (pleonektein) 
 






indefinite Jury men, do not allow the 
ambitions of those who are ready 
to lavish their money to be 
dependent upon the greed 













neighbor there is no greater nuisance than a 








the Rhodians they might have the advantage of 







the dead (the dead) checked all acts of 
pleonexia among the Greeks 
themselves, assigning themselves 
to each station where justice was 
arrayed ... 
 






 If those that have gained 
friendship with Macedon should 












The pleonexic context Associations 
1.81.10 
tas …pleonexias 
mercenaries who rebelled 







causing them to 







Gauls who raided Roman 
lands 
stasis broke out 
among the Gauls 
over the spoils 
from a successful 
















Aetolians - only 
Aetolians 
collectively 
















Aetolians driven by their 
pleonexia they 
will attack anyone 
for any reason - 
even those who 





Aetolians their pleonexia 
drives them to 
conquer as much 
as possible - 
beyond even the 
limits of Greece 
pleonexia 




















Aetolians because the 
Aetolians are poor 
they want stuff, 








beasts - theriōde 
(parallels with 




Dorimachus/Aetolians Dorimachus broke 
the truce, a youth 
full of the hatred 
and pleonexia 









Aetolians Aetolians pillage 
Messene 







contrary to “law 
of nations” - 
pleonexia leads 
to unjust actions 
4.87.4 
pleonexias 
Apelles/courtiers courtiers use 





Apelles Apelles soon 
would face 
consequences of 





children of aristocrats because of the 
wealth they grow 
up with, kids 
become corrupted, 
and aristocracy 










Cretans Cretans are 
opposite of 
everyone else - 
hold acquisition of 
money and power 
in high regards - 
no matter cost 
pleonexia is not 
disgraceful 
aiskhrokerdeian 
(also idea that 
everyone else 
























Cretans pleonexia causes 
constant civil 
disturbances 




general (hypothetical) when people are 
covetous in 
private and public 
actions unjust, 
then we may say 





Spartans while well 
behaving toward 
each other, the 
Spartans were 






Spartans Spartan pleonexia 






apo tōn mē 
kathēkontōn 
Romans In contrast to 
Carthage, in 
Rome to seek gain 
from improper 















general decline (Romans 
implied) 
internal decline in 
states caused 
when people 
attack those they 





through a men 
de construction); 










Phoenicians/Carthaginians civil unrest breaks 
out amongst the 
Carthaginians due 





to pleonektein  
speech of Lyciscus, envoy 







Romans Romans are safe 
when sacking 
camps because 
those left behind 
know they will 
receive a fair 




Antiochus and Philip V outrage at the 
treaty between 







Molpagoras of Cius description - good 
speaker, but 




definition of treachery allowing foreign 
garrisons into 
town in order to 
benefit individual 
























Pharnaces contrast between 
Eumenes 











Chaeron Chaeron an 
administrator of 
Sparta - about to 
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